A revolution in thought

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is not true LadyShea. Many determinists believe that the agent is part of the deterministic process. Look up naturalism.

Some determinists believe there is no agency. We call that hard determinism.

Are you now saying you recognize and agree that different people mean different things when they use the word determinism, and that there are different types of determinism, and so it is not as simple as you asserted?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am making it very simple because there's one determinism which includes the agent. I could easily come up with this type of determinism and that type of determinism, but when all is said and done, there is only one type.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I never said we have control over what we do.

Originally Posted by Lessans

no one can cause or compel you to do anything against your will — unless you want to, because over this you have mathematical control.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

The fact that no one can cause or compel you to do what you don't want to do" is not the same thing as being compelled to do everything you do. These are not contradictory and form the foundation for the two-sided equation. You have complete control over the former, but none over the latter.

Just because I cannot be made to do
something against my will does not mean my will is free because my
desire not to do it appeared the better reason, which gave me no free
choice since I got greater satisfaction. Nor does the expression, ‘I did
it of my own free will, nobody made me do it,’ mean that I actually
did it of my own free will — although I did it because I wanted to —
because my desire to do it appeared the better reason which gave me
no free choice since I got greater satisfaction.”

<snip>

To solve this problem of evil with the aid of our enigmatic corollary —
Thou Shall Not Blame — (for this seems mathematically impossible since
it appears that man will always desire something for which blame and
punishment will be necessary), it is extremely important to go through a
de-confusion process regarding words by employing the other scientific fact
revealed to you earlier. Consequently, as was pointed out, and to reveal
this relation, it is an absolutely undeniable observation that man does not
have to commit a crime or do anything to hurt another unless he wants to.

As history reveals, even the most severe tortures and the threat of death
cannot make him do to others what he makes up his mind not to do. He
is not caused or compelled against his will to hurt another by his
environment and heredity but prefers this action because at that moment
of time he derives greater satisfaction in his motion to there, which is a
normal compulsion of his nature over which he has absolutely no control.
Though it is a mathematical law that nothing can compel man to do to
another that which he makes up his mind not to do (this is an extremely
crucial point), he is nevertheless under a compulsion during every moment
of his existence to do everything he does. This reveals that he has
mathematical control over the former (you can lead a horse to water but
you can’t make him drink) but none over the latter because he must move
in the direction of greater satisfaction.

[But]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The fact that no one can cause or compel you to do what you don't want to do" is not the same thing as being compelled to do everything you do. These are not contradictory and form the foundation for the two-sided equation. You have complete control over the former, but none over the latter.

If you have control over what you want, and what you want causes what you do, then you have control over what you do.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is not true LadyShea. Many determinists believe that the agent is part of the deterministic process. Look up naturalism.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Some determinists believe there is no agency. We call that hard determinism.

Regardless, the word determinism means that there is no other way something could have turned out. It can be broken down in different sub-categories, but that's the general meaning of the term.

de·ter·min·ism (d -tûr m -n z m). n
1. (Philosophy) the philosophical doctrine that all events including human actions and choices are fully determined by preceding events and states of affairs, and so that freedom of choice is illusory Also called necessitarianism Compare free will [1b]
2. (Philosophy) the scientific doctrine that all occurrences in nature take place in accordance with natural laws

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Are you now saying you recognize and agree that different people mean different things when they use the word determinism, and that there are different types of determinism, and so it is not as simple as you asserted?

We are working toward a definition that is useful because it is reflects the real world. Without an agent no one can feel responsibility because he could say he did not perform the action. In the new world this excuse would be similar to someone saying he couldn't help himself because his will is not free, but these excuses can only be offered in a free will environment where someone is questioning his conduct. When no one is blaming him or holding him responsible, these type excuses would never be permitted by conscience.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by But

If you have control over what you want, and what you want causes what you do, then you have control over what you do.

You have complete control over what you don't want because no one can make you do something against your will, but you have no control over what you do want because this is determined by the choice that is most preferable, which your desire is forced to take. No one is exempt from this law of our nature.

[But]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You have complete control over what you don't want because no one can make you do something you don't want to do, but you have absolutely no control over what you do want. What you do want is always determined by the choice that is most preferable, which desire is forced to take. No one is exempt from this law of our nature.

If you have complete control over what you don't want, you have complete control over what you want. It's just the exact opposite of what you don't want.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by But

If you have complete control over what you don't want, you have complete control over what you want. It's just the exact opposite of what you don't want.

It does not mean the same thing, but in either case whether it's not to do something, or to do something, you are moving in the direction of greater satisfaction. I already posted this, but I'll post it again because it's important to understand.

Just because I cannot be made to do
something against my will does not mean my will is free because my
desire not to do it appeared the better reason, which gave me no free
choice since I got greater satisfaction. Nor does the expression, ‘I did
it of my own free will, nobody made me do it,’ mean that I actually
did it of my own free will — although I did it because I wanted to —
because my desire to do it appeared the better reason which gave me
no free choice since I got greater satisfaction.”

[But]

You ignored what I wrote. It's logically impossible to have complete control over what you don't want and yet have absolutely no control over what you do want.

[Vivisectus]

Hang on - do the books not state that things of the mind are not of the material world?

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

At no point in this entire post have you managed to address the objection I have been raising. At no point do you demonstrate any actual understanding of what that objection even is. It's like you're just reading from a prepared script without paying any attention to what I wrote.

You have a potential excuse and a potential justification. And you have two contexts in which they are each to be considered. The potential excuse is that people are only moving in the direction of their greater satisfaction as they are allegedly compelled to do. The potential justification is that people cannot be compelled to do something they do not want to do. The first context is that of considering one's own future act of harming another when one will not be blamed by anyone else. The second context is that of considering another person's future actions when they act in a way that harms another person.

You say that the potential excuse works against blame (towards others) in the second context but does not work in the first context against conscience. You say that the potential justification works to maintain a guilty conscience in the first context, but does not work to justify blaming others in the second context. But you can't support or justify either of these claims.

It is this completely arbitrary refusal to consider the potential excuse and the potential justification in BOTH contexts that I am objecting to. If other people are not to be blamed because they were only moving as they are compelled to in their direction of greater satisfaction, then I must judge that what they did was not bad and they should not feel bad about it (for if I don't think this, then I will seek to blame them for doing something bad that they should feel bad about). But then when I consider myself doing the same harmful action that I cannot blame others for, I will have to recognize that the same applies to me - what I did was also not something bad that I should feel bad about, because I was likewise only moving as I am compelled to do, in my direction of greater satisfaction. Hence, if this potential excuse works against blaming others, then it will be equally effective in relieving any possibility of a guilty conscience. And if it fails to serve as an excuse for my conscience, then it will equally fail to convince me that I should not blame others - for if I still see myself as worthy of a guilty conscience for performing a harmful action, then if I am consistent I must also see others as worthy of blame for performing the same action.

Likewise - and on the other side of the non-equation - if I am to feel guilty in imagining myself performing a harmful action because I know that nothing could have compelled me to do it if I didn't want to, then I must be judging that I have done something bad that I should feel bad about - despite knowing I was only moving in the direction of greater satisfaction as I am compelled to do. If I think this, then to be consistent I must also view any other people performing the same action as doing something bad that they should feel bad about. And this is all I need to be justified in blaming them.

Look at it this way: Imagine yourself behind Rawls' famous veil of ignorance. Someone has just performed a harmful action, but you don't know whether or not that person is you. The person was compelled to move in their direction of greater satisfaction, but it was also impossible for them to be compelled to do anything they did not want to do. Has that person done anything bad that they should feel bad about? Yes, or No?

Lessans has it that if the person is not you, then they cannot be blamed, and so must be judged as not having done anything bad that they should feel bad about. He also has it that if the person is you, then you will have a guilty conscience, and must be judged (by you) as having done something bad that they should feel bad about. But this is massively inconsistent with the most fundamental aspect of moral judgment - that such judgments should not depend on who the actor is, i.e. merely upon whether it is you or someone else performing the action.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You can certainly use the term 'causal necessity', but you don't get to assert that it is inconsistent with 'free will' without specifying which kind of free will you mean. It is inconsistent with contra-causal/libertarian free will, but it is not at all inconsistent with compatibilist free will.

One can be free in the compatibilist sense without being free from causal determination, and this kind of freedom is therefore perfectly compatible with determinism.

I already answered this repeatedly. We can be blamed because in relevantly similar situations with slightly different antecedent causal conditions we could have chosen otherwise, meaning blame in this situation is justified by the fact that it will be able to influence future behaviour. And you are changing the topic. You just asserted in your last post (and in this one) that compatibilist freedom is not compatible with determinism. That is obviously false, and I just gave you the definitions of both so you could show me this alleged incompatibility. But instead of doing so you have avoided the point, and repeated your false claim.

I never said you could have causal determinism without causal determination. Obviously that is not the case. What you can have is causal determination (in a given individual case) without having causal determinism (the thesis of universal causal determination).

Your position is the opposite of reasoned. Of course the compatibilists' notion of freedom is watered down in the sense of being less strong than the libertarian contra-causal notion. But this is no grounds for objection. You have to show not only that this sense of freedom is weaker, but that it is too weak to justify blame and punishment. Simply pointing out that it is 'watered down' is to object against compatibilists for not contradicting themselves, as they would be if they retained the same strength of freedom when arguing for its compatibility with determinism.

Just once it would be nice if you could manage to properly read and comprehend what you were replying to. There are TWO senses in which one 'could have chosen otherwise'. The first is the ability to choose differently given the exact same causal scenario. This kind does not need proving because it is not the kind of ability that compatibilists say we have. The second is the ability to choose differently in relevantly similar situations with slightly different antecedent causal conditions. This kind also does not need proving, because it is trivially obvious that different initial causes can lead to different resulting effects. So I am not trying to weasel out of proving my point (as you consistently do yourself), but simply pointing out that when you distinguish between these two different senses, you are either asking me to prove something I am not claiming, or asking me to prove something that is obviously and trivially correct.

You are delusional and I can prove it. Quote for me this alleged contradiction you think you have have shown me. I guarantee you will not be able to, for you have never shown any such thing. Go ahead and try.

That he could not have chosen differently in the exact same causal situation is not at all relevant to blameworthiness, and I've already explained why. If all antecedent causal conditions - including all of my beliefs, desires, memories, values, and goals - could be held the same, without thereby determining whether I will do X or not do X, then my choice of action is not up to me - and blame will therefore be pointless, for in a future similar situation my memory of being blamed will just be another of these antecedent causal factors, which again will jointly fail to determine the course of my action. So the ability to choose differently in a contra-causal sense is not relevant to blameworthiness at all. What matters for the effectiveness and therefore justifiability of blame, is instead whether one could have chosen differently in slightly different but relevantly similar causal scenarios.

Punishment or the threat of it does not always have to be an effective deterrent. I am not claiming that. My point is rather that if blame was never effective in affecting future behaviour, then it would not be justified at all, and that blame is therefore justified to the extent that it can affect future behaviour. This is why what matters is not what would be causally possible in the exact same situation, but rather what is causally possible in slightly different but relevantly similar situations. And I'm afraid your father did too make a big fat assumption about conscience. You've just repeated it here for me, so I don't even need to tell you what it was.

I can call it free in the compatibilist sense of the word, because being caused does not prevent one from being free in this sense. Your use of the word 'programmed' supports my point. If someone has been programmed to do X given input Y, then they will always do X in any causal scenario that meets the specification of input Y regardless of any other causal influences or variations in antecedent circumstances. This is not the case with merely being causally determined in one's choice. And please don't quote entire articles at me. If you have a point to make, then either quote the relevant paragraph, or put it in your own words.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[thedoc]

Damn it, struts are even more expensive than shocks.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

Hang on - do the books not state that things of the mind are not of the material world?

That would be Lessans and Peacegirls minds, there is nothing there that relates to the material world, just a Fantasy Island. That's just south of Ignore Island.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by But

You ignored what I wrote. It's logically impossible to have complete control over what you don't want and yet have absolutely no control over what you do want.

You have control to the degree that no one can make you do what you choose not to do.

[But]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You have control to the degree that no one can make you do what you choose not to do.

Can someone make you do what you choose to do?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I think you've been feeding your obsessive delusions by making up whatever nonsense you have to in order to avoid the points being raised and still continue posting.

No you haven't. You've just repeatedly asserted that our definitions are a bunch of strung together words so as to avoid addressing the arguments made which employ them. You reject definitions purely because you do not like what they can be used to show.

I can and have done. His work was not scientific because he did not employ the methodology of science. At best he wrote (very bad) philosophy and speculative psychology.

I think his most conspicuous example of poor reasoning (efferent vision aside) bears repeating: He argues that we will anticipate a guilty conscience because we know we cannot be compelled to do anything we do not want to do, and that we can never be blamed because we are compelled to always move in the direction of greater satisfaction. Yet he completely overlooks the obvious objection that one could just as easily say the opposite - that we will not anticipate a guilty conscience because we will know that we are compelled to always move in the direction of greater satisfaction, and we will be able to blame others because we know they cannot be compelled to do anything they do not want to do.

I don't feel like answering your posts. You are patronizing me and I don't like the fact that you call Lessans' claims big fat assumptions. Your reasoning is not accurate, but you will not see it nor will you consider that you could be wrong. I am on the side of those who see the incompatibility of free will and determinism. The free will that you speak so highly of is an attempt to make it appear compatible, but in reality it's not. I don't feel like arguing with you because you believe your position justifies blameworthiness, and I don't think you've proven your case at all.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't feel like answering your posts. You are patronizing me and I don't like the fact that you call Lessans' claims big fat assumptions. Your reasoning is not accurate, but you will not see it nor will you consider that you could be wrong. I am on the side of those who see the incompatibility of free will and determinism. The free will that you speak so highly of is an attempt to make it appear compatible, but in reality it's not. I don't feel like arguing with you because you believe your position justifies blameworthiness, and I don't think you've proven your case at all.

Of course you don't feel like answering my posts. You always avoid them because you have nothing rational at all to say in response. Yet again you are withdrawing from rational discussion and failing to address criticism of your and your father's claims.

If you don't like Lessans' claims about conscience being described as assumptions, then you need to provide support for them. Until you do, they remain assumptions.

I am quite willing to consider that I may be wrong, but I won't believe that my reasoning is not accurate until you can tell me where and why it is inaccurate.

If you think you can see an incompatibility between compatibilist freedom and determinism then you are obviously and trivially wrong, and you have never shown any such thing.

If you think I haven't made my case for the compatibilist justification of blameworthiness, then you need to address my arguments and show where they are wrong.

But you can't and won't do any of these things. So you will instead as always just retreat behind your wall of faith and keep repeating the same things you always do, despite having failed to show any flaw in compatibilism whatsoever. You have lost your 'dual'. What's your next evasive change of topic going to be? You refuse to discuss light and vision. Your refuse to discuss conscience. You refuse to discuss the secret 10th chapter. And now you are refusing to discuss free will and compatibilism any further. What's left?

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I was not being sarcastic, so why are you?

Because it pleases me to do so.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I never implied that it was not possible to fly on an airplane with only two engines. Your response missed the point entirely.

No, you. You used the airplane example in response to my question about why you think that we can't blame someone for doing something when they could not possibly have done otherwise. Since, as you admit, it is possible to choose to fly on the two engine plane rather than the four engine plane your example fails as a response to my question.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am not arguing with that. I'm not even arguing that even under risky conditions you might still want to go with the cheaper fare in the direction of greater satisfaction. I can't judge what your preference will be, and the reasons for those preferences. The point I'm making is that whatever your preference is, it is in the direction of greater satisfaction. That being said, most people would prefer to fly on a plane that has the best chances of reaching shore. If they thought for one second that flying on a two seater propeller plane was extremely risky in comparison to flying on a commercial jet across the ocean, most would prefer the commercial jet with four engines.

The only reason you will find it more preferable to agree not to blame (and become a citizen of the new world) is because you believe it is in your best interest. If you don't, then you don't have to sign the agreement, but how can you not want to sign the agreement when science establishes that in doing so we can create a better world for all. But regardless, we are leaving it to your choice. There is no force at all in this process.

The choice is always there, but once you understand that no blame is better than blame, you will find greater satisfaction in not blaming. But if you want to blame, go ahead, and if you want to lie by signing the agreement not to blame so you can get the guarantee, go ahead. We won't blame you if hurt us in our effort to transition to the new world. The more power to you if you can.

In other words, you are retracting your claim that we can't blame someone for doing something when they could not have done otherwise and replacing it with the claim that most people would not choose to blame someone for doing something when they could not have otherwise. That is a much weaker claim. Thank you for the retraction. I'm glad we got that settled.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are not excused by conscience. In the new world you can do anything you want. If you want to steal, people's doors are going to be unlocked so all you have to do is take what you want. You will not be blamed even if you steal all of someone's belongings while he is watching. See if you can do it.

Being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction cannot be used as an excuse when you are already excused. As Lessans stated: “This proves conclusively that the only time man can say, “I couldn’t help myself because my will is not free,” or offer any other kind of excuse, is if someone said he could help himself or blamed him in any way so he could make this effort to shift his responsibility." Why would you attempt to offer an excuse when no one is holding you reponsible? We are not going to judge you at all, wrong or right.

But that's just the point; you can't do something morally wrong because you cannot excuse what you are about to do without advance justification, and you are denied the advance justification when all blame is removed.

Don't you think I know that Spacemonkey? I've only been trying to clarify this for two days now.

But you are assuming that you will still be able to cause this harm under the changed conditions, which is the very thing that is prevented. And other people are also prevented from causing this harm once all blame is removed from the environment. That is the two-sided equation, and you haven't understood it yet.

Again, you are assuming that people are going to do those things that justify this blame. But if by removing the blame, they are prevented from doing those things that hurt others, there is no need for blame. You are putting the cart before the horse.

No, it is you who is missing the most important aspect of this equation. If you cannot justify your actions, your conscience will not allow you to hurt others. When you know you are going to be forgiven for whatever you do, because no one is going to judge what you do, right or wrong, you cannot find the justification you need in order to follow through with your contemplated actions that could harm another. You cannot move in this direction for greater satisfaction. It's a psychological law of man's nature that conscience will not allow. And please stop calling this a non-equation.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

At no point in this entire post have you managed to address the objection I have been raising. At no point do you demonstrate any actual understanding of what that objection even is. It's like you're just reading from a prepared script without paying any attention to what I wrote.

I understand your objection. Stop patronizing me.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You have a potential excuse and a potential justification.

You have no potential excuse and no potential justification. You're lost.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

And you have two contexts in which they are each to be considered. The potential excuse is that people are only moving in the direction of their greater satisfaction as they are allegedly compelled to do.

You can't use this as an excuse. This is what you're not getting and you're not going to tell me that I'm wrong and you're right because Spacemonkey says so.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

The potential justification is that people cannot be compelled to do something they do not want to do.

The potential excuse works against blame? What potential excuse? And what excuse doesn't work in the first context against conscience? You're confused.

What potential justification works to maintain a guilty conscience? Give me specific examples because I can't even follow your reasoning in terms of this equation. We don't blame others because will is not free. This gobbledegook you are putting forth in your defense for compatibilism is a logical nightmare.

There are no excuses or justifications in either context that you can object to if determinism is true (which it is).

No Spacemonkey. You are putting the cart before the horse again. If someone hurts me, I am entitled to feel bad, but this law prevents someone from hurting me so I don't have to feel bad.

You do not understand the most important aspect of this knowledge. If I am prevented from hurting you, then you don't have to retaliate, which would be justified.

This is not a potential excuse against blaming others. It's a logical result of knowing the true nature of man. It does not relieve any possibility of a guilty conscience, it does the exact opposite. This shows me, once again, how utterly confused you are.

No Spacemonkey. The potential for a guilty conscience due to a hurtful action not yet performed is what prevents the action from being performed, but this in no way means that we judge others as worthy of blame when man's will is not free. The potential to feel guilty for hurting someone is not about blameworthiness; it is about using one's conscience to prevent that which we would feel guilty about. That is the function of conscience. It is that small whisper that lets us know when we are about to do something that could lead to someone getting hurt.

If you say that this is a non-discovery or a non-equation again, I'm not going to converse with you anymore.

Your reasoning is so convoluted, I am not going to even try to disentangle it.

How would you not know if the person was you? You are so confused I'm not going to continue answering you with this strange logic you think is sound reasoning.

Lessans has it that if the person is not you, then they cannot be blamed, and so must be judged as not having done anything bad that they should feel bad about.

That is not what he is saying.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

He also has it that if the person is you, then you will have a guilty conscience, and must be judged (by you) as having done something bad that they should feel bad about. But this is massively inconsistent with the most fundamental aspect of moral judgment - that such judgments should not depend on who the actor is, i.e. merely upon whether it is you or someone else performing the action.

You've lost the equation completely. How can someone have a guilty conscience if they never perform an action that justifies this feeling of guilt? Is it possible? Answer yes or no.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by But

Can someone make you do what you choose to do?

No?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

Because it pleases me to do so.

No, you. You used the airplane example in response to my question about why you think that we can't blame someone for doing something when they could not possibly have done otherwise. Since, as you admit, it is possible to choose to fly on the two engine plane rather than the four engine plane your example fails as a response to my question.

In other words, you are retracting your claim that we can't blame someone for doing something when they could not have done otherwise and replacing it with the claim that most people would not choose to blame someone for doing something when they could not have otherwise. That is a much weaker claim. Thank you for the retraction. I'm glad we got that settled.

You still don't seem to understand that only when you see the benefit to yourself will you desire to sign the agreement not to blame anyone for anything. If by not blaming you see a great benefit to yourself, you will join the ranks of those who have already become citizens. Very few people would not want to become part of this new world because it will be so much better than what we have now. But if someone doesn't want to become a citizen, he won't have to. This will not stop the momentum of this new world which must come about because it is God's will or the laws of our nature that give us no choice. It is being taken out of our hands.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How can someone have a guilty conscience if they never perform an action that justifies this feeling of guilt? Is it possible? Answer yes or no.

Yes or No.