A revolution in thought

[koan]

Yep. That sums it up pretty well. "Goddammit! If the Earth isn't flat then I can claim anything I damn well want because non-believers are Earth flatteners! Eat my scientifical language assassinating dick." (Or dick in a box: which is much more suspenseful and entertaining though it might land you in pre-enlightened jail.)

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

LOL at Lady Shea trumping peacegirl's Dr. Phil with a Dr. Ruth.

I wonder who was on top?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I get to use a term in the way it is normally defined Spacemonkey.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You can use your words in any way that you like, but if you insist on defining a term differently to how it is being used by those you are arguing against, then you will be arguing against a strawman instead of the view they are actually expressing.

That's why it's important to agree that we're using the same definition. That has been a big problem.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't insist you do anything at all. Do what you want, and define terms any way that you want, but you won't get any closer to the truth. Non-causal compulsion is an oxymoron.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Here you make a valid point. "Non-causal compulsion" was a very poor choice of words on my part. Obviously all compulsion will be causal. The point of the distinction I was making is that some (of what you wish to call) compulsion is merely causal, while there is also a stronger form of compulsion which involves a strong and experienced psychological impulse towards a certain action that one feels unable to act against.

My question is why are you making a false distinction between "merely causal" and the the kind of compulsion which you claim involves a stronger impulse leading towards a certain action that one feels unable to act against? Lessans shows clearly that when push comes to shove, a person with a strong compulsion to do something could easily give up that compulsion if the alternative was worse. If he knew that by doing something that he felt compelled to do was going to kill his family, he would be able to control that compulsion. And what do you mean by an experienced psychological compulsion? Are you talking about an ingrained habit?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Consider a drug addict choosing to inject himself (or you choosing to continue posting here). There is a strong and experienced psychological compulsion which involves more than merely being caused to choose as one does. It is a causal influence which overrides all other causal factors, rendering the final choice largely immune from influence by changes in any other antecedent circumstances.

I don't have to be here; I am not psychologically compelled to be here whereby other causal influences would not be able to alter my choice to do something else if something better came along. I am not immune from influence by changes in any other antecendent circumstance; in fact, I'm looking forward to other opportunites to share this knowledge, and when they present themselves I will be compelled to move on in the direction of greater satisfaction. That's what I mean when I say compibilibism is falsely distinguishing between certain actions just because the impulse is stronger than other impulses. What they are contending is that some actions cannot be controlled where other actions can. That's false. Of course it's harder to be influenced by antecedent circumstances when a particular behavior is ingrained or strongly desired, but it doesn't mean a person cannot change. On the other hand, it is easier to alter one's choice when the compulsion isn't as strong, but that doesn't change the direction we are compelled to move because we are compelled to choose the option that we find the most preferential given a particular set of options and given our particular circumstances.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

A causally determined choice need not involve any such experienced psychological compulsion. I can be caused to choose toast over cereal for breakfast without feeling compelled to choose one over the other. The choice is still rigid in the sense that given those exact antecedent circumstances I would always have chosen the same. But it is not rigid in the stronger sense involved in the kind of compulsion compatibilists speak of.

But don't you see, there's no difference except in degree which changes nothing insofar as our choices being determined? The separation between degrees of compulsion does not suddently give someone free will. This definition does not reflect what is actually going on in reality, therefore it's not useful. You have to be able to let go of this theory (even temporarily) so you can follow the reasoning that Lessans puts forth, if you want to ever grasp the two-sided equation.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

In this case the choice is rigid across not only the actual antecedent circumstances, but also a wide range of counterfactually differing circumstances. The drug addict will still inject himself even if offered a great deal not to do so, or if the consequences are known to be very bad. Differing antecedent circumstances will not be likely to result in a different choice given this kind of compulsion.

That is true only because there are strong emotional and physical factors involved, and all of the incentives to change does not equal the benefit from injecting the drug, even though he knows it's not in his best interest in the long run. The physical high, the dependence on the drug, the comparison of being high to the low he feels when he's straight, overrides anything that offers something better, because it's not better in his set of circumstances. But if he knew his child whom he loves would be killed if he doesn't stop, the choice that is before him has now changed dramatically, and when faced with this possibility, he doesn't care about the high or even the withdrawal symptoms he will experience because the very thought of losing his child is so terrible to contemplate that he suddenly develops the strength to overcome his drug problem.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Compatibilism says that freedom from coercion and this stronger sense of compulsion is all that is required to make us morally responsible beings that can be justly praised or blamed for our actions. It says that merely being caused to choose as one does (regardless of whether or not you wish to also call this 'compulsion') does not prevent us from being morally responsible beings that can be justly praised or blamed for our actions.

But that's making a false distinction. Determinism means that every single action is caused so you cannot say that one behavior is blameworthy and one isn't, depending on the intensity of the compulsion.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is no such thing as compatibilist freedom, as if this is different from the standard usage of the word. You cannot give your sacred belief a free pass because you don't want it to be wrong. If compatibilist freedom requires only freedom from coercion, you still are left with the standard definition of free will. If compatibilist freedom requires freedom from compulsion, you also still left with the standard definition of free will because "compulsion" means "compelled". If one is compelled, he does not have a free choice.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

There is a compatibilist notion of freedom which differs from the contra-causal variety. I have defined it for you, and will do so again. And contra-causal/libertarian free will is not the 'standard usage'. Plus you are still equivocating between different senses of compulsion.

Compatibilist free will: The freedom to choose without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion which renders a choice highly resistant to variation in antecent causal conditions (i.e. no 'compulsion' beyond mere causal determination), and without coercion, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices.

Contra-causal/Libertarian free will: The freedom to choose without compulsion, coercion, or causal necessity, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices, i.e. such that with exactly the same antecedent causal conditions, one could have chosen otherwise.

Compatibilism says that the former is sufficient, and the latter is unnecessary, for making us morally responsible beings that can be justly praised or blamed for our actions. And you still have no argument or rational objection against it.

I'm not going to continue the discussion because the disrespect in here is hard to take, but I feel compelled to point out to you that I do have a rational basis for my argument, even though you are highly resistant and I don't know whether you will allow yourself to see what I see so clearly: compatabilism is wrong. There is no free will, and the definitions that try to make it appear as if one can be praised or blamed for their actions, is a smokescreen because philosophers could never get beyond the implications of "determinism".

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Compatibilist free will: The freedom to choose without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion which renders a choice highly resistant to variation in antecent causal conditions (i.e. no 'compulsion' beyond mere causal determination), and without coercion, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices.

You can't make exceptions Spacemonkey for certain types of actions which you believe renders someone blameworthy. It doesn't add up. You can't have some compulsions that are worthy of blame and some that aren't, unless you're trying to make a definition work artificially. How can one be determined by "antecedent causal conditions, on the one hand, and not be determined by "antecedent causal conditions, on the other, just because there's more resistance due to the kind of compulsion that you are distinguishing from other compulsions. We're compelled to do what we do based on antecedent events no matter how strong or weak the compulsion appears to be.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

LOL at Lady Shea trumping peacegirl's Dr. Phil with a Dr. Ruth.

Dr. Ruth is an actual academic, and an all around badass. I her.

[Dragar]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Dr. Ruth is an actual academic, and an all around badass. I her.

While dating a girl, I once brought up a a barely remembered line of a poem relevent to the conversation topic. She, being a graduate student of literature, corrected my quotation and managed to recite all three stanzas.

Very, very sexy.

It's crazy someone could imagine that physical attraction is all there is - but I guess crazy is the theme of this thread.

[LadyShea]

An experienced psychological compulsion, as Spacemonkey is using it, is one that defies all logic, and defies contemplation, and pushes the person to act on it even if they do not want to.

Lessans said nothing could make one do what they don't want to do. He was wrong. Those who suffer compulsions are made to act in ways they do not want to. Someone with OCD does not want to scrub their hands until they bleed, or check that the door is locked 45 times before they can go to sleep, but they experience (actually consciously recognize) an overwhelming need to do so against their conscious wishes.

Being merely causally compelled isn't an experience like that. You don't consciously tell yourself "I HATE toast, I do not want to eat toast" but find yourself making and eating toast, possibly crying while doing so at your inability to contemplate and affect your actions to be in accordance with your desires, to alleviate an overwhelming fear of not doing so.

In those cases of experienced compulsion, it may not be toast but rather they are compelled to eat dirt, or eat hair. Have you ever experienced a compulsion to pull your hair out and eat it, peacegirl, because you felt that if you didn't do this you would die? Would you feel that is the same sort of compulsion as you experience eating a piece of toast?

Addictions also have this kind of experienced compulsive component in many cases.

The ability to contemplate our needs and desires and act in accordance with our needs and desires (including the ability to not act when we do not want to) is a type of freedom, and that freedom is all that is required to be held responsible for our actions according to compatibilists.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by Dragar

While dating a girl, I once brought up a a barely remembered line of a poem relevent to the conversation topic. She, being a graduate student of literature, corrected my quotation and managed to recite all three stanzas.

Very, very sexy.

It's crazy someone could imagine that physical attraction is all there is - but I guess crazy is the theme of this thread.

I find competence very sexy. Like watching someone do something they are very good at, and enjoy doing, is very attractive.

Watching my husband playing drums is a total aphrodisiac. It's so effortless for him, and he is totally lost in the music. Beautiful to see.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Watching my husband playing drums is a total aphrodisiac. It's so effortless for him, and he is totally lost in the music. Beautiful to see.

This reminds me of my first date with my wife. We met in a laundramat, she was having trouble with the machines and I helped her, we started chatting, and exchanged phone numbers. About 2 weeks later I called her and we went out. First roller skating, then to a lounge to listen to one of my favorite road bands. When the band took a break we walked around the hotel and under a staircase we found a piano and we sat on the bench. I played the 1st movement of Beethoven's 'Moonlight Sonata' And she just told me she was thinking "He's a keeper". That was 36 years ago, it's been good. I think what really helps is that I make her laugh.

[Dragar]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I find competence very sexy.

This was, almost word for word, my response.

[LadyShea]

Wow, so all of us are totally abnormal in the degree to which personality influences our relationships?

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Watching my husband playing drums is a total aphrodisiac. It's so effortless for him, and he is totally lost in the music. Beautiful to see.

If you or your husband haven't done it yet, go onto 'youtube and look up Cozy Cole and 'Topsy'.

Cozy Cole - Topsy Part I and Part II - YouTube

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's why it's important to agree that we're using the same definition. That has been a big problem.

A problem you keep creating, by trying to use definitions other than those I have carefully presented, thereby arguing against a strawman rather than the actual compatibilist position.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

My question is why are you making a false distinction between "merely causal" and the the kind of compulsion which you claim involves a stronger impulse leading towards a certain action that one feels unable to act against? Lessans shows clearly that when push comes to shove, a person with a strong compulsion to do something could easily give up that compulsion if the alternative was worse. If he knew that by doing something that he felt compelled to do was going to kill his family, he would be able to control that compulsion. And what do you mean by an experienced psychological compulsion? Are you talking about an ingrained habit?

I am not making a false distinction. I am making an entirely legitimate distinction between mere causal determination and experienced psychological compulsion. If you think it is a false distinction then you need to raise some objection against it. Lessans did not show any such thing, and a strong compulsion is by definition something that cannot be easily given up, even in the face of worse alternatives. It doesn't matter whether or not it can be overcome in the face of really terrible consequences - the point is simply that this is a different kind of 'compulsion' to merely being caused, and that this difference is not merely one of degree or strength. And no, I am not talking about an ingrained habit. An experienced psychological compulsion is simply one that is manifested in one's conscious experience - something one feels. Merely being caused need not be a 'compulsion' of this type at all.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't have to be here; I am not psychologically compelled to be here whereby other causal influences would not be able to alter my choice to do something else if something better came along. I am not immune from influence by changes in any other antecendent circumstance; in fact, I'm looking forward to other opportunites to share this knowledge, and when they present themselves I will be compelled to move on in the direction of greater satisfaction. That's what I mean when I say compibilibism is falsely distinguishing between certain actions just because the impulse is stronger than other impulses. What they are contending is that some actions cannot be controlled where other actions can. That's false. Of course it's harder to be influenced by antecedent circumstances when a particular behavior is ingrained or strongly desired, but it doesn't mean a person cannot change. On the other hand, it is easier to alter one's choice when the compulsion isn't as strong, but that doesn't change the direction we are compelled to move because we are compelled to choose the option that we find the most preferential given a particular set of options and given our particular circumstances.

None of this is relevant to my point. You certainly are compelled to be here in the sense I described, as your choice to stay is highly resistant to the kinds of negative causal influences which would normally lead someone to leave. But again, this is not relevant to my point, and was merely an example. The distinction I am making is not merely a matter of some impulses being stronger than others. The kind of psychological compulsion I have been talking about certainly is a matter of degree - a compelled choice can be more or less resistant to changes in antecedent causal factors. But the difference between this kind of compulsion and causal determination is not merely one of degree. Being caused does not imply any experienced compulsion at all. It does not imply any resistance to changes in antecedent causal conditions. The distinction I am making is not one of degree. And the compulsion you speak of in terms of being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction is not something that is always felt or experienced, so it is not an example of the kind of compulsion I am talking about. It is therefore irrelevant to my point, for it is not something that compatibilism says we must be free of in order to be responsible beings who can be fairly blamed.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But don't you see, there's no difference except in degree which changes nothing insofar as our choices being determined? The separation between degrees of compulsion does not suddently give someone free will. This definition does not reflect what is actually going on in reality, therefore it's not useful. You have to be able to let go of this theory (even temporarily) so you can follow the reasoning that Lessans puts forth, if you want to ever grasp the two-sided equation.

No, I don't see that, for it is not true at all. The distinction I have carefully explained to you is not one of degree. I am not distinguishing between degrees of compulsion, but rather between types of compulsion. I spoke of a "stronger sense" of compulsion, not a "stronger compulsion". And you are again resulting to sloganeering apparently as a result of not having understood anything I said.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is true only because there are strong emotional and physical factors involved, and all of the incentives to change does not equal the benefit from injecting the drug, even though he knows it's not in his best interest in the long run. The physical high, the dependence on the drug, the comparison of being high to the low he feels when he's straight, overrides anything that offers something better, because it's not better in his set of circumstances. But if he knew his child whom he loves would be killed if he doesn't stop, the choice that is before him has now changed dramatically, and when faced with this possibility, he doesn't care about the high or even the withdrawal symptoms he will experience because the very thought of losing his child is so terrible to contemplate that he suddenly develops the strength to overcome his drug problem.

Again, it is completely irrelevant to my point whether or not the kind of compulsion I am talking about can be overcome. The point is simply that it is a different kind of compulsion to merely being caused. Being caused merely requires the choice to be the same given the exact same antecedent causal conditions. Being compelled (in my sense) requires in addition to this that the choice will also be the same given significant changes in those antecedent causal conditions. This is not merely a difference in the degree of compulsion.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But that's making a false distinction. Determinism means that every single action is caused so you cannot say that one behavior is blameworthy and one isn't, depending on the intensity of the compulsion.

That's not what I'm saying at all. The degree of intensity is not the issue. I am saying that an action's being caused does not mean that it was compelled in the sense of being in any degree immune to changes in antecedent conditions, and that only the latter is a threat to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. Being caused is no threat to blameworthiness at all.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm not going to continue the discussion because the disrespect in here is hard to take, but I feel compelled to point out to you that I do have a rational basis for my argument, even though you are highly resistant and I don't know whether you will allow yourself to see what I see so clearly: compatabilism is wrong. There is no free will, and the definitions that try to make it appear as if one can be praised or blamed for their actions, is a smokescreen because philosophers could never get beyond the implications of "determinism".

You already have continued the discussion, merely by replying to my post. I am continuing it by pointing out your mistakes and misunderstandings. Unless you are compelled in the sense I have been explaining, you are free to leave the discussion whenever you like. If you have a rational basis for your position then I would like to know what it is. In this post you have merely misunderstood my position by thinking that my distinction is one of degree when it is not, and in this part of your post you have simply asserted once more your conclusion that compatibilism is wrong. This is not a rational basis. It isn't even a basis.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You can't make exceptions Spacemonkey for certain types of actions which you believe renders someone blameworthy. It doesn't add up. You can't have some compulsions that are worthy of blame and some that aren't, unless you're trying to make a definition work artificially. How can one be determined by "antecedent causal conditions, on the one hand, and not be determined by "antecedent causal conditions, on the other, just because there's more resistance due to the kind of compulsion that you are distinguishing from other compulsions. We're compelled to do what we do based on antecedent events no matter how strong or weak the compulsion appears to be.

Again, the distinction is not a matter of how strong or weak the compulsion appears to be. And I most certainly can have some 'compulsions' that affect blameworthiness and some that do not. That is precisely the point of the distinction I have been making. Yet I never said anything about being both determined by antecedent causes on the one hand and not being so determined on the other. Where did that bit of nonsense come from? You still haven't properly understood or addressed compatibilism, or provided any rational basis for your rejection of it.

Compatibilist free will: The freedom to choose without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion which renders a choice highly resistant to variation in antecent causal conditions (i.e. no 'compulsion' beyond mere causal determination), and without coercion, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices.

Contra-causal/Libertarian free will: The freedom to choose without compulsion, coercion, or causal necessity, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices, i.e. such that with exactly the same antecedent causal conditions, one could have chosen otherwise.

Compatibilism says that the former is sufficient, and the latter is unnecessary, for making us morally responsible beings that can be justly praised or blamed for our actions. And you still have no argument or rational objection against it.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[But]

Originally Posted by Dragar

While dating a girl, I once brought up a a barely remembered line of a poem relevent to the conversation topic. She, being a graduate student of literature, corrected my quotation and managed to recite all three stanzas.

Very, very sexy.

It's crazy someone could imagine that physical attraction is all there is - but I guess crazy is the theme of this thread.

What a crazy thing to say for a physicist!

Or are you using attraction in a more general sense than that, like some people do with a term like "energy", for example?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by thedoc

I wonder who was on top?

Who is Dr. Ruth? She wouldn't happen to be the sex therapist on t.v.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Are you hallucinating now? Where was this vote of support?

I thought I saw one vote. LadyShea mentioned that there was one.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's why it's important to agree that we're using the same definition. That has been a big problem.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

A problem you keep creating, by trying to use definitions other than those I have carefully presented, thereby arguing against a strawman rather than the actual compatibilist position.

I am creating no problem that you yourself aren't doing all by yourself. I understand the definitions you have given. I'm not using them in any other way than what you presented, therefore, I am arguing against the actual compatibilist position, and it's still wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

My question is why are you making a false distinction between "merely causal" and the the kind of compulsion which you claim involves a stronger impulse leading towards a certain action that one feels unable to act against? Lessans shows clearly that when push comes to shove, a person with a strong compulsion to do something could easily give up that compulsion if the alternative was worse. If he knew that by doing something that he felt compelled to do was going to kill his family, he would be able to control that compulsion. And what do you mean by an experienced psychological compulsion? Are you talking about an ingrained habit?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I am not making a false distinction. I am making an entirely legitimate distinction between mere causal determination and experienced psychological compulsion.

That's exactly what you're doing. What do you mean by "mere" causal determination?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If you think it is a false distinction then you need to raise some objection against it. Lessans did not show any such thing, and a strong compulsion is by definition something that cannot be easily given up, even in the face of worse alternatives. It doesn't matter whether or not it can be overcome in the face of really terrible consequences - the point is simply that this is a different kind of 'compulsion' to merely being caused, and that this difference is not merely one of degree or strength. And no, I am not talking about an ingrained habit. An experienced psychological compulsion is simply one that is manifested in one's conscious experience - something one feels. Merely being caused need not be a 'compulsion' of this type at all.

You're very confused Spacemonkey. You are not listening at all, which is why you don't get it. This theory is wrong because there are no causal conditions where someone is free. That right there is a contradiction, which you are trying to overcome by distinguishing between compulsive actions and those that are not, but the point is that the compulsive actions you are deeming free and therefore blameworthy, are also under a compulsion. Can't you see the contradiction in what you just said?

It doesn't matter whether or not it can be overcome in the face of really terrible consequences, the point is simply that this is a different kind of 'compulsion' to merely being caused

Obviously, someone who is ill and does things compulsively has a different kind of problem than a "mere" causal condition, but it's still causal. That's what I've been trying to tell you.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't have to be here; I am not psychologically compelled to be here whereby other causal influences would not be able to alter my choice to do something else if something better came along. I am not immune from influence by changes in any other antecendent circumstance; in fact, I'm looking forward to other opportunites to share this knowledge, and when they present themselves I will be compelled to move on in the direction of greater satisfaction. That's what I mean when I say compibilibism is falsely distinguishing between certain actions just because the impulse is stronger than other impulses. What they are contending is that some actions cannot be controlled where other actions can. That's false. Of course it's harder to be influenced by antecedent circumstances when a particular behavior is ingrained or strongly desired, but it doesn't mean a person cannot change. On the other hand, it is easier to alter one's choice when the compulsion isn't as strong, but that doesn't change the direction we are compelled to move because we are compelled to choose the option that we find the most preferential given a particular set of options and given our particular circumstances.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

None of this is relevant to my point. You certainly are compelled to be here in the sense I described, as your choice to stay is highly resistant to the kinds of negative causal influences which would normally lead someone to leave. But again, this is not relevant to my point, and was merely an example. The distinction I am making is not merely a matter of some impulses being stronger than others. The kind of psychological compulsion I have been talking about certainly is a matter of degree - a compelled choice can be more or less resistant to changes in antecedent causal factors. But the difference between this kind of compulsion and causal determination is not merely one of degree.

So what is it then?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Being caused does not imply any experienced compulsion at all. It does not imply any resistance to changes in antecedent causal conditions.

Just because there's no resistance to change does not mean a person is free in the sense of free will. Yes, he is free of psychological compulsion. But that doesn't mean his choices are blameworthy because they aren't the kind of "compulsion" compatibilists consider excusable.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

The distinction I am making is not one of degree.

You make an artificial distinction between causal determination and compulsion, which is the source of the problem.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

And the compulsion you speak of in terms of being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction is not something that is always felt or experienced, so it is not an example of the kind of compulsion I am talking about. It is therefore irrelevant to my point, for it is not something that compatibilism says we must be free of in order to be responsible beings who can be fairly blamed.

You are obviously only defining compulsion when it's felt. That is not at all what Lessans is referring to. You understood nothing I wrote in the previous post. If life is causing you to move in a certain direction, can you be blamed for moving in that direction? I really don't care about a definition if the underlying proposition is wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But don't you see, there's no difference except in degree which changes nothing insofar as our choices being determined? The separation between degrees of compulsion does not suddently give someone free will. This definition does not reflect what is actually going on in reality, therefore it's not useful. You have to be able to let go of this theory (even temporarily) so you can follow the reasoning that Lessans puts forth, if you want to ever grasp the two-sided equation.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

No, I don't see that, for it is not true at all. The distinction I have carefully explained to you is not one of degree. I am not distinguishing between degrees of compulsion, but rather between types of compulsion.

I don't see where the differences where this "freedom" you are talking about is anything other than the standard definition of free will. Causal determination + free will = incompatibility

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I spoke of a "stronger sense" of compulsion, not a "stronger compulsion". And you are again resulting to sloganeering apparently as a result of not having understood anything I said.

Sloganeering? Where does that come into the discussion? As I said, we are compelled (whether it's the kind that can be seen, or not) to move in a particular direction, so there is no separation between compulsions that give some people a free pass, and others not.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is true only because there are strong emotional and physical factors involved, and all of the incentives to change does not equal the benefit from injecting the drug, even though he knows it's not in his best interest in the long run. The physical high, the dependence on the drug, the comparison of being high to the low he feels when he's straight, overrides anything that offers something better, because it's not better in his set of circumstances. But if he knew his child whom he loves would be killed if he doesn't stop, the choice that is before him has now changed dramatically, and when faced with this possibility, he doesn't care about the high or even the withdrawal symptoms he will experience because the very thought of losing his child is so terrible to contemplate that he suddenly develops the strength to overcome his drug problem.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Again, it is completely irrelevant to my point whether or not the kind of compulsion I am talking about can be overcome. The point is simply that it is a different kind of compulsion to merely being caused.

There is no compulsion that is uncaused. That's what compulsion means. Again, we're on two different wavelengths entirely.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Being caused merely requires the choice to be the same given the exact same antecedent causal conditions. Being compelled (in my sense) requires in addition to this that the choice will also be the same given significant changes in those antecedent causal conditions. This is not merely a difference in the degree of compulsion.

I understand what you're saying. But a person who is able to change based on significant changes in antecedent events does not make him blameworthy anymore than the person who will be the same regardless of significant changes in causal conditions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But that's making a false distinction. Determinism means that every single action is caused so you cannot say that one behavior is blameworthy and one isn't, depending on the intensity of the compulsion.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

That's not what I'm saying at all. The degree of intensity is not the issue. I am saying that an action's being caused does not mean that it was compelled in the sense of being in any degree immune to changes in antecedent conditions, and that only the latter is a threat to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. Being caused is no threat to blameworthiness at all.

Being immune to changes in antecedent events as being the only kind of person that is exempt of responsibility, while another is not exempt because his choices "could be changed by antecedent events" is a definition that is not useful whatsoever, because it's not right. It's a mishmash of words thrown together to try to make it appear as if there's a relevant distinction. This still reverts right back to free will because what you're saying is that given significant antecedent conditions that are free of the kind of compulsion that is exempt, this person could have acted differently. But the question remains: How do you know this? This is not proof that a person can act differently if the alternative (the favored choice) is considered worse.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm not going to continue the discussion because the disrespect in here is hard to take, but I feel compelled to point out to you that I do have a rational basis for my argument, even though you are highly resistant and I don't know whether you will allow yourself to see what I see so clearly: compatabilism is wrong. There is no free will, and the definitions that try to make it appear as if one can be praised or blamed for their actions, is a smokescreen because philosophers could never get beyond the implications of "determinism".

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You already have continued the discussion, merely by replying to my post. I am continuing it by pointing out your mistakes and misunderstandings. Unless you are compelled in the sense I have been explaining, you are free to leave the discussion whenever you like.

Yes I am free to leave, but this doesn't make my will free. That's exactly the point when Lessans said: We are not interested in opinions and theories regardless of where they
originate, just in the truth, so let’s proceed to the next step and prove
conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, that what we do of our own
free will (of our own desire because we want to) is done absolutely
and positively not of our own free will.

I, too, am going to point out your mistakes and misunderstandings, because there are many.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If you have a rational basis for your position then I would like to know what it is. In this post you have merely misunderstood my position by thinking that my distinction is one of degree when it is not, and in this part of your post you have simply asserted once more your conclusion that compatibilism is wrong. This is not a rational basis. It isn't even a basis.

I have a very strong rational basis for my position. Compatibilism is wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You can't make exceptions Spacemonkey for certain types of actions which you believe renders someone blameworthy. It doesn't add up. You can't have some compulsions that are worthy of blame and some that aren't, unless you're trying to make a definition work artificially. How can one be determined by "antecedent causal conditions, on the one hand, and not be determined by "antecedent causal conditions, on the other, just because there's more resistance due to the kind of compulsion that you are distinguishing from other compulsions. We're compelled to do what we do based on antecedent events no matter how strong or weak the compulsion appears to be.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Again, the distinction is not a matter of how strong or weak the compulsion appears to be. And I most certainly can have some 'compulsions' that affect blameworthiness and some that do not. That is precisely the point of the distinction I have been making.

But that is an artificial distinction. In true determinism, man is unfree regardless of the type of compulsion you are talking about. This additional word does not change the definition of free will that is compatible with determinism. It's true that in court someone would be found guilty if they were using that definition because it would imply that this person was sane, was not psychotic, was not compelled (your meaning), and therefore morally responsible. We're right back where we started: free will.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Yet I never said anything about being both determined by antecedent causes on the one hand and not being so determined on the other. Where did that bit of nonsense come from? You still haven't properly understood or addressed compatibilism, or provided any rational basis for your rejection of it.

A person who is able to change his choice when there is a strong antecedent condition; different from the person who can't do that so easily, does not make his will free. And if his will is free, he wouldn't be determined because the word "determined" means he couldn't choose otherwise. How can a person be free if he can't choose otherwise Spacemonkey? You say he can choose otherwise, which is regular old free will, exactly what Lessans was disputing. Geeeezzeeeeeeee!!!!!!!

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Compatibilist free will: The freedom to choose without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion which renders a choice highly resistant to variation in antecent causal conditions (i.e. no 'compulsion' beyond mere causal determination), and without coercion, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices.

Contra-causal/Libertarian free will: The freedom to choose without compulsion, coercion, or causal necessity, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices, i.e. such that with exactly the same antecedent causal conditions, one could have chosen otherwise.

Compatibilism says that the former is sufficient, and the latter is unnecessary, for making us morally responsible beings that can be justly praised or blamed for our actions. And you still have no argument or rational objection against it.

I have a much stronger argument than you do. Causal determination means "caused". If a person is caused, he cannot be held morally responsible in a deeper sense. Obviously, we're in a free will environment and in order to keep peace, we blame and punish. But we're never going to get to his discovery, which offers a much better solution to blame and punishment. You are just too resistant.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I thought I saw one vote.

You didn't.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

LadyShea mentioned that there was one.

No, she didn't.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Who is Dr. Ruth? She wouldn't happen to be the sex therapist on t.v.

She is. But unlike Dr. Phil she is ALSO an actual academic- a professor at NYU and fellow at both Yale and Princeton-, and she is licensed to practice psychology and still maintains a small private practice, and she did her post-doctorate work in the field of human sexuality, and she conducted field research while working at Planned Parenthood that was published in government health reports.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am creating no problem that you yourself aren't doing all by yourself. I understand the definitions you have given. I'm not using them in any other way than what you presented, therefore, I am arguing against the actual compatibilist position, and it's still wrong.

None of what you just said is true. You tried to insist upon using what you thought was the standard definition, saying you didn't care how I was choosing to define my terms. And you repeatedly stated that you didn't understand the distinction I was making, the notion of freedom I had defined for you, or how it differed from contra-causal freedom.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's exactly what you're doing. What do you mean by "mere" causal determination?

"Mere causal determination" means causal determination without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion I have been explaining to you. And why do you ask? Didn't you just tell me you understood the definitions I have given?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're very confused Spacemonkey. You are not listening at all, which is why you don't get it. This theory is wrong because there are no causal conditions where someone is free. That right there is a contradiction, which you are trying to overcome by distinguishing between compulsive actions and those that are not, but the point is that the compulsive actions you are deeming free and therefore blameworthy, are also under a compulsion. Can't you see the contradiction in what you just said?

It doesn't matter whether or not it can be overcome in the face of really terrible consequences, the point is simply that this is a different kind of 'compulsion' to merely being caused

Obviously, someone who is ill and does things compulsively has a different kind of problem than a "mere" causal condition, but it's still causal. That's what I've been trying to tell you.

I don't think I'm confused, and I can assure you I am paying attention to what you say (probably more attention than you are). So why are you again telling me there is a contradiction without telling me what it is? I do not see any contradiction in what I said. Nor do you. If you did, then you would have been able to tell me what it was. The actions I am deeming free and blameworthy are not under the kind of compulsion I have been talking about. And that renders them free in the only sense relevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. I've never denied that a person acting from compulsion is still causally determined, so I have no idea why you've been trying to tell me this.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

So what is it then?

I explained it in the post you just replied to: "Being caused merely requires the choice to be the same given the exact same antecedent causal conditions. Being compelled (in my sense) requires in addition to this that the choice will also be the same given significant changes in those antecedent causal conditions. This is not merely a difference in the degree of compulsion."

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Just because there's no resistance to change does not mean a person is free in the sense of free will. Yes, he is free of psychological compulsion. But that doesn't mean his choices are blameworthy because they aren't the kind of "compulsion" compatibilists consider excusable.

The lack of resistance to change in antecedent causal conditions makes the person free in the sense of free will that compatibilism has defined. It isn't meant to make the will free in any other sense, and especially not in the contra-causal sense. Compatibilism does not view that kind of freedom as morally relevant. And yes, according to compatibilism choices are made blameworthy by being 'compelled' only in the sense of being caused, because that is an excusable - i.e. not morally relevant - kind of 'compulsion'.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You make an artificial distinction between causal determination and compulsion, which is the source of the problem.

Your not liking it doesn't make it 'artificial' or problematic. What exactly is an "artificial distinction", and why are they bad? Are you trying to say that it is an ad hoc or irrelevant distinction? Could you support either charge?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are obviously only defining compulsion when it's felt. That is not at all what Lessans is referring to. You understood nothing I wrote in the previous post. If life is causing you to move in a certain direction, can you be blamed for moving in that direction? I really don't care about a definition if the underlying proposition is wrong.

Can you state this "underlying proposition" and tell me why it is wrong? Yes, I am defining the kind of compulsion I am talking about as one that must be felt. Yes, that means Lessans' notion of being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction does not qualify as a compulsion of the sort I have been explaining to you - i.e. it is not an example of the kind of compulsion which compatibilism views as a constraint upon or a threat to free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't see where the differences where this "freedom" you are talking about is anything other than the standard definition of free will. Causal determination + free will = incompatibility

I thought you said you understood the definitions I have been using? Was that not true? The compatibilist freedom I have defined differs from the contra-causal sort by requiring only that one could have done otherwise in causally similar situations, but not that one could have done otherwise in casually identical situations. Your above equation only holds if the 'free will' in question is of the contra-causal variety, and this is not the kind of free will that compatibilism is concerned with.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Sloganeering? Where does that come into the discussion? As I said, we are compelled (whether it's the kind that can be seen, or not) to move in a particular direction, so there is no separation between compulsions that give some people a free pass, and others not.

And compatibilism says that this kind of compulsion simply isn't relevant to whether or not we are free in the sense of being morally responsible agents who can be fairly blamed for our actions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is no compulsion that is uncaused. That's what compulsion means. Again, we're on two different wavelengths entirely.

Yes, you are apparently on a wavelength of not reading what I wrote, for I never said that there can be compulsions which are not caused. I have put in bold the word which you appear to have missed.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I understand what you're saying. But a person who is able to change based on significant changes in antecedent events does not make him blameworthy anymore than the person who will be the same regardless of significant changes in causal conditions.

I'm glad you finally understand that the distinction I've been drawing is not merely one of degree. But I disagree with your above claim. A person whose choice is open to change based on changes to antecedent causal conditions is rendered blameworthy because blame then becomes a causal factor itself in influencing future behaviour in similar circumstances. A person whose choice is not open in this way, due to being subject to coercion or the kind of compulsion I have been talking about is not blameworthy because blame will be ineffective - it will just become another factor which fails to influence the choice due to the compulsion in question. So the distinction I have been making is both legitimate and morally relevant.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Being immune to changes in antecedent events as being the only kind of person that is exempt of responsibility, while another is not exempt because his choices "could be changed by antecedent events" is a definition that is not useful whatsoever, because it's not right. It's a mishmash of words thrown together to try to make it appear as if there's a relevant distinction. This still reverts right back to free will because what you're saying is that given significant antecedent conditions that are free of the kind of compulsion that is exempt, this person could have acted differently. But the question remains: How do you know this? This is not proof that a person can act differently if the alternative (the favored choice) is considered worse.

Definitions cannot be right or wrong. My distinction is not a mishmash of words, and I have explained why it is relevant. The person could have acted differently because there is no coercion or compulsion present preventing a change in antecedent conditions from causally determining a different resulting choice. We can know this because it follows from the definitions. It doesn't need proving. And the freedom I have defined does not require one to be able to choose what one views as a worse choice. It requires only that one could have chosen it by not viewing it as the worse choice (given differing antecedent circumstances).

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I, too, am going to point out your mistakes and misunderstandings, because there are many.

It's a pity then that you can't identify or point out any of these alleged mistakes of mine, for if there are any then I would like to know about them.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I have a very strong rational basis for my position. Compatibilism is wrong.

That's not a rational basis. That's merely you repeating your overall position. A basis would be the supposedly rational grounds upon which this position is based. Grounds which you have yet to provide.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But that is an artificial distinction. In true determinism, man is unfree regardless of the type of compulsion you are talking about. This additional word does not change the definition of free will that is compatible with determinism. It's true that in court someone would be found guilty if they were using that definition because it would imply that this person was sane, was not psychotic, was not compelled (your meaning), and therefore morally responsible. We're right back where we started: free will.

I don't know what you think "true determinism" is, but determinism itself does not say that we are unfree. Perhaps you are thinking of hard determinism, which is the combination of determinism and incompatibilism. Yet even hard determinism does not deny that we can be free in the compatibilist sense (it just denies that this freedom is enough to make us morally responsible agents). Other than that I don't know what you are saying here. I don't know what you mean by an 'artificial' distinction, and I don't know what "additional word" you are talking about.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

A person who is able to change his choice when there is a strong antecedent condition; different from the person who can't do that so easily, does not make his will free. And if his will is free, he wouldn't be determined because the word "determined" means he couldn't choose otherwise. How can a person be free if he can't choose otherwise Spacemonkey? You say he can choose otherwise, which is regular old free will, exactly what Lessans was disputing. Geeeezzeeeeeeee!!!!!!!

You haven't been paying attention. You are now back to conflating two senses of 'could have chosen otherwise'. The compatibilist's free agent could not have chosen otherwise in the exact same causal scenario, but he could have chosen differently given slightly different antecedent causal conditions. The compatibilist's unfree compelled agent could not have chosen otherwise given slightly different antecedent circumstances due to the compulsion which renders the choice immune to such changes. According to compatibilism, the kind of ability to have chosen otherwise is not one that requires freedom from causal determination.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I have a much stronger argument than you do. Causal determination means "caused". If a person is caused, he cannot be held morally responsible in a deeper sense. Obviously, we're in a free will environment and in order to keep peace, we blame and punish. But we're never going to get to his discovery, which offers a much better solution to blame and punishment. You are just too resistant.

Maybe, but I back up my resistance with clear arguments and explanations. I agree that causal determination means the choice is caused, but I see no reason to agree that this means we are not morally responsible in any deep sense. If you think you have a stronger argument than me then I would very much like you to present it. I'd also like to know why you have been withholding it from us for all of this time.

[Vivisectus]

It is a bit like a game of dice, isn't it. If we live in a strictly deterministic universe, each roll was determined from the big bang onwards. And yet a pair of dice act as if the results are random. Or rather, we experience a level of unpredictability which we choose to call random results.

By the same token, we experience free will even if our desires are caused and determined. We may live in a deterministic universe, but we certainly do not live in a determined one.

Why is this so hard for PG to deal with? It is pretty much what the book says: we are compelled of our own free will to do what we do. Or rather, the vague way the book describes it can be said to be pretty close.

[Dragar]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

It is a bit like a game of dice, isn't it. If we live in a strictly deterministic universe, each roll was determined from the big bang onwards. And yet a pair of dice act as if the results are random. Or rather, we experience a level of unpredictability which we choose to call random results.

By the same token, we experience free will even if our desires are caused and determined. We may live in a deterministic universe, but we certainly do not live in a determined one.

Why is this so hard for PG to deal with? It is pretty much what the book says: we are compelled of our own free will to do what we do. Or rather, the vague way the book describes it can be said to be pretty close.

Probably the bigger issue is that for most people, 'free-will' is a nebulous thing that, if you have it, lets this other magical thing called 'responsibility' stick to you after making choices. I don't think peacegirl is particularly unique in having a very naive view on the topic.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Dragar

Probably the bigger issue is that for most people, 'free-will' is a nebulous thing that, if you have it, lets this other magical thing called 'responsibility' stick to you after making choices. I don't think peacegirl is particularly unique in having a very naive view on the topic.

She may be a little more unique in having maintained this naive view despite having debated the topic on and off with better-informed thinkers for nearly a decade.

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

Why is this so hard for PG to deal with? It is pretty much what the book says: we are compelled of our own free will to do what we do. Or rather, the vague way the book describes it can be said to be pretty close.

That's the oddest thing. Lessans' position basically is a form of compatibilism. It's just that he makes a further arbitrary and ad hoc stipulation that the kind of moral responsibility we have (which allows us to hold ourselves responsible via conscience) does not allow us to hold others responsible for the same actions. He claims we are morally responsible - just not in a way that makes us blameworthy... unless the blame is coming from our own conscience.

[Vivisectus]

Is the argument that conscience is somehow not subject to causality? Is what we call "conscience" in humans not formed or influenced because of what happens to a person during his or her life?

Hah I forgot - he never thought his ideas through this far

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

An experienced psychological compulsion, as Spacemonkey is using it, is one that defies all logic, and defies contemplation, and pushes the person to act on it even if they do not want to.

Defies whose logic? Obviously, it doesn't defy their logic, and they wouldn't do it if there wasn't some kind of pay-off, even if it's punitive in nature.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Lessans said nothing could make one do what they don't want to do. He was wrong. Those who suffer compulsions are made to act in ways they do not want to.

Lessans was not wrong. You are wrong. People can have strong compulsions, but as I said a few posts ago, if someone threatened their family unless they stopped their compulsion, you would see how quickly they could stop their compulsion because the alternative would be worse than doing something that they can control if they want to, or if their desire is strong enough.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Someone with OCD does not want to scrub their hands until they bleed, or check that the door is locked 45 times before they can go to sleep, but they experience (actually consciously recognize) an overwhelming need to do so against their conscious wishes.

I agree that it's a psychological problem that needs to be addressed, but under extreme circumstances, they could stop what they were doing (even if the fear of stopping was great), if the fear of not stopping was even greater such as a threat to a loved one. In a situation like this, there has to be a compelling reason to stop when there is a strong compulsion not to stop.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Being merely causally compelled isn't an experience like that. You don't consciously tell yourself "I HATE toast, I do not want to eat toast" but find yourself making and eating toast, possibly crying while doing so at your inability to contemplate and affect your actions to be in accordance with your desires, to alleviate an overwhelming fear of not doing so.

LadyShea, I understand the difference but it doesn't change the fact that whatever the motive, it is a preference, and preferences can be changed depending on antecedent events that become determinants, even in extreme cases if the threat is even greater than the compulsion. Moreover, moving in the direction of greater satisfaction is not always a conscious act, so it's not always felt, but it's still occurring. Animals move in the direction of greater satisfaction, but this term does not mean they are contemplating. They don't have this ability. They are just moving along from one spot to another, from here to there as they live out their lives. If you give them two kinds of dog food, and they choose, they don't think, "Well, I like this food over that food, or "which choice is better for my diet", they just pick one according to their sense of smell and choose the one that is preferable, which means they couldn't choose the food that was least preferable at that moment, unless this food was their only choice, and they were hungry.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

In those cases of experienced compulsion, it may not be toast but rather they are compelled to eat dirt, or eat hair. Have you ever experienced a compulsion to pull your hair out and eat it, peacegirl, because you felt that if you didn't do this you would die? Would you feel that is the same sort of compulsion as you experience eating a piece of toast?

I said there are differences in degrees, and, yes, some people are so mentally ill that they tell themselves that killing their offspring is saving them from a life of hell. But even though the impulse is strong, and it looks like they cannot choose anything other than what they are doing, if something comes along that is worse to them, they would stop because the preference not to do that thing becomes greater than to do it (whatever that thing is).

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Addictions also have this kind of experienced compulsive component in many cases.

There is a compulsive component to addictions because there is often a psychological and a physical high from doing certain things that offsets the life that one is leading. Usually there is a void in one's life and they are using this addiction to comfort themselves; it's a form of self-medicating.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

The ability to contemplate our needs and desires and act in accordance with our needs and desires (including the ability to not act when we do not want to) is a type of freedom, and that freedom is all that is required to be held responsible for our actions according to compatibilists.

No LadyShea, you are wrong. This is not all that is needed. The ability to contemplate our needs and desires and act in accordance with our needs and desires (including the ability to not act when we do not want to) is not all that is required to be held responsible. Yes, according to compatibilists it is, but please think about this carefully before responding: If one has no choice but to act according to his needs and desires, and cannot choose otherwise, then how can he be held responsible? I understand people don't like the implications of this, but you have to see where it leads before hitting your judge's gavel as a done deal. The problem is that up until now we could not do anything other than blaming and punishing as a deterrent to not do those things that are hurtful to others. But you have to stay with me in this reasoning process in order to understand why man's will is not free, and why this knowledge actually prevents those actions that made blame and punishment necessary.