The only regret i have about hiroshima and nagasaki...

[fragment]

Originally Posted by beyelzu

any idea why it does that fragment?

There's a plug-in that recognises links. When it sees them it hits the page linked to, parses it to find the title, and writes that into the link.

Occasionally there's something in the html that breaks the parsing.

[godfry n. glad]

Any initiative, in peacetime, or wartime, has the potential of addressing more than a single concern.

The use of atomic weapons served a couple of purposes. Japan was exceedingly nationalistic and its power structure was riven with accomodationist/militarist divisions. The Japanese militarists were using the potential entrance of the Soviet Union as a rationale to hold out even against a home island invasion....The US military did not wish to utilize such a bold tactic, because it was viewed to be too costly in terms of US personnel needed to undertake such a venture. However, the Russians had promised at Yalta to formally enter the war six months from the date of the Yalta Agreement, which they honored and immediately invaded Manchuria. It took that time from the cessation of hostilities in Germany to ship sufficient troops and provisions across the Asian land mass.

With the completion of the Trinity test, the US had a new weapon. It did not know the actually efficacy of such a weapon in real usage, but it promised to be a real impressive product. They thought they might end the war, without an invasion and without having to wait out a blockade of materials into Japan. As it happens, it was determined that Japan had just three days of food supply prior to their surrender. The only real option to invasion would have produced nationwide starvation, potentially killing far more noncombatants than both atomic bombs. So, acquiescence to the dual bombing as a clear sign that Japan would not endure and should surrender, saved thousands, probably millions of Japanese lives and millions more from enduring starvation and depravation...and probabaly widespread disease.

That said...I still think that the Nagasaki bomb was more of a statement to the Russians. It said "we have more of these". Of course, it made that same statement to the Japanese and pushed an already tettering governmental structure into final, and unconditional, surrender.

Curiously, the Soviets were promised a hand in the victory over and post-war occupation of Japan. They had to be satisfied with the (Chinese) lands they grabbed from the Japanese colony in Manchuria. The US would have no part of the Soviets administering postwar Japan. The US renegged on its part of the Yalta Agreement, as I understand it.

[fragment]

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is the historian I mentioned.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by vork on the entry of the russians

That's because it was not a major factor in the surrender. Hirohito mentioned Soviet entry once, on the 13th, during this whole period. Suzuki explained Japanese thinking in December, saying that the major issue was the landings. Once the Japanese realized that air power alone could annhilate the forces at the beachhead and reduce US losses to insignificant levels, the game was up. This was corroborated by Kido. The Emperor also wrote a letter to his son a week after surrender, which did not mention Soviet entry either. Additionally, after the Soviets had entered, the Council and the Cabinet both refused in separate votes to end the war. In other words, Soviet entry was not a major factor in the decision to end the war.

this is one issue im not very familiar with.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by fragment

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is the historian I mentioned.

maybe i should read his book

"Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan."


pretty sure i know what he is going to advocate.

[fragment]

Go out on a limb, bey, let us know your prediction

[godfry n. glad]

Originally Posted by beyelzu

this is one issue im not very familiar with.

The timing of the entry of the Soviets was not a Japanese issue, but an American one. The US wanted a quick and early unconditional surrender so that they would not have to share the occupation of Japan with the Soviets.

A blockade, the only other reasonable answer to a direct invasion of the home islands, would have been protracted and quite ugly. Probably more ugly, in the end, than the two atomic weapons inflicted upon the hapless Japanese public. In the end, it would have resulted in the US sharing the occupation of Japan with the Soviet Union, at least, and possibly other allied powers, as well. The US wanted total control in Japan. Both bombings, by the way, were gross violations of US war-making policies, but they'd already pissed away those moral constraints with carpet bombing in Germany (most notably Dresden) and the fire-bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities.

[fragment]

I should point out that, while I find the historical details interesting, I'm with Adora in that I think a determination of the morality of the A-bomb decision (and plenty of other war-time decisions) doesn't just rest on comparing numbers of deaths between two courses of action.

[godfry n. glad]

Nor do I. The matrix of factors considered most likely made such considerations, but they were probably weighed with othe considerations as well. There was no single determinant....even the weight of casualties on either or both sides.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by fragment

Go out on a limb, bey, let us know your prediction

i really would like to read his perspective, i will if i can get it cheaply.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by fragment

I should point out that, while I find the historical details interesting, I'm with Adora in that I think a determination of the morality of the A-bomb decision (and plenty of other war-time decisions) doesn't just rest on comparing numbers of deaths between two courses of action.

disagree if yo udont consider number of deaths and the effects on people's lives you are left unable to make a decision at all.

is it the best criteria

but being dead definitely sucks more than being alive and minimizing deaths is a good thing.

[Ari]

I have an issue with them choosing targets partly based on how much civilian damage could be done. Obviously one point was demoralization but I think that could have been done while attempting to reduce, not increase, civilian deaths.
At least that's what I understand from gov papers weighing which targets to hit.

[ZEZOZE]

the only regret i have about bombs is that they aren't used exclusively on the people who believe they solve problems.

michael

[beyelzu]

ok, i wasnt aware that the targets were picked to maximize civilian deaths


got a link?

[ZEZOZE]

fuck the nuclear shit. it is far worse that tokyo was fire-bombed and most of the targets were indeed civilian. i don't know how you could argue otherwise after witnessing the aftermath and the ordinance used (not exactly accurate) and i even think mcnamara admits that in 'fog of war'...i could be wrong about that.

do you agree with the fire-bombing of tokyo? probably not if you invest in real estate or raw materials for building....

michael

[Ari]

Originally Posted by beyelzu

ok, i wasnt aware that the targets were picked to maximize civilian deaths
got a link?

I may be misremembering the report but I'll find a link. Obviously it wasn't their only reason but I remember it to be high on the list, which included an untouched area to really show off the damage as well as containing a military target.

Here is a site with what looks to be a large number of documents, which I found while searching. The documents I'm thinking of are the notes from the first and second target committee meetings.

[ZEZOZE]

there is a lot of profit in rebuilding after a war, but i'm sure that has nothing to do with things. a person would have to be paranoid to think this way...

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by InTheServiceOfZeke

fuck the nuclear shit. it is far worse that tokyo was fire-bombed and most of the targets were indeed civilian. i don't know how you could argue otherwise after witnessing the aftermath and the ordinance used (not exactly accurate) and i even think mcnamara admits that in 'fog of war'...i could be wrong about that.

do you agree with the fire-bombing of tokyo? probably not if you invest in real estate or raw materials for building....

michael

it was effective which is why they switched to incendiary bombs as opposed to conventional bombing.

[ZEZOZE]

oh...so...100 000 people burned to death, but none were targeted?

terrible aim.

but hey...got rid of those shitty wood buildings. concrete is the western way...


michael

[fragment]

Originally Posted by beyelzu

disagree if yo udont consider number of deaths and the effects on people's lives you are left unable to make a decision at all.

For the record, I didn't say don't consider deaths at all, just that it's insufficient.

[Kyuss Apollo]

Originally Posted by beyelzu

it was effective which is why they switched to incendiary bombs as opposed to conventional bombing.

The psychological effect also of a SINGLE bomb inflicting that much damage, was...quite effective. How can you prevent even a single bomb from landing?

Offtopic I know but this is also why W's stupid missile shield is the stupidest thing I've ever heard come out of his mouth.

[California Tanker]

Originally Posted by Ari

I have an issue with them choosing targets partly based on how much civilian damage could be done. Obviously one point was demoralization but I think that could have been done while attempting to reduce, not increase, civilian deaths.
At least that's what I understand from gov papers weighing which targets to hit.

That's the problem with trying to relate to WWII thinking from a 21st Century point of view. By 1945, ariel bombing of civilian targets had been going on for five years by all sides, from the Blitz, through the V1/V2 attacks, the Thousand Bomber Raids, and the firebombings of Dresden or Tokyo. This was total war, the enemy to be defeated wasn't just the opposition's military, but the opposition's nation to include the people who constituted that nation. We today know nothing like that mentality. So what if they killed civilians? More dead enemy, from their perspective. Today, we disapprove of that line of thinking but given the criteria of the time, the weapons just made the standard procedure even more effective, just like any other improvement in weapons development.

Indeed, atomic weapons were envisioned as being not the weapons of last resort and deterrance as they are now, but as being standard battlefield equipment. It was expected that the next war would, by default, be fought by soldiers slinging A-weapons around left, right and centre, and nobody had a problem with that. It's part of the reason that the US Army was caught a little short-footed in Korea.

the only regret i have about bombs is that they aren't used exclusively on the people who believe they solve problems.

One could argue that they seemed to solve America's immediate Japanese problem of 1945.

NTM

[godfry n. glad]

Sorry, CT...not true.

There were existing protocols on aerial bombing as early as 1907. The US pushed for more explicit bans on aerial bombing in the early twenties.

Here's the section from the Geneva Conventions - Aerial Bombing of Cities section of wiki:

Aerial bombardment and international law
International law up to 1945
International law relating to aerial bombardment before and during World War II rests on the treaties of 1864, 1899, 1907 which constituted the definition of most of the laws of at that time — which, despite repeated diplomatic attempts, was not updated in the immediate run up to World War II. The most relevant of these treaties are the Hague Conventions of 1907 because they were the last treaties ratified before 1939 which specify the laws of war on aerial bombardment. Of these treaties there are two which have a direct bearing on this issue of bombardment. These are "Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907"[3] and "Laws of War: Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX); October 18, 1907"[4]. It is significant that there is a different treaty which should be invoked for bombardment of land by land (Hague IV) and of land by sea (Hague IX) [5]. Hague IV which reaffirmed and updated Hague II (1899) [6] contains the following clauses:

Article 25: The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.
Article 26: The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.
Article 27: In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.
The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants.[6]

In 1923 a draft convention, promoted by the United States was proposed: The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, December, 1922-February, 1923",[7] There are number of articles which would have directly affected how nations used aerial bombardment and defended against it; these are articles 18, 22 and 24. It was, however, never adopted in legally binding form. [8]

The subordination of the law of air warfare to the law of ground warfare was arguably established by the Greco-German arbitration tribunal of 1927-30. It found that the 1907 Hague Convention on "The Laws and Customs of War on Land" applied to the German attacks in Greece during World War I:[9] This concerned both Article 25 and Article 26.

The U.S. Air Force Law Review argues that "if international law is not enforced, persistent violations can conceivably be adopted as customary practice, permitting conduct that was once prohibited"[10] Even if the Greco-German arbitration tribunal findings had established the rules for aerial bombardment, by 1945, the belligerents of World War II had ignored the preliminary bombardment procedures that the Greco-German arbitration tribunal had recognized.[11]

In response to a League of Nations declaration against bombardment from the air[12], a draft convention in Amsterdam of 1938[13] would have provided specific definitions of what constituted a "undefended" town, excessive civilian casualties and appropriate warning. This draft convention makes the standard of being undefended quite high - any military units or anti-aircraft within the radius qualifies a town as defended. This convention, like the 1923 draft, was not ratified, nor even close to being ratified, when hostilities broke out in Europe. While the two conventions offer a guideline to what the belligerent powers were considering before the war, neither of these documents came to be legally binding.

After the war the judgement of the Nuremberg Trials,[14] the records the decision that by 1939 these rules laid down in the 1907 Hague Convention were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as declaratory of the laws and customs of war. Under this post-war decision, a country did not have to have ratified the 1907 Hague conventions in order to be bound by them [15].

In 1963 the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the subject of a Japanese judicial review in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State. The review draws several distinctions which are pertinent to both conventional and atomic aerial bombardment. Based on international law found in Hague Convention of 1907 IV - The Laws and Customs of War on Land and IX - Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, and the Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1922–1923 the Court drew a distinction between "Targeted Aerial Bombardment" and indiscriminate area bombardment, that the court called "Blind Aerial Bombardment", and also a distinction between a defended and undefended city.[16] "In principle, a defended city is a city which resists an attempt at occupation by land forces. A city even with defence installations and armed forces cannot be said to be a defended city if it is far away from the battlefield and is not in immediate danger of occupation by the enemy."[17] The court ruled that blind aerial bombardment is only permitted in the immediate vicinity of the operations of land forces and that only targeted aerial bombardment of military installations is permitted further from the front. It also ruled that, in such an event, the incidental death of civilians and the destruction of civilian property during targeted aerial bombardment was not unlawful.[18] The court acknowledged that the concept of a military objective was enlarged under conditions of total war, but stated that the distinction between the two did not disappear.[19] The court also ruled that when military targets were concentrated in a comparatively small area, and where defence installations against air raids were very strong, that when the destruction of non-military objectives is small in proportion to the large military interests, or necessity, such destruction is lawful.[18] So in the judgement of the Court, because of the immense power of the bombs, and the distance from enemy (Allied) land forces, the bombing of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki "was an illegal act of hostilities under international law as it existed at that time, as an indiscriminate bombardment of undefended cities".[20]

Not all governments and scholars of international law agree with the analysis and conclusions of the Shimoda review, because it was not based on positive international humanitarian law. Colonel Javier Guisández Gómez, at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, points out:

In examining these events [Anti-city strategy/blitz] in the light of international humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind that during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of the civilian population or civilian property, as the Conventions then in force dealt only with the protection of the wounded and the sick on the battlefield and in naval warfare, hospital ships, the laws and customs of war and the protection of prisoners of war.[11]

This leaves the legal status of aerial bombardment during World War II ambiguous and open to other interpretations, for example one of the reasons given by John Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, for the USA not agreeing to be bound by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is that

A fair reading of the [Rome Statute], for example, leaves the objective observer unable to answer with confidence whether the United States was guilty of war crimes for its aerial bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan in World War II. Indeed, if anything, a straightforward reading of the language probably indicates that the court would find the United States guilty. A fortiori, these provisions seem to imply that the United States would have been guilty of a war crime for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is intolerable and unacceptable.[21]

[California Tanker]

Originally Posted by godfry n. glad

There were existing protocols on aerial bombing as early as 1907.

I'd say that's unlikely as the first time an airplane dropped a bomb on anything was 1911.

The US pushed for more explicit bans on aerial bombing in the early twenties.

Yet they were never accepted by the rest of the world. There are two things to note here. The first is that most likely nobody at the time knew the devastation which could be caused by massed ariel attack. Remember that in 1923, bombers were still biplanes. Even the dreaded Zeppelin raids of WWI (which were conducted in response to French bombing raids of German cities) were of overall limited lethality. Note also the 1938 issue of 'what is defended', a question I was going to pose as soon as I read the first part of the post but before I got to the 1938 section.

The second, although more controversial, is the concept that in a case of such total war, adherence to any rules at all is more a concession than a requirement. The loser of WWII would not have received a "Fair Play Award" after all. Thus, since there was no legal restriction in force preventing ariel bombings, and as it was a case of playing for keeps, it was bombs away over cities with little compunction. It's a lot easier to talk about being civilised in warfare when not actually partaking in a war at the time.

NTM

[Clutch Munny]

Originally Posted by California Tanker

massed ariel attack