A revolution in thought

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The only real determinists are hard determinists, by definition. Soft determinism is a made up definition that tries to fenagle the meaning of determinism (by adding soft to it, as if this changes reality) in order to make free will fit into the determinism schemata. The only problem is it doesn't work.

Did you even read the definitions you just posted? Hard and soft determinism are not different varieties of determinism. Both hard and soft determinism FULLY ACCEPT determinism - the thesis that our thoughts and actions are causally determined. The two positions are different positions on the IMPLICATIONS of determinism with respect to human freedom. Hard and soft determinists believe in different kinds of freedom, not different kinds of determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is irrelevant what you want Spacemonkey. The laws of our universe don't give a flying *#$* what you want. What matters is what is true.

Great, because it is uncontroversial that we do not have libertarian free will and we do have compatibiist freedom. We both agree on that. The point of compatibilism is that what we have is all that we should want. Libertarians and hard determinists want something more, but are wrong to do so - the freedom they want us to have isn't worth wanting.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Determinism threatens the made-up compatibilist notion of free will...

No it doesn't. It is COMPATIBLE with it. And compatibilism is no more 'made up' than determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

...as a justification to place blame because although we can choose based on our own preferences and deliberations, this does not in any way make our choices free.

They are free in the compatibilist sense. They aren't being claimed to be free in any other sense. You can't use libertarian free will as the measure by which to evaluate compatibilism, because then you're just accusing compatibilists of not being incompatibilists. You do the same thing when you criticize compatibilists for not being hard determinists (i.e. incompatibilist determinists).

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Yes, all light travels at the same speed therefore all light in the spectrum would arrive at the same time. I wish I could see a radio telescope detecting the radio waves, and an optical telescope seeing the image at the same exact moment. It would have to be a celestial object that has never been seen before.

Why? What is wrong with an object that has been seen before, Just because an object hasn't been seen does not mean that the light has not arrived. Or do you mean an object that has just started to emit light?

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Lone Ranger, please watch your sarcasm.

I am sure you don't talk to your students this way. And don't tell me that the reason you don't is because your students are a lot smarter than I am.

Yes, Peacegirl has had to endure a lot of abuse and hostility because of the stupid and ignorant things she has posted. Be nice, so that she will continue to post idiotic things that are quite amusing.

Even students that expect a passing grade because they pay their tuition but don't do any class work or even attend classes, would be smarter than Peacegirl. They at least know that they need to pay for what they get. Peacegirl expects everyone to believe without any proof or evidence at all.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Did you even read the definitions you just posted? Hard and soft determinism are not different varieties of determinism. Both hard and soft determinism FULLY ACCEPT determinism - the thesis that our thoughts and actions are causally determined. The two positions are different positions on the IMPLICATIONS of determinism with respect to human freedom. Hard and soft determinists believe in different kinds of freedom, not different kinds of determinism.

Great, because it is uncontroversial that we do not have libertarian free will and we do have compatibiist freedom. We both agree on that. The point of compatibilism is that what we have is all that we should want. Libertarians and hard determinists want something more, but are wrong to do so - the freedom they want us to have isn't worth wanting.

No it doesn't. It is COMPATIBLE with it. And compatibilism is no more 'made up' than determinism.

They are free in the compatibilist sense. They aren't being claimed to be free in any other sense. You can't use libertarian free will as the measure by which to evaluate compatibilism, because then you're just accusing compatibilists of not being incompatibilists. You do the same thing when you criticize compatibilists for not being hard determinists (i.e. incompatibilist determinists).

Well, not to throw a wet towel onto your enthusiasm, (too late) but I would say that these various definitions are not penetrating Peacegirl's thick skull. More like bouncing off, remember she has the impenetrable armor of Lessanology. However, for the benefit of everyone else, please continue with your very informative posts.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

A radio telescope or an IR telescope do not "see" in real time because of the finite speed of light. I understand what you're saying; that if infrared light is delayed, what is the difference between the visual spectrum light and this infrared light. They travel at the same finite speed and are detected only after a delay. That means we should always detect radio waves at the same time we see the celestial body, correct? Even though everything points to Lessans being wrong, his proof is convincing as well. I will not give up on his proof, as I believe it has merit. I'm not sure how to resolve this until more empirical studies are done. I know you don't think this is necessary, as you believe this little demonstration proves that he is wrong, but I'm still not convinced. I know what you're thinking. What can I say?

Scientists and hobbyists all over the world use telescopes every day, and have for decades, and they always detect radio waves and see the object as being in the same location at the same time. There can be no greater empirical proof than that. If Lessans was right, this would not be the case at all.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Yes, all light travels at the same speed therefore all light in the spectrum would arrive at the same time. I wish I could see a radio telescope detecting the radio waves, and an optical telescope seeing the image at the same exact moment.

Observing Pulsars with Radio Telescopes - YouTube

It would have to be a celestial object that has never been seen before.

Why?

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

They would have to be pointed at the same coordinates.

So you have changed your position a complete 180 in the last 2 days. How sure are you about this claim? How sure were you when you claimed the opposite a few days back? On what evidence are you basing today's statement?

That wouldn't add up if the entire light spectrum travels at the same rate. He did say that we would see the moon and stars in real time. I understand the dilemma, and I'm not sure how to reconcile it so I'm not going to try. What I believe is that we may be able to see light in delayed time, but that would not negate the idea (I don't believe) that we would see the material world in real time.

Weasel, waffle, move the goal posts

So it would take 8 minutes to detect light from the Sun, but we would be able to see each other instantly (not in delayed time) once the light got here.

That makes no sense

[thedoc]

[quote=LadyShea;1173245]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That makes no sense

Was it something that Peacegirl said?

[Vivisectus]

So it would take 8 minutes to detect light from the Sun, but we would be able to see each other instantly (not in delayed time) once the light got here.

Ah - but then something needs to be in contact with light for it to be visible instantly?

Then we should see the sun instantly, and then detect the light coming in from the sun from a slightly different position, as the earth would have kept on turning in those 8 minutes.

It boggles the mind how come, if this is true, we can detect the light from the Crab Nebula at exactly the same position as we can see it with even fairly primitive telescopes: it was discovered in the 18th century, after all, long before anyone had even heard of radio-waves. Please bear in mind that the crab nebula is very definitely an object: it is basically an enormous dust cloud.

This nebula is many light-years away. So how come it is in the same spot in the sky as the incoming radiation? With the earth constantly spinning and circling the sun, we should be getting the radiation from any odd angle. And yet, every night when it comes in to view, it is in the same spot.

We know the radiation needs years to get to us. So how come it isn't in a different position? If sight were instant, this would not be possible.

I really do not know how we could possibly get clearer empirical testing than this.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The only real determinists are hard determinists, by definition. Soft determinism is a made up definition that tries to fenagle the meaning of determinism (by adding soft to it, as if this changes reality) in order to make free will fit into the determinism schemata. The only problem is it doesn't work.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Did you even read the definitions you just posted? Hard and soft determinism are not different varieties of determinism. Both hard and soft determinism FULLY ACCEPT determinism - the thesis that our thoughts and actions are causally determined. The two positions are different positions on the IMPLICATIONS of determinism with respect to human freedom. Hard and soft determinists believe in different kinds of freedom, not different kinds of determinism.

Don't you see the contradiction Spacemonkey? You don't get to give any definition you want in order to justify the very thing that determinism does not allow, if you are a true determinist. I can do the same thing with numbers. I can say that I know that two plus two equals four until I want it to be three.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is irrelevant what you want Spacemonkey. The laws of our universe don't give a flying *#$* what you want. What matters is what is true.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Great, because it is uncontroversial that we do not have libertarian free will and we do have compatibiist freedom.

Nope, not having OCD or being forced by something external does not give you free will. It's a made up definition that is the very antithesis of determinism, and there is no getting around it by manipulating definitionis.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

We both agree on that. The point of compatibilism is that what we have is all that we should want.

What do you mean by that? I should want? I don't want. I want peace on earth, not a free will that is not really free will.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Libertarians and hard determinists want something more, but are wrong to do so - the freedom they want us to have isn't worth wanting.

What are you talking about? I don't want the kind of libertarian freedom that says our thoughts are random and therefore we are not responsible, but I don't want the compatibilist kind of freedom either which states that our wants and desires based on mental processes that produce reasons for our actions is all that is necessary for blameworthiness. And as far as determinism, we have no free will period, so what kind of freedom is the determinist kind?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Determinism threatens the made-up compatibilist notion of free will...

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

No it doesn't. It is COMPATIBLE with it. And compatibilism is no more 'made up' than determinism.

It is extremely made up. It is a pull out of the hat kind of definition that fits nicely in an effort to make these two positions appear compatible in order to keep the idea of holding people responsible for their actions yet at the same time say they are not responsible for their actions. Doesn't that sound contradictory to you?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

...as a justification to place blame because although we can choose based on our own preferences and deliberations, this does not in any way make our choices free.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

They are free in the compatibilist sense. They aren't being claimed to be free in any other sense. You can't use libertarian free will as the measure by which to evaluate compatibilism, because then you're just accusing compatibilists of not being incompatibilists. You do the same thing when you criticize compatibilists for not being hard determinists (i.e. incompatibilist determinists).

You are talking gobbledegook Spacemonkey and your reasoning is not sound. No one is free in any sense, compatibilist or libertarian. If we are determined by our genetics and environment, then every action is based on an antecedent condition that renders none of our actions free. The definition used by compatibilism is an effort to have both worlds. I am well aware that we have no free will but have no problem with the reasons we had to believe in free will and why we need to hold people accountable. It took our development to come to this point in history where we can see the truth since there is now a way to prevent "evil" by proceeding with the investigation which shows that when we do not blame (which is the corollary of determinism), man does not become less responsible; he becomes more responsible. But you won't listen. Others will.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

So you have changed your position a complete 180 in the last 2 days. How sure are you about this claim? How sure were you when you claimed the opposite a few days back? On what evidence are you basing today's statement?

Weasel, waffle, move the goal posts

That makes no sense

I'm not convinced that we can establish perfect coordinates on a tiny piece of space, and I'm not convinced that the light-time correction is the math that is responsible for us seeing a celestial object at a different location than where it actually is. Look, I'm never going to be able to convince you to hold on and not jump to a conclusion that Lessans must be wrong based on what the telescopes tell us. My insistence that we have to have a wait and see attitude may compel you to laugh in my face, and to believe that I am a fundie because, according to all appearances, it looks like it's a slam dunk. I'm not so sure so I will maintain my position until the empirical tests are done (with his claim in mind) that prove, without a shadow of doubt, that he was wrong.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Don't you see the contradiction Spacemonkey? You don't get to give any definition you want in order to justify the very thing that determinism does not allow, if you are a true determinist. I can do the same thing with numbers. I can say that I know that two plus two equals four until I want it to be three.

I don't see a contradiction because you haven't shown me one. And I'm not trying to justify anything that determinism doesn't allow. Determinism allows compatibilist freedom.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Nope, not having OCD or being forced by something external does not give you free will. It's a made up definition that is the very antithesis of determinism, and there is no getting around it by manipulating definitionis.

It is uncontroversial that we have compatibilist free will. You just don't like calling it 'free will' because you're an idiot who thinks it makes sense to ignore all definitions you don't like.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

What do you mean by that? I should want? I don't want. I want peace on earth, not a free will that is not really free will.

I mean exactly what I've already explained to you. Compatibilist freedom is the only kind of any relevance or value. And we have it.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

What are you talking about? I don't want the kind of libertarian freedom that says our thoughts are random and therefore we are not responsible, but I don't want the compatibilist kind of freedom either which states that our wants and desires based on mental processes that produce reasons for our actions is all that is necessary for blameworthiness. And as far as determinism, we have no free will period, so what kind of freedom is the determinist kind?

Libertarian is a big fat red herring. The only freedom worth having is the compatibilist kind, and that is the kind that we have. Your insistence on redefining free will as libertarian free will and determinism as hard determinism is just plain stupid.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is extremely made up. It is a pull out of the hat kind of definition that fits nicely in an effort to make these two positions appear compatible in order to keep the idea of holding people responsible for their actions yet at the same time say they are not responsible for their actions. Doesn't that sound contradictory to you?

It sounds like the ignorant bollocks that it is. The definitions of determinism and compatibilist freedom are both equally made up by human beings to pick out and refer to actual aspects of human existence. Human make up definitions for words all the time. That doesn't make them problematic or objectionable. The term you are looking for is 'ad hoc', but compatibilist freedom is not ad hoc at all. It is a principled distinction.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are talking gobbledegook Spacemonkey and your reasoning is not sound.

Fuck off then.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No one is free in any sense, compatibilist or libertarian.

Of course we are free in the compatibilist sense. To deny this is to say that every decision we make is due to psychological compulsion or external constraints such that we could not have chosen otherwise even if we had wanted too. That's an insane and obviously false claim.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You don't get to give any definition you want in order to justify the very thing that determinism does not allow, if you are a true determinist.

You don't get to decide what is or is not "true" determinism, to do so is fallacious

No True Scotsman
You made what could be called an appeal to purity as a way to dismiss relevant criticisms or flaws of your argument.

In this form of faulty reasoning one's belief is rendered unfalsifiable because no matter how compelling the evidence is, one simply shifts the goalposts so that it wouldn't apply to a supposedly 'true' example. This kind of post-rationalization is a way of avoiding valid criticisms of one's argument.

[Vivisectus]

No one is free in any sense, compatibilist or libertarian. If we are determined by our genetics and environment, then every action is based on an antecedent condition that renders none of our actions free.

That only applies if you decide that "free" equals "divorced from causality in every way".

But that is silly: only utterly random and completely solipsistic(1) choices can ever be "free" according to that definition of "free". Having any reason at all to choose something would automatically mean a choice is not free.

In fact, your version of freedom would require complete control over the universe (as far as you experience that universe) in order for someone to have it.

If you want to argue that other definitions of freedom are incorrect, then feel free to do so. So far you have simply claimed they are and left it at that: an unfortunate family trait, it seems. But in order to make your case, you would have to point out why your definition is "correct" and why others are not, something you have been asked to do before and have failed to do. Anything else is the equivalent of saying "Is not!" with your fingers crammed into your ears.

(1) can I even use the word solipsistic in that way?

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm not convinced that we can establish perfect coordinates on a tiny piece of space, and I'm not convinced that the light-time correction is the math that is responsible for us seeing a celestial object at a different location than where it actually is.

Yet anyone with a telescope can demonstrate this consistently on demand. Look around the web for star maps, visit a local astronomy club meeting, if you have a smartphone or tablet, get the Starwalk app. There is no mystery here, there is only what you refuse to acknowledge or investigate.

Aberration of light - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Look, I'm never going to be able to convince you to hold on and not jump to a conclusion that Lessans must be wrong based on what the telescopes tell us.

He explicitly stated we see distant stars through a telescope in real time without the need to correct for light travel time. He was absolutely wrong as is demonstrated every day.

My insistence that we have to have a wait and see attitude may compel you to laugh in my face, and to believe that I am a fundie because, according to all appearances, it looks like it's a slam dunk.

You are very much like anyone holding onto a demonstrably wrong position based on deeply held faith beliefs. Young Earth Creationists insist the Earth is less than 10,000 years old and maintain that "something else must be going on" with regard to all the "slam dunk" evidence to the contrary. What makes you any different from them?

I'm not so sure so I will maintain my position until the empirical tests are done (with his claim in mind) that prove, without a shadow of doubt, that he was wrong.

Many YEC's maintain their beliefs, some lose them. The evidence that finally convinces someone cannot be known or predicted.

I seem to recall hearing that active apologists are more likely to lose their faith than those who do not participate in debate. If I am remembering that correctly, then it would make sense that something they have been told shook their faith position. Something they couldn't explain away, something they couldn't defend.

So, here you have an article of faith you cannot defend at all. Right now, you will just hold onto it (or pretend to hold onto it) for emotional reasons...both sunk costs and loyalty as well as hope for a better future. Even if you have come to the realization that Lessans was wrong about vision, you will never publicly admit it...so I don't expect that. What I do see is that you are here debating instead of marketing the book. You haven't posted to your Facebook page that the website has been updated, or that the book is now available for order, even, which is a very logical and easy first step. Why is that?

[Vivisectus]

I'm not convinced that the light-time correction is the math that is responsible for us seeing a celestial object at a different location than where it actually is.

Ah - so you admit that we see it where it isn't, you just don't agree on the way we calculate where it actually is?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Observing Pulsars with Radio Telescopes - YouTube

Why?

It would be interesting to observe. I would like to see where a material object (something that absorbs and reflects light) could not be seen by the eye until the light reaches Earth first. Thanks for the images.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

Ah - so you admit that we see it where it isn't, you just don't agree on the way we calculate where it actually is?

I never said that we would see light before it arrives. We would not. We would not see sunrise until the light got here. I am talking strictly about whether an image of the object does what people think it does, namely, bounces off an object and the unabsorbed photons that make up the light travel through space/time such that if we were looking in the right place we might be able to see the time of Socrates, or the Crusades, or the Spanish Inquisition. After all, that past light, according to scientists, has to be traveling through the universe. If we happen to be on another planet, and have powerful telescopes, the logic tells us we would be able to get a glimpse of some long ago event if our telescopes happen to be in the right part of the sky to detect this light. This is what is being disputed even though by all accounts, the logic (that is based on afferent vision) tells us that this is what we would see.

[Vivisectus]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I never said that we would see light before it arrives. We would not. We would not see sunrise until the light got here. I am talking strictly about whether an image of the object does what people think it does, namely, bounces off an object and the unabsorbed photons that make up the light travel through space/time such that if we were looking in the right place we might be able to see the time of Socrates or Columbus discovering America or the Crusades, or the Spanish Inquisition.

You are like a little octopus, only in stead of ink you spout little clouds of ignorance when startled.

still, progress:

We would not see sunrise until the light got here.

So for starters, your father was wrong when he said we would see the sun instantly if it was turned on?

I am talking strictly about whether an image of the object does what people think it does, namely, bounces off an object

No-one thinks that. In fact we have told you again and again that no-one thinks that. It seems to take years for old ideas to leave your head and new ones to arrive.

light travels, bounces, and generally does things. Images do not.

and the unabsorbed photons that make up the light travel through space/time such that if we were looking in the right place we might be able to see the time of Socrates or Columbus discovering America or the Crusades, or the Spanish Inquisition.

Ah - but then we see things were they really are, no-matter what the distance? Because when we see and detect the radiation from a distant nebula, then we see it as it was, and where it was, not where it is now, nor do we detect the radiation it is emitting now.

We know the radiation travels at lightspeed (or close to, in the case of neutrinos) and needs a year per lightyear of distance to get to us.

So either we see the nebula as it was when the light left it, or we see it where it is now... but then where did the radiation come from? Why is it not in a different place?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

That only applies if you decide that "free" equals "divorced from causality in every way".

But that is silly: only utterly random and completely solipsistic(1) choices can ever be "free" according to that definition of "free". Having any reason at all to choose something would automatically mean a choice is not free.

In fact, your version of freedom would require complete control over the universe (as far as you experience that universe) in order for someone to have it.

If you want to argue that other definitions of freedom are incorrect, then feel free to do so.

I already have. We don't have freedom if, under the exact same conditions, we could have chosen otherwise. Yes, we can punish people as a deterrent even if we believe they couldn't do otherwise, but it's important to be honest here. The compatibilist definition does not change the fact that there is no free will, libertarian or not. No one is free, not the prosecuted or the prosecutors. Freedom of the will means we have control over our choices, and in the case of compatibilism we have control if we are not being physically forced or we don't have OCD, but this is not true. Just because the "freedom" that compatibilists claim is not libertarian does not make their definition any more accurate.

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

So far you have simply claimed they are and left it at that: an unfortunate family trait, it seems.

What do you mean by that?

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

But in order to make your case, you would have to point out why your definition is "correct" and why others are not, something you have been asked to do before and have failed to do. Anything else is the equivalent of saying "Is not!" with your fingers crammed into your ears.

(1) can I even use the word solipsistic in that way?

No Vivisectus, you cannot keep accusing me of putting fingers in my ears just because I disagree with compatibilism. I have been explaining why it isn't sound and why it is not in keeping with the true meaning of determinism. The core definition of determinism is that no other choice was possible; that under those same conditions we could not have done otherwise. It does not mean that we could not do otherwise in a similar situation. Obviously, our choices are constantly changing from moment to moment and the threat of punishment may enter into our next decision. That being said, this deterrent does not always work. Spacemonkey believes that if we don't attribute moral responsibility to those who do wrong, our civilization would end up worse off. This is what I'm trying to show is not true. It's the exact opposite of what intuition tells us. I am not going to try to prove to you that Lessans was right because you will argue with me, just because it's him. There are many other philosophers coming to the same conclusion that compatibilism is incoherent and determinism is valid. Some words in the following abstract are not correct such as eects. If anyone can guess what word should be in its place, please let me know.

Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689

1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument
There are many dierent ways to state the compatibilist position but I
will here focus on what some have called classical compatibilism (e.g.,
Watson, 1975; Kane, 2002). According to classical compatibilism, as
long as we do something we want to dosomething we choose to do
and we are not externally constrained or impeded, we are acting freely.

Put in terms of the voluntary/involuntary distinction, we can say that
free actions are those we do voluntarily, whereas unfree actions are
those we do involuntarily (appropriately qualied).2 A number of well-
known philosophers have held versions of this position, including Thomas
Hobbes, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, W.T. Stace (1952), A.J. Ayer
(1954), Moritz Schlick (1966), Donald Davidson (1973), and Michael
Levin (2004, 2007). Classical compatibilism argues that the traditional
free will debate is a pseudo-problem, the product of a series of concep-
tual or terminological confusions. It maintains that, when the relevant
terms are rightly understood, there is no inconsistency in holding to both
free will and causal determinism. Compatibilists argue that free action
is to be distinguished from unfree action not by the absence of causes, as
incompatibilists insist, but rather by the type of causes at work. That is,
free actions are caused by our desires, wants, or willings, whereas unfree
actions are not. As long as the action is caused by the inner psycholog-
ical states of the agent, and is not externally constrained or impeded,
the action is free on this account.3

Many critics have argued that this denition of freedom is incoherent
and that instead of solving the problem it only camouages it (e.g., Tay-
lor, 1992; Hospers, 1950a,b). The real question, they insist, is whether
or not our wants and desires are themselves caused. Since compatibilists
have to concede that they are, because they accept or assume deter-
minism,4 critics charge that it does not preserve real freedom.5 It is
incoherent, they argue, to claim that an action is both free and causally
determined. If the inner psychological states that determine our choices
and actions are themselves causally determined, how can free will be
preserved? Critics maintain that the real issue, so far as the will is con-
cerned, is not whether we can do what we choose to do, but whether we
can choose our own choice, whether the choice itself issues in accordance
with law from some antecedent. For reasons such as these, William
James famously labeled compatibilism a quagmire of evasion (1884),
and Anscombe said it is nothing more than so much gobbledygook
(1971: 46).

Compatibilists, nonetheless, insist that whether or not our inner psy-
chological states are causally determined is irrelevant. What is of real
importance, they argue, is that the agent does as he/she wants. The
only freedom that matters, according to compatibilism, is the ability to
guide our conduct by means of our own wants and desires. As Michael
Levin puts it:

An agent's wants can be eects of factors beyond his control, indeed
preceding his birth, and the action they lead to be free, so long as the
action is an eect of the wants. The sources of his wants don't matter;
freedom is consistent with any account of those sources, including fully
deterministic ones. Thus, my daily jog may well be a product of my genes,
upbringing and current environmental stimuli, none of which I had a say in,
yet I jog of my own free will since I jog because I want to (whatever caused
that want). Genes, upbringing and environment produced a desire to exercise,
and that desire not kidnappers, not a gust of wind caused me to move along
the running track [. . . ] I acted freely when I jogged yesterday, says
compatibilists, insofar as I did what I wanted, and there, pending renements,
the analysis ends (2004: 426)

Compatibilism believes that this is the appropriate denition of freedom
since it accords with our everyday common usage. They maintain that
our folk-psychological or commonsense notions of freedom and moral re-
sponsibility are completely consistent with the acceptance of determin-
ism. They insists that, in ordinary language, freedom essentially means
doing as we want to do, not some libertarian notion of freedom. They
also insist that our ordinary conception of responsibility is perfectly con-
sistent with determinism. For compatibilists, when we say Agent A is
responsible for action X we mean X happened because A wanted X to
happen (Levin, 2004: 426). What matters, compatibilists contend, is
whether or not the agent acted voluntarily, not whether the action is de-
termined by upbringing, heredity, personal psychology, brain chemistry,
or the environment. This, they maintain, ts with our ordinary usage,
and for most classical compatibilists, common usage is the appropriate
criterion for deciding how these notions should be dened (e.g., W.T.
Stace, 1952; Levin, 2004; Baumeister, 2008).

Levin, for example, writes: Use xes meaning, and `free' is used of actions
owing from preference (2004: 427). Stace goes further and maintains that
The [problem of free will and determinism] is merely verbal, and is due to
nothing but a confusion about the meanings of words. It is what is now
fashionably called a semantic problem (1952: 383).

He goes on to argue that the dispute can be resolved by examining what
people ordinarily mean by `free' and `responsible.' He writes: common
usage is the criterion for deciding whether a denition is correct or not.
And this is the principle which I shall apply to free will (1952: 383; orig-
inal emphasis). Ayer likewise maintains that the compatibilist definition
must reect our ordinary notion of freedom.

It is indeed obvious that if we are allowed to give the word`freedom' any
meaning that we please, we can nd a meaning that will reconcile it with
determinism: but this is no more a solution of our present problem than the
fact that the word `horse' could be arbitrarily used to mean what is ordinarily
meant by `sparrow' is a proof that horses have wings (1954:
278).

Other compatibilists, although less explicit about the need to comport
with ordinary usage and our folk-psychological intuitions, nevertheless
maintain that the compatibilist conception of freedom and its cognates
corresponds to what laypersons generally mean when they distinguish
free from unfree action (Baumeister, 2008: 14).

The obvious question, then, is whether the compatibilist is correct
in assuming that our ordinary understanding of free will is a compati-
bilist one. Do people generally believe free will is compatible with their
own inner psychological states being causally determined? I believe the
answer is no, but I will explore this question more fully in the follow-
ing section where I turn to empirical research in social psychology for
support. Before doing so, however, I would briey like to look at one
of the more traditional incompatibilist arguments. There are a number
of arguments against compatibilism but perhaps the most famous and
direct incompatibilist argument is the so-called Consequence (or Modal )
Argument (see, Ginet, 1966, 1980, 1983, 1990; van Inwagen, 1975, 1983,
2000; Wiggins, 1973; Lamb, 1977). This is widely regarded as the best
argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. It at-
tempts to establish the conclusion that, if determinism is true, then it is
never up to us how we act. Since this argument has been exhaustively
60 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689
discussed by others, and since those who are not yet convinced by it are
unlikely to be persuaded by anything I have to say, I will only outline the
argument and some possible replies before moving on to an alternative
line of attack.

Although there are many dierent formulations of the consequence
argument, we can follow van Inwagen in stating the basic idea as follows:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of
the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is
not up to us what went on before we were born; and neither
is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the
consequence of these things (including our present acts) are
not up to us (1983: 16).

According to the consequence argument, if it's not up to us whether
certain things happen, then neither is it up to us whether the consequence
of those things happen. Van Inwagen calls this the No-Choice Principle.
Essentially it claims: If we have no control over certain things, then we
do not have control over the consequences of those things, either. As van
Inwagen points out, it is not up to us what went on before we were born,
nor is it up to us what the laws of nature arewe simply have no control
over those things. Hence, if we have no control over the laws and the
past, and they have the consequence that we will act a certain way, then
we have no control over how we act. This is a very powerful argument.
The consequence argument can be viewed as part of a more general
incompatibilist argument. This standard incompatibilist argument can
be stated as follows (see Kane, 2002):

(1) The existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent's power to do
otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely.
(2) Determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it pre-
cludes the power to do otherwise).
(3) Therefore, determinism is not compatible with acting freely.

The consequence argument can be seen as a defense of premise (2), the
crucial premise, since it maintains that, if determinism is true, the future
is not open but is rather the consequence of the past (going back before
we were born) and the laws of nature. According to the consequence
argument, if determinism is true, we lack genuine alternative possibility
(and hence the ability to do otherwise) since, as William James puts it,
Possibilities that fail to get realized, are, for determinism, pure illusions;
Gregg D. Caruso: The Folk Psychology of Free Will 61 they never were
possibilities at all (1884: 151). The determination of an action, it is argued,
renders an agent powerless to perform any alternative action. Hence, our
belief that there is more than one choice we can make, more than one
action we can perform, and more than one future which is within our power
to bring about, must be an illusion if determinism
is true.6

Compatibilists have a number of replies to this argument. The stan-
dard compatibilist reply to this argument has been to accept premise (1)
but deny premise (2). Classical compatibilists typically grant that the
agent's power to do otherwise is a necessary condition for acting freely,
but deny that determinism precludes this power. In arguing against
premise (2), classical compatibilists usually maintain that terms like can,
power, and ability should be given a conditional or hypothetical analysis.
They maintain that when we say that an agent can (i.e., has the power
or ability to) do something, we mean that the agent would do it if the
agent wanted (desired or chose) to do it. According to classical compat-
ibilism, this type of conditional analysis ts common usage and allows
us to see how the power and freedom to do otherwise can be reconciled
with determinism. If the power to do otherwise means only that you
would have done otherwise if you wanted or desired, so the argument
goes, it would be consistent with determinism since it would not require
changing the past or violating laws of nature. To say you could have
done otherwise would only amount to the counterfactual claim that you
would have done otherwise, if (contrary to fact) the past (or the laws of
nature) had been dierent in some way. Conditional analyses of this type
have been defended by the likes of G.E. Moore (1912), A.J. Ayer (1954),
Aune (1967, 1982), Nielsen (1971), Lehrer (1980), and Levin (1979).7

Although this is an interesting and sophisticated way to counter the
incompatibilist argument, there is growing agreement among philoso-
phers that it fails (see Campbell, 1951, 1957; Broad, 1952; Ginet, 1995;
J.L. Austin, 1961, 1966; Chisholm, 1964, 1966; van Inwagen, 1983;
Lehrer, 1964, 1966, 1968).8 In fact, some compatibilists have even aban-
doned conditional analyses, insisting that if compatibilism is to succeed
it must nd an alternative strategy (Lehrer, 1976; Audi, 1974; Berofsky,
1987, 2002). One of the main criticisms of this analysis is that it appears
to lead to a regress problem (see Chisholm, 1964, 1966; Lehrer, 1964).
Richard Taylor lays the problem out nicely:

Having made my choice or decision and acted upon it, could I have chosen
otherwise or not? [. . . ] Here the [compatibilist], hoping to surrender nothing
and yet to avoid the problem implied in the question, bids us not to ask it;
the question itself, he announces, is without meaning. For to say that I could
have done otherwise, he says, means only that I would have done otherwise,
if those inner states that determined my action had been different; if, that is,
I had decided or chosen differently. To ask, accordingly, whether I could have
chosen or decided differently is only to ask whether, had I decided to decide
differently, or chosen to choose differently, or willed to will differently, I would
have decided or chosen or willed differently. And this, of course, is unintelligible
nonsense


[. . . ] But it is not nonsense to ask whether the cause of my actions my own
inner choices, decisions, and desires are themselves caused. And of course
they are, if determinism is true, for on that thesis everything is caused and
determined. And if they are, then we cannot avoid concluding that, given
the causal conditions of those inner states, I could not have decided, willed,
chosen, or desired other than I, in fact, did, for this is a logical consequence
of the very definition of determinism. Of course we can still say that, if the
causes of those inner states, whatever they were, had been different, then
their eects, those inner states themselves, would have been different, and
that in this hypothetical sense I could have decided, chosen, willed, or desired
differently but that only pushes our problem back still another step [Italics
added]. For we will then want to know whether the causes of those inner
states were within my control, and so on ad innitum. We are, at each step,
permitted to say could have been otherwise only in a provision sense provided,
that is, that something else had been different but must then retract it and
replace it with could not have been otherwise as soon as we discover, as
we must at each step, that whatever would have to have been different
could not have been different (Taylor, 1992: 45-46). It would seem that the
compatibilist conception of could have done otherwise amounts to nothing
more than the little could that would but can't so won't! The problem is that
instead of reconciling determinism with the ability to do otherwise, the conditional
interpretation merely pushes the problem back one step causing a regress.
On this analysis, to say that I could have done otherwise means I would have
done otherwise if I wanted to. This only invites the obvious question: Do I
have the Gregg D. Caruso: The Folk Psychology of Free Will freedom (or ability)
to want differently? For the compatibilist argument to work it would have to show
that the ability to want otherwise is itself compatible with determinism; and here
the conditional interpretation will not help.

kriterion-2012-26-056-089-caruso.pdf

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It would be interesting to observe. I would like to see where a material object (something that absorbs and reflects light) could not be seen by the eye until the light reaches Earth first. Thanks for the images.

Um what do you mean? If it's too far away for the light to have reached us yet, and is out of reach for our most powerful instruments, it can't be detected at all so we can't predict when/where such "new" sightings might occur.

[Vivisectus]

[quote=peacegirl;1173299]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

That only applies if you decide that "free" equals "divorced from causality in every way".

But that is silly: only utterly random and completely solipsistic(1) choices can ever be "free" according to that definition of "free". Having any reason at all to choose something would automatically mean a choice is not free.

In fact, your version of freedom would require complete control over the universe (as far as you experience that universe) in order for someone to have it.

If you want to argue that other definitions of freedom are incorrect, then feel free to do so.

I already have. We don't have freedom if, under the exact same conditions, we could have chosen otherwise.

I know what you claim. I want to know why you think it is correct. I want you to support what you say in stead of mindlessly repeating it over and over as you did just now:

Yes, we can punish people as a deterrent even if we believe they couldn't do otherwise, but it's important to be honest here.

Blah blah blah consequences...

The compatibilist definnition does not change the fact that there is no free will, libertarian or not.

And another claim.

No one is free, not the prosecuted or the prosecutors.

Repeats the claim

Freedom of the will means we have control over our choices,

And again

and in the case of compatibilism we have control if we are not being physically forced or we don't have OCD, but this is not true. Just because the "freedom" that compatibilists claim is not libertarian does not make their definition any more accurate.

equivalent of saying "No! U!!!"

What do you mean by that?

The book also simply claims things and then does not prove them. The way it says conscience works, for starters.

I have been explaining until I'm out of breath why this definition is not in keeping with the meaning of what determinism is.

Nope, you just claim it.

The core definition of determinism is that no other choice was possible;

No, it is not.

that under those same conditions we could not have done otherwise. It does not mean that we could not do otherwise in a similar situation. Obviously, our choices are constantly changing from moment to moment and the threat of punishment may enter into our next decision. That being said, this deterrent does not always work. Spacemonkey believes that if we don't attribute moral responsibility to those who do wrong, our civilization would end up worse off. This is what I'm trying to show is not true. It's the exact opposite of what intuition tells us.

Aaaand moe of the same.

At no stage have you supported your assertion that your definition of freedom is the correct one. I wonder if you have even noticed that.

[thedoc]

It seems that Lessans and now Peacegirl have committed a basic fallacy, and that is the 'excluded middle'. (Someone please correct me if I am wrong.) They claim that it is either determinism or free will but not a combination of the two concepts.

Most of Lessans examples in the book have been extreme cases that are then supposed to be interpreted as proving his point by ignoring less extreme situations that could go the other way. They seem to be arguing as if everything is all or nothing, but from my own experience, this is seldom the case.

[Vivisectus]

I would like to see where a material object (something that absorbs and reflects light) could not be seen by the eye until the light reaches Earth first.

Why not the other way round? Where are the objects that we can see in real time, but not detect any radiation from because we have to wait a few hundred years for the light to arrive?

How do you propose to detect an object that is so far away that the light has not reached us yet, by the way? What faster-than-light particle do you propose to detect in order to become aware of it's presence?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Vivisectus

You are like a little octopus, only in stead of ink you spout little clouds of ignorance when startled.

still, progress:

So for starters, your father was wrong when he said we would see the sun instantly if it was turned on?

No-one thinks that. In fact we have told you again and again that no-one thinks that. It seems to take years for old ideas to leave your head and new ones to arrive.

light travels, bounces, and generally does things. Images do not.

Ah - but then we see things were they really are, no-matter what the distance? Because when we see and detect the radiation from a distant nebula, then we see it as it was, and where it was, not where it is now, nor do we detect the radiation it is emitting now.

We know the radiation travels at lightspeed (or close to, in the case of neutrinos) and needs a year per lightyear of distance to get to us.

So either we see the nebula as it was when the light left it, or we see it where it is now... but then where did the radiation come from? Why is it not in a different place?

We see light that has gotten to us, which takes time. I never disagreed with this. I'm done talking about this because it's only being used as fodder for lulz. This claim is not nearly as important as his other claim only because the truth of determinism is the portal that will lead to global peace. If this claim turns out to be true maybe people will take a second look at his claim of efferent vision. The truth is all that matters. Lessans himself would have admitted if he was wrong.