It is obvious that what we see is not going to be the place where the planet will be when the probe reaches its target, but whether the time-light correction is absolutely vital for accuracy still needs further research, even though you think the testing has already been done.
The time-light correction is completely distinct from the correction made for the planet's travel during transit of the probe. The time-light correction is one of thousands of kilometers, that according to Lessans should not be made at all. Yet we do make it and we do not miss by thousands of kilometers. That proves him wrong.
No it doesn't. Your analysis is just as bad as your analysis regarding determinism.
It does, see The Lone Rangers math. Can you refute it?
Quote:
Fair enough, but there is a huge assumption here that the calculation (which may be necessary) can only be due to the speed of light correction.
You cannot place theoretical science on a such a pedestal that there there can be no other explanation.
It's not an assumption, nor is it theoretical science. It's simple mathematics.
If you have another explanation that can be proven using actual math, then present it...appeals to a mysterious, unknown "something else" aren't relevant.
I said that this correction may be necessary for some other reason than what you are attributing it to.
Yes, the mysterious "something else" that must exist for Lessans to be right! Unfortunately, the math says there is nothing else.
But the results do not negate real time seeing. When it's morning, we see light approaching, true? In other words, if the Sun is 8 light minutes away, we would see morning after 8 minutes.
But light does not produce an image; it just produces full spectrum light. Light itself would not give us an image of matter because images, or the partial spectrum, is not being reflected. We are seeing the object due to light's presence ONLY. The wavelength that allows us to see said object does not travel through space/time as believed. Do you get what I'm saying? I doubt it.
No, we see the light after it arrives, to say we see it coming is just a bit silly.
Actually we see the Sun 8 minutes after the sun physically, is visually above the horizon.
__________________ The highest form of ignorance is when you reject something you don’t know anything about. Wayne Dyer
they are not really determinists because if they were they could not accept the logic any serious determinist (which you are not) will tell you that
the kind of free will that serious philosophical debates are comprised of
I like how she switched from Strawman to No True Scotsman.
Many professional philosophers, who think about and discuss this stuff on a daily basis, are Compatibilists peacegirl. Is it your claim that they are not serious about philosophy?
LadyShea, they may be serious about philosophy but they are not true determinists.
Of course, how this question is to be answered depends on what free will is. Compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism, the thesis that a complete statement of the laws of nature together with a complete description of the condition of the entire universe at any point in time logically entails a complete description of the condition of the entire universe at any other point in time. (A description of what you and I are doing at this moment is part of a complete description of the universe at this moment.) If compatibilists are right, then my brain's functioning deterministically does not preclude my having free will. But Searle sets compatibilism aside, reporting that "according to the definitions … that I am using, determinism and free will are not compatible" (47). Furthermore, in his view, "quantum indeterminism" in the world around us "gives us no help with the free will problem" (44): we need to be internally indeterministic. Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
So, John Searle states that it is a matter of definition as well, and they are incompatible according to the definitions he is using (meaning there are definitions in existence that he is not using).
He gives a definition so that everyone is on the same page. The definition may prove to be true, or it may not. I can give a definition that says three is the sum of one plus one. This is just as good of a definition as one plus one is two; the only problem is it doesn't reflect the truth.
She is just being stupidly obtuse and obfuscatory.
This post was entirely motivated by the opportunity to use the word "obfuscatory".
Oh! I really like that word, can I borrow it? Please!
No, but I will sell it to you for 200€. Alternatively, you could just steal it.
Wonderful, Is it OK if I owe you in US$ cash? Thanks. Or do you prefer some other tender that I owe you.
Euros please. If I am not going to get paid I would rather not get paid in money that does not seem quite real to me. The element of unreality lessens the pain.
__________________ Old Pain In The Ass says: I am on a mission from God to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable; to bring faith to the doubtful and doubt to the faithful.
According to you, peacegirl, if we look through an optical telescope (that is, one which uses visible light), we're seeing a distant star or planet where it is right now. According to you, there's no difference between the object's apparent position and its actual position.
But if we're using a radio telescope to observe the same object, the object's apparent position will be different from its actual position, due to the finite speed of electromagnetic waves. (Radio waves are a form of light, by the way.)
You've said this. Repeatedly. I can quote you, if you like.
As it happens, there is a very simple way to test this belief of yours. All that we need do is point an optical telescope and a radio telescope at the same object, and see if the two telescopes "see" them in different positions.
And as it happens, this experiment has been done. Many, many times.
Guess what the results are in every single instance?
__________________
“The greatest way to live with honor in this world is to be what we pretend to be.”
The time-light correction is completely distinct from the correction made for the planet's travel during transit of the probe. The time-light correction is one of thousands of kilometers, that according to Lessans should not be made at all. Yet we do make it and we do not miss by thousands of kilometers. That proves him wrong.
No it doesn't.
Of course it does.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Your analysis is just as bad as your analysis regarding determinism.
And yet you've been completely unable to find fault with either analysis.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I'm not interested in discussing these topics with you anymore because you're stubborn and will not budge from your position when the truth of determinism is staring you right in the face.
You're the one who has stubbornly declared she couldn't care less about evidence and intends to never budge from her position no matter how much evidence is against Lessans.
And who's arguing with determinism anyway? Not me.
__________________ video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor
There is absolute proof that compatibilism is false...
Is there? Then why have you never provided it? Was this just another faith claim?
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I know I'm free to end this conversation (I'm not giving up on; are you kidding?).
You've clearly given up on actually addressing my points or supporting your own.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Which he does. He shows how conscience becomes perfect when the conditions change.
His argument for this is based on the assumption I'm asking you to support - that conscience has an innate potential perfection. This is what he assumes without support or argument in order to conclude conscience will become perfect when blame is removed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Greater satisfaction is tautological because whatever we choose is in the direction of greater satisfaction, but as I've said many times that it is not meaningless. Knowing that whatever we choose is the direction we had to choose has major implications. The other principle: nothing can make us do anything against our will, is not tautological.
Both are tautological and both are useless. If you think the latter is not tautological, then give us a logically conceivable falsifying counterexample.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
It doesn't. There is nothing compatible between free will and determinism. They cancel each other out.
It is only libertarian free will that is incompatible with determinism. Why do you keep ignoring other kinds of free will?
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
No, I'm giving up on you...
See? You are giving up again.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I did not change the subject. I did not say anything that was wrong.
Yes you did. You claimed that compatibilist free will was not the kind of free will that serious philosophical debates are comprised of.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
No, it's his wisdom that is appealing to many people, not his authority.
And yet you've committed the fallacy by merely appealing to him as an authority instead of actually employing any of his arguments or claims. That is the fallacy.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
It can be relevant if you want to show that everything does go back to before we were born. That being said, we don't have to focus on this; we can discuss how the contemplative process in making a present choice is all that is needed to prove determinism true.
That would also be irrrelevant. No-one is arguing with determinism with respect to human behaviour.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
And I've explained to you why the kind of free will you are using to distinguish it from liberatarian free will is also flawed...
No, you haven't. You've only ever complained that it isn't contra-causal free will, and insisted that by pretending it doesn't exist we can somehow do better.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
If will is not free, hard determinism is true, although we don't need to go back that far to determine that our immediate preferences and deliberations are also not free except as a superficial perception. You seem to think it's enough to say that having a preference and being able to act on that preference is a free choice, and that this counts for moral responsibility. This is completely a mistaken notion, but there's no convincing you. You are dead set on your worldview.
You're the one making the mistakes. You're the one who just conflated determinism and hard determinism, for instance. I'm quite prepared to question my worldview. Are you?
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
It exists because you have a definition of what compatibilism is, but it doesn't make it correct.
How many times have we explained to you that definitions cannot be correct or incorrect? It still hasn't penetrated your skull, has it?
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
All you have to do is put this in your browser and it will take you to the file on google, which you can then click on.
Why should I bother looking up some paper you are unable to discuss?
__________________ video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor
According to you, peacegirl, if we look through an optical telescope (that is, one which uses visible light), we're seeing a distant star or planet where it is right now. According to you, there's no difference between the object's apparent position and its actual position.
But if we're using a radio telescope to observe the same object, the object's apparent position will be different from its actual position, due to the finite speed of electromagnetic waves. (Radio waves are a form of light, by the way.)
You've said this. Repeatedly. I can quote you, if you like.
As it happens, there is a very simple way to test this belief of yours. All that we need do is point an optical telescope and a radio telescope at the same object, and see if the two telescopes "see" them in different positions.
And as it happens, this experiment has been done. Many, many times.
Guess what the results are in every single instance?
They don't see them in different positions which makes sense because light has not been detected in either the optical or the radio telescope. I am only referring to images that objects supposedly reflect which then travel through space and time. I don't believe that is true.
they are not really determinists because if they were they could not accept the logic any serious determinist (which you are not) will tell you that
the kind of free will that serious philosophical debates are comprised of
I like how she switched from Strawman to No True Scotsman.
Many professional philosophers, who think about and discuss this stuff on a daily basis, are Compatibilists peacegirl. Is it your claim that they are not serious about philosophy?
LadyShea, they may be serious about philosophy but they are not true determinists.
Quote:
I can give a definition that says three is the sum of one plus one
The time-light correction is completely distinct from the correction made for the planet's travel during transit of the probe. The time-light correction is one of thousands of kilometers, that according to Lessans should not be made at all. Yet we do make it and we do not miss by thousands of kilometers. That proves him wrong.
No it doesn't.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
Of course it does.
I don't think it does.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
Your analysis is just as bad as your analysis regarding determinism.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
And yet you've been completely unable to find fault with either analysis.
There is major fault and I have explained it. It's gobbledegook.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I'm not interested in discussing these topics with you anymore because you're stubborn and will not budge from your position when the truth of determinism is staring you right in the face.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
You're the one who has stubbornly declared she couldn't care less about evidence and intends to never budge from her position no matter how much evidence is against Lessans.
I care very much about evidence. And the evidence points to determinism.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spacemonkey
And who's arguing with determinism anyway? Not me.
they are not really determinists because if they were they could not accept the logic any serious determinist (which you are not) will tell you that
the kind of free will that serious philosophical debates are comprised of
I like how she switched from Strawman to No True Scotsman.
Many professional philosophers, who think about and discuss this stuff on a daily basis, are Compatibilists peacegirl. Is it your claim that they are not serious about philosophy?
LadyShea, they may be serious about philosophy but they are not true determinists.
Quote:
I can give a definition that says three is the sum of one plus one
LOL, you are a treasure.
I can do this and no one can tell me it's wrong. It's my definition and it's useful when I need it to be 3.
She would see the celestial object through the optical telescope in real time, therefore the telescope would be pointed to where the object actually is, whereas the radio telescope readings would be in delayed time, therefore she would be pointing the telescope to where it only appears to be.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
They don't see them in different positions which makes sense because light has not been detected in either the optical or the radio telescope.
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An
Argument Against Compatibilism
Gregg D. Caruso
Abstract
This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in
social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that
our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility
are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In
section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briey discuss
the standard incompatibilist argumentthe so-called consequence
argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychol-
ogy of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent
empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe and others,
reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions are essentially in-
compatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in section 3 by
examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and argue
that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
Determinism, as it is commonly understood in the free will debate, is
the position that every event or action, including human action, is the
inevitable result of preceding events and actions and the laws of nature.1
Incompatibilists maintain that free will is at odds with determinism and
that the two cannot be reconciledif determinism is true, free will is
impossible. Compatibilists, on the other hand, maintain that our ordi-
nary, folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are
completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In this pa-
per, I challenge the claim that compatibilism reects our pretheoretical
beliefs and I present existing results and experimental evidence in social
psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis. In section 1, I spell
out the compatibilist position and briey discuss the standard incom-
patibilist argumentthe so-called consequence argument. In section 2,
I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that,
contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols,
Joshua Knobe and others, reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions
Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689. KRITERION
c 2012 The author
Gregg D. Caruso: The Folk Psychology of Free Will 57
are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in
section 3 by examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and
argue that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument
There are many dierent ways to state the compatibilist position but I
will here focus on what some have called classical compatibilism (e.g.,
Watson, 1975; Kane, 2002). According to classical compatibilism, as
long as we do something we want to dosomething we choose to do
and we are not externally constrained or impeded, we are acting freely.
Put in terms of the voluntary/involuntary distinction, we can say that
free actions are those we do voluntarily, whereas unfree actions are
those we do involuntarily (appropriately qualied).2 A number of well-
known philosophers have held versions of this position, including Thomas
Hobbes, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, W.T. Stace (1952), A.J. Ayer
(1954), Moritz Schlick (1966), Donald Davidson (1973), and Michael
Levin (2004, 2007). Classical compatibilism argues that the traditional
free will debate is a pseudo-problem, the product of a series of concep-
tual or terminological confusions. It maintains that, when the relevant
terms are rightly understood, there is no inconsistency in holding to both
free will and causal determinism. Compatibilists argue that free action
is to be distinguished from unfree action not by the absence of causes, as
incompatibilists insist, but rather by the type of causes at work. That is,
free actions are caused by our desires, wants, or willings, whereas unfree
actions are not. As long as the action is caused by the inner psycholog-
ical states of the agent, and is not externally constrained or impeded,
the action is free on this account.3
Many critics have argued that this denition of freedom is incoherent
and that instead of solving the problem it only camouages it (e.g., Tay-
lor, 1992; Hospers, 1950a,b). The real question, they insist, is whether
or not our wants and desires are themselves caused. Since compatibilists
have to concede that they are, because they accept or assume deter-
minism,4 critics charge that it does not preserve real freedom.5 It is
incoherent, they argue, to claim that an action is both free and causally
determined. If the inner psychological states that determine our choices
and actions are themselves causally determined, how can free will be
preserved? Critics maintain that the real issue, so far as the will is con-
cerned, is not whether we can do what we choose to do, but whether we
can choose our own choice, whether the choice itself issues in accordance
58 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689
with law from some antecedent. For reasons such as these, William
James famously labeled compatibilism a quagmire of evasion (1884),
and Anscombe said it is nothing more than so much gobbledygook
(1971: 46).
outledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973.
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An
Argument Against Compatibilism
Gregg D. Caruso
Abstract
This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in
social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that
our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility
are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In
section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briey discuss
the standard incompatibilist argumentthe so-called consequence
argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychol-
ogy of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent
empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe and others,
reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions are essentially in-
compatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in section 3 by
examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and argue
that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
Determinism, as it is commonly understood in the free will debate, is
the position that every event or action, including human action, is the
inevitable result of preceding events and actions and the laws of nature.1
Incompatibilists maintain that free will is at odds with determinism and
that the two cannot be reconciledif determinism is true, free will is
impossible. Compatibilists, on the other hand, maintain that our ordi-
nary, folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are
completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In this pa-
per, I challenge the claim that compatibilism reects our pretheoretical
beliefs and I present existing results and experimental evidence in social
psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis. In section 1, I spell
out the compatibilist position and briey discuss the standard incom-
patibilist argumentthe so-called consequence argument. In section 2,
I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that,
contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols,
Joshua Knobe and others, reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions
Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689. KRITERION
c 2012 The author
Gregg D. Caruso: The Folk Psychology of Free Will 57
are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in
section 3 by examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and
argue that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument
There are many dierent ways to state the compatibilist position but I
will here focus on what some have called classical compatibilism (e.g.,
Watson, 1975; Kane, 2002). According to classical compatibilism, as
long as we do something we want to dosomething we choose to do
and we are not externally constrained or impeded, we are acting freely.
Put in terms of the voluntary/involuntary distinction, we can say that
free actions are those we do voluntarily, whereas unfree actions are
those we do involuntarily (appropriately qualied).2 A number of well-
known philosophers have held versions of this position, including Thomas
Hobbes, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, W.T. Stace (1952), A.J. Ayer
(1954), Moritz Schlick (1966), Donald Davidson (1973), and Michael
Levin (2004, 2007). Classical compatibilism argues that the traditional
free will debate is a pseudo-problem, the product of a series of concep-
tual or terminological confusions. It maintains that, when the relevant
terms are rightly understood, there is no inconsistency in holding to both
free will and causal determinism. Compatibilists argue that free action
is to be distinguished from unfree action not by the absence of causes, as
incompatibilists insist, but rather by the type of causes at work. That is,
free actions are caused by our desires, wants, or willings, whereas unfree
actions are not. As long as the action is caused by the inner psycholog-
ical states of the agent, and is not externally constrained or impeded,
the action is free on this account.3
Many critics have argued that this denition of freedom is incoherent
and that instead of solving the problem it only camouages it (e.g., Tay-
lor, 1992; Hospers, 1950a,b). The real question, they insist, is whether
or not our wants and desires are themselves caused. Since compatibilists
have to concede that they are, because they accept or assume deter-
minism,4 critics charge that it does not preserve real freedom.5 It is
incoherent, they argue, to claim that an action is both free and causally
determined. If the inner psychological states that determine our choices
and actions are themselves causally determined, how can free will be
preserved? Critics maintain that the real issue, so far as the will is con-
cerned, is not whether we can do what we choose to do, but whether we
can choose our own choice, whether the choice itself issues in accordance
58 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689
with law from some antecedent. For reasons such as these, William
James famously labeled compatibilism a quagmire of evasion (1884),
and Anscombe said it is nothing more than so much gobbledygook
(1971: 46).
outledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973.
Another fallacious appeal to authority.
__________________ video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor
So, if I'm looking at the planet Venus through an optical telescope, I'm looking at an image of the planet. (The planet is reflecting light, not emitting it.) According to you, the apparent position of the planet (when observed through the optical telescope) is the same as its true position, since I'm seeing the planet in "real time."
But if I use an infrared or a radio telescope to fix its position, I'll get a different result, since the infrared or radio telescope is limited by the finite speed of light, while the visible-light telescope isn't.
That's what you're saying?
__________________
“The greatest way to live with honor in this world is to be what we pretend to be.”
Of course not. You refuse to acknowledge reality. It proves Lessans wrong nonetheless.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
There is major fault and I have explained it. It's gobbledegook.
Calling something you don't understand gobbledegook is not to identify or explain any fault.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I care very much about evidence. And the evidence points to determinism.
No-one is arguing against determinism, and you don't care about evidence at all. You've made it quite clear that you will continue to believe Lessans was right no matter what the evidence shows:
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I do not care what you think about Lessans' claim regarding the eyes. You can think whatever you want. I believe he was right even if, by all appearances, it looks like he was wrong.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
You are not a determinist.
Why would you say that? I'm a compatibilist. Compatibilists accept determinism with respect to human choices and behaviour.
__________________ video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor
She would see the celestial object through the optical telescope in real time, therefore the telescope would be pointed to where the object actually is, whereas the radio telescope readings would be in delayed time, therefore she would be pointing the telescope to where it only appears to be.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
They don't see them in different positions which makes sense because light has not been detected in either the optical or the radio telescope.
These seem to be contradictory statements.
You're right. It's obvious that light cannot be detected if it has not arrived at the detector. If it's dark outside and I have a light detector, it won't pick up light until the light have arrived.
Of course not. You refuse to acknowledge reality. It proves Lessans wrong nonetheless.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
There is major fault and I have explained it. It's gobbledegook.
Calling something you don't understand gobbledegook is not to identify or explain any fault.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I care very much about evidence. And the evidence points to determinism.
No-one is arguing against determinism, and you don't care about evidence at all. You've made it quite clear that you will continue to believe Lessans was right no matter what the evidence shows:
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
I do not care what you think about Lessans' claim regarding the eyes. You can think whatever you want. I believe he was right even if, by all appearances, it looks like he was wrong.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
You are not a determinist.
Why would you say that? I'm a compatibilist. Compatibilists accept determinism with respect to human choices and behaviour.
Nope, you are not a determinist because determinists believe that you are not free just because you can choose based on your preferences.
Nope, you are not a determinist because determinists believe that you are not free just because you can choose based on your preferences.
No they don't. That is what incompatibilists (i.e. hard determinists) believe. Determinists can be either compatibilists or incompatibilists. Why are you conflating determinism and hard determinism again? Determinism is a position on whether or not our choices and actions are causally determined. It is not a position on whether or not they are free.
__________________ video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An
Argument Against Compatibilism
Gregg D. Caruso
Abstract
This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in
social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that
our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility
are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In
section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briey discuss
the standard incompatibilist argumentthe so-called consequence
argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychol-
ogy of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent
empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe and others,
reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions are essentially in-
compatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in section 3 by
examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and argue
that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
Determinism, as it is commonly understood in the free will debate, is
the position that every event or action, including human action, is the
inevitable result of preceding events and actions and the laws of nature.1
Incompatibilists maintain that free will is at odds with determinism and
that the two cannot be reconciledif determinism is true, free will is
impossible. Compatibilists, on the other hand, maintain that our ordi-
nary, folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are
completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In this pa-
per, I challenge the claim that compatibilism reects our pretheoretical
beliefs and I present existing results and experimental evidence in social
psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis. In section 1, I spell
out the compatibilist position and briey discuss the standard incom-
patibilist argumentthe so-called consequence argument. In section 2,
I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that,
contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols,
Joshua Knobe and others, reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions
Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689. KRITERION
c 2012 The author
Gregg D. Caruso: The Folk Psychology of Free Will 57
are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in
section 3 by examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and
argue that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument
There are many dierent ways to state the compatibilist position but I
will here focus on what some have called classical compatibilism (e.g.,
Watson, 1975; Kane, 2002). According to classical compatibilism, as
long as we do something we want to dosomething we choose to do
and we are not externally constrained or impeded, we are acting freely.
Put in terms of the voluntary/involuntary distinction, we can say that
free actions are those we do voluntarily, whereas unfree actions are
those we do involuntarily (appropriately qualied).2 A number of well-
known philosophers have held versions of this position, including Thomas
Hobbes, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, W.T. Stace (1952), A.J. Ayer
(1954), Moritz Schlick (1966), Donald Davidson (1973), and Michael
Levin (2004, 2007). Classical compatibilism argues that the traditional
free will debate is a pseudo-problem, the product of a series of concep-
tual or terminological confusions. It maintains that, when the relevant
terms are rightly understood, there is no inconsistency in holding to both
free will and causal determinism. Compatibilists argue that free action
is to be distinguished from unfree action not by the absence of causes, as
incompatibilists insist, but rather by the type of causes at work. That is,
free actions are caused by our desires, wants, or willings, whereas unfree
actions are not. As long as the action is caused by the inner psycholog-
ical states of the agent, and is not externally constrained or impeded,
the action is free on this account.3
Many critics have argued that this denition of freedom is incoherent
and that instead of solving the problem it only camouages it (e.g., Tay-
lor, 1992; Hospers, 1950a,b). The real question, they insist, is whether
or not our wants and desires are themselves caused. Since compatibilists
have to concede that they are, because they accept or assume deter-
minism,4 critics charge that it does not preserve real freedom.5 It is
incoherent, they argue, to claim that an action is both free and causally
determined. If the inner psychological states that determine our choices
and actions are themselves causally determined, how can free will be
preserved? Critics maintain that the real issue, so far as the will is con-
cerned, is not whether we can do what we choose to do, but whether we
can choose our own choice, whether the choice itself issues in accordance
58 Kriterion Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 5689
with law from some antecedent. For reasons such as these, William
James famously labeled compatibilism a quagmire of evasion (1884),
and Anscombe said it is nothing more than so much gobbledygook
(1971: 46).
outledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973.
Another fallacious appeal to authority.
This has nothing to do with an appeal to authority. It is an appeal to common sense. This is only a small part of this abstract. If you want to debate it, that's fine with me.
She would see the celestial object through the optical telescope in real time, therefore the telescope would be pointed to where the object actually is, whereas the radio telescope readings would be in delayed time, therefore she would be pointing the telescope to where it only appears to be.
Quote:
Originally Posted by peacegirl
They don't see them in different positions which makes sense because light has not been detected in either the optical or the radio telescope.
These seem to be contradictory statements.
You're right. It's obvious that light cannot be detected if it has not arrived at the detector. If it's dark outside and I have a light detector, it won't pick up light until the light have arrived.
So, if Suzie wants to see a distant star on an optical telescope, how does she calculate the sky coordinates to point the telescope? If Johnny wants to point a radio telescope at the same star at the same time, does he use the same calculations or different ones?
Classical compatibilism argues that the traditional
free will debate is a pseudo-problem, the product of a series of concep-
tual or terminological confusions. It maintains that, when the relevant
terms are rightly understood, there is no inconsistency in holding to both
free will and causal determinism. Compatibilists argue that free action
is to be distinguished from unfree action not by the absence of causes, as
incompatibilists insist, but rather by the type of causes at work. That is,
free actions are caused by our desires, wants, or willings, whereas unfree
actions are not. As long as the action is caused by the inner psycholog-
ical states of the agent, and is not externally constrained or impeded,
the action is free on this account.3
This is a good summary, actually, somewhat in keeping with my own feelings on the subject (though I prefer to stop at "psuedo-problem"). Peacegirl, where are the logical inconsistencies in the above?
Re: A revolution in thought
Linear Mode
