A revolution in thought

[thedoc]

Integrity has no need of rules

- Albert Camus

Insanity doesn't know any rules. - thedoc

[koan]

Originally Posted by thedoc

Actually I'm not high on anything right now, I'm too tired to think. We just put the grandchildren to bed, the usual struggle, and they finally just fell asleep where they were and I carried them back to bed.

I'm in a similar uncomfortable state.
I went to the doctor today for a strained tendon in my finger and ended up getting acupuncture on my butt for a sciatic problem. Now I'm here, trying to sit on my sore butt and read over 800 pages of posts in this thread.

[LadyShea]

It's the same discussions over and over, feel free to skim

[thedoc]

NO! NO! NO! You need to read every word, every line, and suffer just as all of us have suffered over the last 1 year, 8 months, and 14 days. Don't think you can get off easy just because you are new and pretty. Buckle down and do your homework, or Peacegirl will ignore you. Well, she will soon anyhow, so welcome to the club. Oh and I had a couple months with her on another forum, so don't get any ideas about skimping.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by koan

I'm in a similar uncomfortable state.
I went to the doctor today for a strained tendon in my finger and ended up getting acupuncture on my butt for a sciatic problem. Now I'm here, trying to sit on my sore butt and read over 800 pages of posts in this thread.

Talk about your pain in the butt!

[koan]

Holy crap. I'm still only on page 10 of this thread.

Freethought Forum - View Single Post - A revolution in thought

Originally Posted by peacegirl

"Blame and punishment is the very foundation of our civilization."

Actually... lol
This is a big point you are misunderstanding. No wonder you think Lessans had a major discovery. If civilization was founded on that, you might be right. The foundation of our civilization is the quest for power in its many forms. The acquisition of such power gives us the feeling that we have power over life and serves a death denying function. We mainly get power (esteem) through validation from our peers and our peers are also in need of power for which they may compete or they may attach themselves to powerful figures to attain through proxy.
^
That is what's called a synopsis. It's a really quick summary off the top of my head mostly from Ernest Becker who summarized Rank and Brown.

The reason he abandoned hope for change through altering social conditions was because he saw that Marxism and other socialist movements failed to achieve egalitarian societies and began to suspect that the problem was internal one that caused people to bind themselves to authority figures. Fear, mostly.
^
That is elaboration.

I'm sure I haven't done Becker's work justice with my quick summary but I'm pretty sure I've brought up points that people will consider to be defensible. I can also follow that up with empirical tests done to confirm the hypothesis. Man needs to feel like an object of importance in a world of meaning. How a person achieves that goal varies greatly for each individual.

Repeat question: So, peacegirl, what do you know about evil?

[koan]

I'm going to throw this out there because peacegirl obviously doesn't have an answer and I'm very interested in seeing legitimate discussions about how to solve the problem of "evil" in the world. Perhaps through showing how Lessans is wrong we might get some useful discussion about what may be right.

I offer the following:
Evil is anything that challenges your world view.

That world view includes feelings of safety and security and feeling that your culture, through prosperity, has value. If your culture shows flaws you will feel compelled to fix it because you want to restore value to this thing from which you get esteem, or abandon it to find a culture that gives you that sense of value, or double up blind support of it in cognitive dissonance so you don't have to deal with the threat to your sense of value. Religion often gives people that sense of security and value but those without religion still get that from their social group/country/therapist.

peacegirl's world view includes that she and her father will be the bringers of a New Golden Age. We are evil to her because we don't support her world view. The problem is this, she needs us because she needs validation. Her world view still has no value unless it gets validation. Sucks doesn't it? That's why we call it evil.

If she denies we are playing the role of evil then she is stuck with having to explain why she has told so many people to not read the book when her sole purpose for being here is to get as many people to read the book as possible.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by koan

Holy crap. I'm still only on page 10 of this thread.

You do realize that she has a second 420-page thread, right?

A Revolution in Thought: Part Two - Freethought Forum

[koan]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You do realize that she has a second 420-page thread, right?

A Revolution in Thought: Part Two - Freethought Forum

omg

I'm going to bed.

[But]

Originally Posted by thedoc

You need to go to college,

That doesn't really help with anything, let me tell you. I collect semesters for a living.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by koan

If "man A" can't change his actions unless "man B" changes his actions first... what makes "man B" change? Man C? Is there an endless "man A-Z" repeat? and how do you find "man infinity" to start the chain reaction?

Interestingly, is the reverse(external instead of internal endless loop) of the fallacy that misled Lessans' conclusions about eyes.

#8: Homunculus Fallacy

There will need to be a Great Transition where people choose to be citizens. If they sign up for citizenship, they agree to stop blaming, and they will start the new world.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's true, but there is one hitch. You need a justificaton. How can you come up with an excuse such as, "I can't help myself because my will is not free" when you are already excused. Only in a free will environment can you use this as an excuse to present to your conscience.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I just gave you the justification. It was the very next sentence in my post: "We have the perfect excuse to present to our conscience - we couldn't have done otherwise as we were just moving in the direction of greater satisfaction." And in your scenario I am not already excused by my conscience. Hence I can still be motivated to rationalize an excuse.

You are not excused by conscience if what you are contemplating is a first blow (which is the part of responsibility that cannot be shifted) when the world stops blaming. That's just the point.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Because you cannot lie to yourself when no one is holding you responsible. You can present your rationalization to your conscience, but why do you need a rationalization? You are already excused. The fact that you cannot come up with an excuse because you're already excused, will bother your conscience to no end. That's what prevents the act. The consequences of a hurtful action that is excused by others is horrible to contemplate because there is no excuse you can come up with that will satisfy your conscience.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I need a rationalization because my conscience is holding me responsible. But then I can come up with the excuse that I couldn't have done otherwise because I was compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction. Hence my conscience is appeased and I am free to harm anybody I like. Obviously this will not be the case, so something must be making me still feel morally responsible and blameworthy - but then whatever this is will also be applicable to others, making me feel justified in blaming them for their actions too.

Your logic is completely off Spacemonkey. Empirically this can be proven. Read and reread if you really want to understand this knoweldge. Conscience will not allow someone to do what cannot be justified, and he cannot justify or rationalize behavior that is a hurt to someone else when he is already excused and knows the behavior is wrong (a hurt).

p. 68 Once he chooses to act on his desire whether it is a minor or more
serious crime he doesn’t come right out and say, “I hurt that person
not because I was compelled to do it against my will but only because
I wanted to do it,” because the standards of right and wrong prevent
him from deriving any satisfaction out of such honesty when this will
only evoke blame, criticism, and punishment of some sort for his
desires. Therefore, he is compelled to justify those actions considered
wrong with excuses, extenuating circumstances, and the shifting of
guilt to someone or something else as the cause, to absorb part if not
all the responsibility which allowed him to absolve his conscience in a
world of judgment and to hurt others in many cases with impunity
since he could demonstrate why he was compelled to do what he really
didn’t want to do.You see it happen all the time, even when a child
says, “Look what you made me do” when you know you didn’t make
him do anything.

Spilling a glass of milk because he was careless and
not wishing to be blamed, the boy searches quickly for an excuse to
shift the responsibility to something that does not include him. Why
else would the boy blame his own carelessness on somebody or
something else if not to avoid the criticism of his parents? It is also
true that the boy’s awareness that he would be blamed and punished
for carelessness — which is exactly what took place — makes him
think very carefully about all that he does to prevent the blame and
punishment he doesn’t want. A great confusion exists because it is
assumed that if man does something to hurt another he could always
excuse his actions by saying, “I couldn’t help myself because my will
is not free.” This is another aspect of the implications which turned
philosophers off from a thorough investigation. In the following
dialogue, my friend asks for clarification regarding certain critical
points.

“You read my mind. I really don’t know how you plan to solve
this enigmatic corollary but it seems to me that this knowledge would
give man a perfect excuse for taking advantage of others without any
fear of consequences. If the boy knows for a fact that his will is not
free, why couldn’t he use this as an excuse in an attempt to shift his
responsibility or use any other excuse he feels will sound believable for
the same reason?”

This last question is a superficial perception of inaccurate
reasoning. Because of this general confusion with words through
which you have been compelled to see a distorted reality, it appears at
first glance that the dethronement of free will would allow man to shift
his responsibility all the more and take advantage of not being blamed
to excuse or justify any desires heretofore kept under control by the
fear of punishment and public opinion which judged his actions in
accordance with standards of right and wrong, but this is inaccurate
simply because it is mathematically impossible to shift your
responsibility, to excuse or justify getting away with something, when
you know that you will not be blamed for what you do. In other
words, it is only possible to attempt a shift of your responsibility for
hurting someone or for doing what is judged improper when you are
held responsible by a code of standards that criticizes you in advance
for doing something considered wrong by others.

The very act of
justifying or excusing your behavior is an indication that the person
or people to whom you are presenting this justification must judge the
behavior unacceptable in some way, otherwise, there would be no need
for it. They are interested to know why you could do such a thing
which compels you for satisfaction to think up a reasonable excuse to
extenuate the circumstances and mitigate their unfavorable opinion
of your action. If you do what others judge to be right is it necessary
to lie or offer excuses or say that your will is not free and you couldn’t
help yourself, when no one is saying you could help yourself?

< snip >

How is it humanly possible for you to desire lying
to me or to yourself when your actions are not being judged or
blamed, in other words, when you are not being given an opportunity
to lie; and how is it possible for you to make any effort to shift your
responsibility when no one holds you responsible? In the world of free
will man was able to absolve his conscience in a world of right and
wrong and get away with murder the very things our new knowledge
positively prevents.

It should be obvious that all your judgments of what is right and
wrong in human conduct are based upon an ethical standard such as
the Ten Commandments which came into existence out of God’s will,
as did everything else, and consequently you have come to believe
through a fallacious association of symbols that these words which
judge the actions of others are accurate. How was it possible for the
Ten Commandments to come into existence unless religion believed
in free will? But in reality when murder is committed it is neither
wrong nor right, just what someone at a certain point in his life
considered better for himself under circumstances which included the
judgment of others and the risks involved; and when the government
or personal revenge retaliates by taking this person’s life, this too, was
neither right nor wrong, just what gave greater satisfaction.

Neither
the government or the murderer are to blame for what each judged
better under their particular set of circumstances; but whether they
will decide to think and react as before will depend not on any moral
values, not on habit, not on custom, not on any standards of right
and wrong, but solely on whether the conditions under which they
were previously motivated remain the same, and they do not remain
as before because the knowledge that man’s will is not free reveals facts
never before understood. We can now see how the confusion of words
and the inability to perceive certain type relations have compelled
many thinkers who could not get beyond this impasse to assume, as
Durant did, that if man knew his will was not free it would give him
a perfect opportunity to take advantage of this knowledge.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Your reasoning is going into a ditch. We are compelled to do that which will not make us feel guilty. We are not compelled to do anything that would make us feel guilty. That's just the point.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You've completely missed my point. I won't feel guilty when considering a potentially harmful action because I will know that if I were to do that action I would not be blameworthy as I was simply moving in the direction of greater satisfaction.

You are missing the most crucial part. You cannot use this as an excuse; your conscience won't let you.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If I will still anticipate feeling guilty because nothing can compel me to do something I do not want to do, then I will also be able to blame others for harmful actions that they were not compelled to do against their desires (despite being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction).

You are getting confused with the principle of "nothing can compel you to do something you don't want to do". Under the changed conditions nothing in this world could make you hurt someone against your will, if you don't want to, which is absolutely true. That principle is just a clarification that if someone hurts another (intentionally or unintentionally) he cannot shift what is his responsibility in the sense that he is the one who performed the action. I clarified this with LadyShea. This is not about blaming the person because we now know that once the choice was made, it was a compulsion beyond his control (in determinism there is no distinction between an experienced compulsion and this kind of compulsion because no action, or movement from the spot called here to the spot called there is free since we can only move in one direction each and every moment of time).

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No, it's a spectacular example of your lack of understanding and poor insight. Your logic is completely off, yet you think it's sound reasoning. Your first premise is faulty.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

What was my first premise, and why was it faulty? You still haven't done anything to address my point. You won't because you can't. It remains true that Lessans uses one side of his non-equation when considering conscience, and the other when considering the blameworthiness of others, but fails to see that the opposite sides of his non-equation are equally well applicable in each case. He doesn't even consider this obvious point or see it as a potential problem. It really is appallingly bad reasoning.

All this shows is how truly confused you are. You will have to let go of this false logic to understand this discovery. If you can't do this, you will continue to say you are right, even though you are not.

[LadyShea]

FYI the root of all evil is fear, because fear is the most powerful human motivator.

Yoda had it right.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Conscience will not allow someone to do what cannot be justified
You cannot use this as an excuse; your conscience won't let you.

This is the assertion you need to support. Until you demonstrate that conscience works this way, all of Lessans and your arguments are speculative.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by koan

I'm in a similar uncomfortable state.
I went to the doctor today for a strained tendon in my finger and ended up getting acupuncture on my butt for a sciatic problem. Now I'm here, trying to sit on my sore butt and read over 800 pages of posts in this thread.

Years ago I was changing the engine in my truck and put my sacroilliac out of joint and pinched the sciatic nerve, I went to a Chiropractor for an adjustment. When I was teaching metal shop in Jr. HS some of the students started calling me the 'Iron Man'. The name of the Chiropractor I went to was Blacksmith, and I was always amused that the 'Iron Man' went to a 'Blacksmith' to get fixed.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are not excused by conscience if what you are contemplating is a first blow (which is the part of responsibility that cannot be shifted) when the world stops blaming. That's just the point.

Sure I am. I am excused by conscience because I was only moving in the direction of greater satisfaction and couldn't have done otherwise. And if this is not a satisfactory justification for my conscience then it isn't going to convince me not to blame others either.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Your logic is completely off Spacemonkey. Empirically this can be proven. Read and reread if you really want to understand this knoweldge. Conscience will not allow someone to do what cannot be justified, and he cannot justify or rationalize behavior that is a hurt to someone else when he is already excused and knows the behavior is wrong (a hurt).

You aren't giving me any reason to think that my logic is off. Empirically your claims have not been proven, and reading and rereading Lessans' claims does not give me any reason to agree with them. Being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction is either a satisfactory excuse or it is not. If it is, then I will not consider others blameworthy and will have a clear conscience no matter what I contemplate doing. If it is not, then I will feel guilty when contemplating harming others and will still consider others blameworthy for doing the same.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are missing the most crucial part. You cannot use this as an excuse; your conscience won't let you.

You don't know that. It's just another faith claim. And if my conscience won't be satisfied with the excuse that I was just moving in the direction of greater satisfaction and would still be doing something morally wrong by harming others, then that same excuse will also be rejected when it comes to the harmful acts of others, i.e. I will still view others as blameworthy.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are getting confused with the principle of "nothing can compel you to do something you don't want to do", but under the changed conditions you won't want to do anything that can hurt another." That principle is just a clarification that the agent, the person who made the choice, is the one who who performed the action, but it is not about blaming the person because we now know that once the choice was made, it was a compulsion beyond his control (I am not distinguishing between experienced compulsions and this kind of compulsion; no action or movement from the spot called here to the spot called there is free).

You are wrong because a guilty conscience is not just about clarifying that I am the one causally responsible for the harm I have caused. It is also a matter of feeling that I have done something morally wrong by causing this harm. So if I would be doing something wrong that I should feel bad about by harming another (despite being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction), then other people who do the same are also doing something wrong that I can blame them for (despite their being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction). Conscience tells us when we have done something we should feel bad about, and the same faculty will also tell us that others doing the same thing are doing something they should feel bad about. And we can always blame others for doing things they should feel bad about. We cannot and would not hold ourselves responsible via our conscience for something we do not consider blameworthy in others.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

All this shows is how truly confused you are. You will have to let go of this false logic to understand this discovery. If you can't do this, you will continue to say you are right, even though you are not.

You've said nothing at all here to address my point, so I will repeat it: "It remains true that Lessans uses one side of his non-equation when considering conscience, and the other when considering the blameworthiness of others, but fails to see that the opposite sides of his non-equation are equally well applicable in each case. He doesn't even consider this obvious point or see it as a potential problem. It really is appallingly bad reasoning."

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

There will need to be a Great Transition where people choose to be citizens. If they sign up for citizenship, they agree to stop blaming, and they will start the new world.

And herein lies the problem that Lessans/Peacegirl don't seem to understand, they claim that these qualities are inborn and imutable laws of nature. If the principles are part of our nature there is no need for agreement, people would act this way without any prompting from the outside. The fact that people do not act this way proves that these principles are not innate and automatic. Agreement only creates an artificial environment that will fall appart at the first stress, and that stress will come quickly as people realize that they can 'get away' with things because there are no consequences.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by koan

omg

I'm going to bed.

Koan, 420 + 904 + 9 = is only 1,333 pages to read, that's 33,278 posts in the 3 threads plus this one. I don't think you have time for sleep, - or work, - eating Maybe? - and definately no SEX ! ! ! Have fun

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by koan

I'm in a similar uncomfortable state.
I went to the doctor today for a strained tendon in my finger and ended up getting acupuncture on my butt for a sciatic problem. Now I'm here, trying to sit on my sore butt and read over 800 pages of posts in this thread.

Did you try a pillow. Maybe that will take the pressure off. I hope you feel better.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by koan

Holy crap. I'm still only on page 10 of this thread.

Freethought Forum - View Single Post - A revolution in thought

Actually... lol
This is a big point you are misunderstanding. No wonder you think Lessans had a major discovery. If civilization was founded on that, you might be right. The foundation of our civilization is the quest for power in its many forms. The acquisition of such power gives us the feeling that we have power over life and serves a death denying function. We mainly get power (esteem) through validation from our peers and our peers are also in need of power for which they may compete or they may attach themselves to powerful figures to attain through proxy.
^
That is what's called a synopsis. It's a really quick summary off the top of my head mostly from Ernest Becker who summarized Rank and Brown.

Obtaining power may be a need for some people; and fear of death may be another motivating factor as to why people do what they do, but Lessans was correct in saying that the cornerstone of all law and order up until now has been blame and punishment. Those that were charged with creating and enforcing this system had to believe not only that the people blamed were doing something wrong, but that they had the free will to do otherwise, which required the justification of this belief in order to absolve their conscience. In other words, they had to believe that man's will was free in order to justify the enforcement of their laws so civilization could develop. Without blame and punishment we would not have reached the outposts of this coming Golden Age. Every age was necessary, but now that mankind has reached the next stage in his development, peaceful coexistence is going to be the next epoch.

Originally Posted by koan

The reason he abandoned hope for change through altering social conditions was because he saw that Marxism and other socialist movements failed to achieve egalitarian societies and began to suspect that the problem was internal one that caused people to bind themselves to authority figures. Fear, mostly.
^
That is elaboration.

I'm sure I haven't done Becker's work justice with my quick summary but I'm pretty sure I've brought up points that people will consider to be defensible. I can also follow that up with empirical tests done to confirm the hypothesis. Man needs to feel like an object of importance in a world of meaning. How a person achieves that goal varies greatly for each individual.

Repeat question: So, peacegirl, what do you know about evil?

Repeat answer: A lot.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

FYI the root of all evil is fear, because fear is the most powerful human motivator.

Yoda had it right.

I agree. We need to feel secure in life and anything that threatens that security we instinctively try to remove. It's called self-preservation.

http://www.businessballs.com/maslow.htm

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

The law of gravity may hold in all actual cases, but fails in counterfactual but logically consistent possible ways the world might have been. Again, this is just the difference between logical and causal necessity. It is not really controversial. It is not a point of of disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists.

You are being ridiculous. The compatibilist notion of freedom is perfectly consistent with determinism. All it requires is freedom from experienced psychological compulsion and coercion, and the ability to act in accordance with one's choices. It doesn't require freedom from causal determination, so it does not contradict determinism.

Compatibilist free will: The freedom to choose without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion which renders a choice highly resistant to variation in antecedent causal conditions (i.e. no 'compulsion' beyond mere causal determination), and without coercion, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices.

Determinism: The thesis that every event or state of affairs is causally determined by previous events or states of affairs, such that given initial conditions and causal laws, no events or states of affairs other than those which actually occur are causally possible.

These two definitions are consistent with each other. The first even specifically states that it is not ruling out the mere causal determination of our choices. If you think you see some inconsistency here, then it is up to you to explain what the hell you are talking about.

You are again just mindlessly asserting what you would like to be true. In reality, the compatibilist notion of freedom exists and is perfectly consistent with determinism. Freedom from compulsion and coercion, and the ability to act in accordance with one's choices is a form of freedom by definition, it undoubtedly exists, and it does not contradict determinism.

(Causal determination is what holds in a specific case where an event is causally determined. Causal determinism is what you get when causal determination holds universally in all cases.)

So what does it mean for a distinction to be "watered down"? Where did I present any such 'watered down' distinction, and why is it problematic? I think you are again just rejecting any and all distinctions and definitions that you fear can be used to refute your unreasoned position.

Of course I am repeating myself. You keep repeating the same false assertions while ignoring my explanations for why they are wrong. I will keep repeating why you are wrong until you start addressing what I am saying. In this instance, you keep refusing to distinguish between the two senses of being able to choose otherwise. I fully agree that the person free of compatibilist compulsion could not have done otherwise in the exact same causal scenario. But for the reasons I have given, I maintain that this is irrelevant to blameworthiness. You keep asking how the person could have done otherwise, and I keep explaining to you that he could have done otherwise in the sense that in slightly different but relevantly similar antecedent circumstances, different causal conditions would have determined a different resulting choice. This kind of ability to choose otherwise does not need proving, and it is the only kind that matters for blameworthiness because it is this kind which distinguishes between cases where blame will and will not be effective in influencing future behavior.

If you think you have shown where compatibilism is flawed then you are utterly delusional. You haven't. What was the flaw? All you've ever done is repeatedly reject it and assert that it is wrong.

You asked how the person could have chosen otherwise, and have just answered your own question (by agreeing with my answer). However, that whatever he chooses will be what he considers to be the most preferable option is completely irrelevant to blameworthiness. This isn't a compulsion in the relevant sense which I have defined and justified for you.

All that is needed for blameworthiness is the compatibilist notion of freedom I have defined for you. I explained why this is the relevant kind of freedom and why it justifies blame, and you still have never once even touched that argument. (In short, it was that the compatibilist notion of freedom establishes freedom from the kind of compulsion that would render blame ineffective in influencing future behavior in relevantly similar scenarios.) And you know you can't show me what you claim above without relying upon your father's big fat assumption about the innate potential perfection of conscience.

Well, duh! Of course they cannot be separated if the two are just like each other. But they are not, and I just explained to you the relevant difference between them. The person out of the wheelchair has the ability to act in accordance with his choice to walk, whereas the wheelchair-bound individual does not. Only the person not in the wheelchair meets the definition of compatibilist freedom with respect to choosing to walk, so the two are obviously not just like each other.

I'm sure you do. I'm doing just fine.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are not excused by conscience if what you are contemplating is a first blow (which is the part of responsibility that cannot be shifted) when the world stops blaming. That's just the point.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Sure I am. I am excused by conscience because I was only moving in the direction of greater satisfaction and couldn't have done otherwise. And if this is not a satisfactory justification for my conscience then it isn't going to convince me not to blame others either.

You are not excused by conscience. In the new world you can do anything you want. If you want to steal, people's doors are going to be unlocked so all you have to do is take what you want. You will not be blamed even if you steal all of someone's belongings while he is watching. See if you can do it.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Your logic is completely off Spacemonkey. Empirically this can be proven. Read and reread if you really want to understand this knoweldge. Conscience will not allow someone to do what cannot be justified, and he cannot justify or rationalize behavior that is a hurt to someone else when he is already excused and knows the behavior is wrong (a hurt).

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You aren't giving me any reason to think that my logic is off. Empirically your claims have not been proven, and reading and rereading Lessans' claims does not give me any reason to agree with them. Being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction is either a satisfactory excuse or it is not. If it is, then I will not consider others blameworthy and will have a clear conscience no matter what I contemplate doing. If it is not, then I will feel guilty when contemplating harming others and will still consider others blameworthy for doing the same.

Being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction cannot be used as an excuse when you are already excused. As Lessans stated: “This proves conclusively that the only time man can say, “I couldn’t help myself because my will is not free,” or offer any other kind of excuse, is if someone said he could help himself or blamed him in any way so he could make this effort to shift his responsibility." Why would you attempt to offer an excuse when no one is holding you reponsible? We are not going to judge you at all, wrong or right.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are missing the most crucial part. You cannot use this as an excuse; your conscience won't let you.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You don't know that. It's just another faith claim. And if my conscience won't be satisfied with the excuse that I was just moving in the direction of greater satisfaction and would still be doing something morally wrong by harming others, then that same excuse will also be rejected when it comes to the harmful acts of others, i.e. I will still view others as blameworthy.

But that's just the point; you can't do something morally wrong because you cannot excuse what you are about to do without advance justification, and you are denied the advance justification when all blame is removed.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are getting confused with the principle of "nothing can compel you to do something you don't want to do", but under the changed conditions you won't want to do anything that can hurt another." That principle is just a clarification that the agent, the person who made the choice, is the one who who performed the action, but it is not about blaming the person because we now know that once the choice was made, it was a compulsion beyond his control (I am not distinguishing between experienced compulsions and this kind of compulsion; no action or movement from the spot called here to the spot called there is free).

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are wrong because a guilty conscience is not just about clarifying that I am the one causally responsible for the harm I have caused. It is also a matter of feeling that I have done something morally wrong by causing this harm.

Don't you think I know that Spacemonkey? I've only been trying to clarify this for two days now.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

So if I would be doing something wrong that I should feel bad about by harming another (despite being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction), then other people who do the same are also doing something wrong that I can blame them for (despite their being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction).

But you are assuming that you will still be able to cause this harm under the changed conditions, which is the very thing that is prevented. And other people are also prevented from causing this harm once all blame is removed from the environment. That is the two-sided equation, and you haven't understood it yet.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Conscience tells us when we have done something we should feel bad about, and the same faculty will also tell us that others doing the same thing are doing something they should feel bad about. And we can always blame others for doing things they should feel bad about. We cannot and would not hold ourselves responsible via our conscience for something we do not consider blameworthy in others.

Again, you are assuming that people are going to do those things that justify this blame. But if by removing the blame, they are prevented from doing those things that hurt others, there is no need for blame. You are putting the cart before the horse.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

All this shows is how truly confused you are. You will have to let go of this false logic to understand this discovery. If you can't do this, you will continue to say you are right, even though you are not.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You've said nothing at all here to address my point, so I will repeat it: "It remains true that Lessans uses one side of his non-equation when considering conscience, and the other when considering the blameworthiness of others, but fails to see that the opposite sides of his non-equation are equally well applicable in each case. He doesn't even consider this obvious point or see it as a potential problem. It really is appallingly bad reasoning."

No, it is you who is missing the most important aspect of this equation. If you cannot justify your actions, your conscience will not allow you to hurt others. When you know you are going to be forgiven for whatever you do, because no one is going to judge what you do, right or wrong, you cannot find the justification you need in order to follow through with your contemplated actions that could harm another. You cannot move in this direction for greater satisfaction. It's a psychological law of man's nature that conscience will not allow. And please stop calling this a non-equation.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Where would it have failed to hold if all apples that are dropped in every case fall to the ground?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

The law of gravity may hold in all actual cases, but fails in counterfactual but logically consistent possible ways the world might have been. Again, this is just the difference between logical and causal necessity. It is not really controversial. It is not a point of of disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists.

So then it's okay that I use the term "causal necessity" as being inconsistent with free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Saying this a hundred times or a thousand times or a hundred thousand times isn't going to change the fact that the compatibilist kind of freedom that you defined for me is in any way consistent with determinism.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are being ridiculous. The compatibilist notion of freedom is perfectly consistent with determinism. All it requires is freedom from experienced psychological compulsion and coercion, and the ability to act in accordance with one's choices. It doesn't require freedom from causal determination, so it does not contradict determinism.

If one is not free from causal determination, he is not free. He can only be held responsible if he is free, and your kind of freedom (the unrestrained ability to choose between alternatives) is incompatible.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Compatibilist free will: The freedom to choose without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion which renders a choice highly resistant to variation in antecedent causal conditions (i.e. no 'compulsion' beyond mere causal determination), and without coercion, and to be able to act in accordance with one's choices.

Determinism: The thesis that every event or state of affairs is causally determined by previous events or states of affairs, such that given initial conditions and causal laws, no events or states of affairs other than those which actually occur are causally possible.

These two definitions are consistent with each other. The first even specifically states that it is not ruling out the mere causal determination of our choices. If you think you see some inconsistency here, then it is up to you to explain what the hell you are talking about.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's where you are wrong. In reality, there is no kind of freedom that is consistent with determinism. None whatsoever. And don't you mean "causal determinism"? I cannot find the phrase "causal determination" in the online dictionary.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are again just mindlessly asserting what you would like to be true. In reality, the compatibilist notion of freedom exists and is perfectly consistent with determinism. Freedom from compulsion and coercion, and the ability to act in accordance with one's choices is a form of freedom by definition, it undoubtedly exists, and it does not contradict determinism.

If we are programmed to do something a certain way (I'm not saying we are automatons that don't have agency, but this example will hopefully give you a little more insight into my argument), and we hurt someone due to the antecedent conditions that came before said action, how can we be blamed for performing that action that was already set in motion?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

(Causal determination is what holds in a specific case where an event is causally determined. Causal determinism is what you get when causal determination holds universally in all cases.)

I don't see how you can have causal determinism and not have causal determination, so this difference in phrasing must only be in reference to a particular example.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's not what I meant by pure. I only meant watered down.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

So what does it mean for a distinction to be "watered down"? Where did I present any such 'watered down' distinction, and why is it problematic? I think you are again just rejecting any and all distinctions and definitions that you fear can be used to refute your unreasoned position.

My position is very well reasoned. Your analysis of what you consider free is a watered down conception of the meaning of free will that incompatibilists say does not exist.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You keep repeating yourself. Just because someone can make a choice that is not controlled by a compulsion does not mean that he could choose otherwise in a situation where the choice has already been made. This is completely theoretical as Lessans demonstrated. The only way you can prove that someone could do otherwise (the kind of freedom that you believe justifies blameworthiness), is if you can go back in time to see if he could have made a different choice UNDER THE SAME EXACT CONDITIONS. Your standard for determining this freedom is not correct. This is not related to the fact that people can act differently under similar antecedent condition. We know this is true, but this doesn't make their will any more free than the person who cannot act differently due to an experienced compulsion.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Of course I am repeating myself. You keep repeating the same false assertions while ignoring my explanations for why they are wrong. I will keep repeating why you are wrong until you start addressing what I am saying. In this instance, you keep refusing to distinguish between the two senses of being able to choose otherwise. I fully agree that the person free of compatibilist compulsion could not have done otherwise in the exact same causal scenario. But for the reasons I have given, I maintain that this is irrelevant to blameworthiness. You keep asking how the person could have done otherwise, and I keep explaining to you that he could have done otherwise in the sense that in slightly different but relevantly similar antecedent circumstances, different causal conditions would have determined a different resulting choice. This kind of ability to choose otherwise does not need proving, and it is the only kind that matters for blameworthiness because it is this kind which distinguishes between cases where blame will and will not be effective in influencing future behavior.

Of course the ability to choose otherwise needs proving. What a cop-out Spacemonkey. That will give you a free pass to tell me I'm wrong without having to prove it. That's foul play because a discovery involves proof, so you can't just make an assertion that you can judge someone blameworthy based on your brand of free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I think you are the one who is delusional. You are entitled to keep your position and act on that belief by blaming those you feel could have acted differently.

I believe compatibilism is flawed and I have showed you where. Take it or leave it.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If you think you have shown where compatibilism is flawed then you are utterly delusional. You haven't. What was the flaw? All you've ever done is repeatedly reject it and assert that it is wrong.

I've continued to defend determinism by showing you that there is a contradiction, and you keep telling me I haven't shown you.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

He could have chosen otherwise HAD HE WANTED TO; NOTHING WAS STOPPING HIM BUT HIS DESIRE WHICH CAN ONLY CHOOSE THAT WHICH IS MOST PREFERABLE AMONG ONE OR MORE OPTIONS.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You asked how the person could have chosen otherwise, and have just answered your own question (by agreeing with my answer). However, that whatever he chooses will be what he considers to be the most preferable option is completely irrelevant to blameworthiness. This isn't a compulsion in the relevant sense which I have defined and justified for you.

That is where you are wrong. He would have chosen otherwise if he had desired to, which would have compelled him to make a different choice than the one he chose, but he had no such option available at that precise moment that would have compelled him to prefer a different choice than the one he acted upon. This is very relevant to the discussion of blameworthiness. In fact it's central.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm not arguing what kind of freedom is needed for blameworthiness because there is none. If you can accept that man's will is not free [temporarily] I could show you that the very thing you want to be actualized (moral responsibility) is being prevented by your notion of blameworthiness.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

All that is needed for blameworthiness is the compatibilist notion of freedom I have defined for you. I explained why this is the relevant kind of freedom and why it justifies blame, and you still have never once even touched that argument. (In short, it was that the compatibilist notion of freedom establishes freedom from the kind of compulsion that would render blame ineffective in influencing future behavior in relevantly similar scenarios.) And you know you can't show me what you claim above without relying upon your father's big fat assumption about the innate potential perfection of conscience.

Unfortunately, threats of punishment do not always deter future behavior because people still perform all kinds of heinous acts taking into consideration that they would be blamed if caught. My father made no fat assumptions that when all blame is removed from the environment, moral responsibility goes up, not down. Conscience get stronger, and man is finally able to prevent from coming back that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But if the person who can walk or not walk (i.e., nothing physically preventing him from walking which is your definition of free will) is just like the person in the wheelchair --- if choosing to walk is the only choice he could make at a particular moment --- then you cannot separate the two.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Well, duh! Of course they cannot be separated if the two are just like each other. But they are not, and I just explained to you the relevant difference between them. The person out of the wheelchair has the ability to act in accordance with his choice to walk, whereas the wheelchair-bound individual does not. Only the person not in the wheelchair meets the definition of compatibilist freedom with respect to choosing to walk, so the two are obviously not just like each other.

It's delusional to think that some people are free in a deterministic framework. If I can walk but I am programmed to move right instead of left, how can I be judged negatively for moving right, the very thing I have been programmed to do? Determinism does involve the agent, but he is still acting upon all of the factors that force his hand when deciding which choice is preferable, so you can't call it free in any sense of the word.

2. Two Models of Control and Determinism's Apparent Threat to Free Will

Determinism poses at least two different sorts of threats to free will. In each case, we can begin with the theory-neutral definition of free will set out in section one: the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility. This characterization of free will in terms of control can be developed in two ways. One concerns an agent's freedom over alternatives. Another concerns the source of an agent's actions. Incompatibilists have rightly exploited both. Each builds upon a different model of control, and each has instigated a different incompatibilist formulation of the free will problem.

2.1 Garden of Forking Paths Models and Alternative Possibilities Worries

A natural way to think of an agent's control over her conduct at a moment in time is in terms of her ability to select among, or choose between, alternative courses of action.[8] This picture of control stems from common features of our perspectives as practical deliberators settling on courses of action. If a person is choosing between voting for Gore as opposed to Bush, it is plausible to assume that her freedom with regard to her voting consists, at least partially, in her ability to choose between these two alternatives. On this account, acting with free will requires alternative possibilities. A natural way to model this account of free will is in terms of an agent's future as a garden of forking paths branching off from a single past. A locus of freely willed action arises when the present offers, from an agent's (singular) past, more than one path into the future. Borrowing from the Argentine fabulist Borges, let us call this the Garden of Forking Paths model of control.[9] Let us say, as the Garden of Forking Paths suggests, that when a person acts of her own free will, she could have acted otherwise. Her ability to have acted otherwise is underwritten by her ability to have selected amongst, or chosen between, alternative courses of action.

Unpacking free will by appeal to the Garden of Forking Paths model immediately suggests that determinism might be a threat to it. For determinism, understood in the strict sense characterized above, tells us that, at any time, given the facts of the past and the laws of nature, only one future is possible. But the Garden of Forking Paths model suggests that a freely willing agent could have acted other than she did and, hence, that more than one future is possible.

Here is an incompatibilist argument that codifies the considerations set out above:
A.Any agent, x, performs any act a of x's own free will iff x has control over a.
B.x has control over a only if x has the ability to select among alternative courses of action to act a.
C.If x has the ability to select among alternative courses of action to act a, then there are alternative courses of action to act a open to x (i.e., x could have done otherwise than a).
D.If determinism is true, then only one future is possible given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature.
E.If only one future is possible given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, then there are no alternative courses of action to any act open to any agent (i.e., no agent could have done otherwise than she actually does).
F.Therefore, if determinism is true, it is not the case that any agent, x, performs any act, a, of her own free will.[10]

For ease of reference and discussion throughout this entry, let us simplify the above argument as follows:
1.If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise (A-C).
2.If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does (D-E).
3.Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (F).

Call this simplified argument the Classical Incompatibilist Argument. According to the argument, if determinism is true, no one has access to alternatives in the way required by the Garden of Forking Paths model.[11]

2.2 Source Models and Source Worries

Here is a different way to develop the notion of control. An agent's control consists in her playing a crucial role in the production of her actions.[12] Think in terms of the transparent difference between those events that are products of one's agency and those that are merely bodily happenings. For instance, consider the choice to pick up a cup of coffee as opposed to the event of one's heart beating or one's blood circulating. In the latter cases, one recognizes events happening to one; in the former, one is the source and producer of that happening. Control is understood as one's being the source whence her actions emanate. On this model, a Source model of control, one's actions issue from one's self (in a suitable manner).

Fixing just upon the Source model, how might determinism pose a threat to free will? If determinism is true, then for any person, there are facts of the past prior to her birth that, when combined with the laws of nature, provide causally sufficient conditions for the production of her actions. But if this is so, then, while it might be true that an agent herself provides a source of her action, that source, the one provided by her, itself has a further source that originates outside of her. Hence, she, as an agent, is not the ultimate source of her actions. What is meant here by an ultimate source, and not just a source? When an agent is an ultimate source of her action, some condition necessary for her action originates with the agent herself. It cannot be located in places and times prior to the agent's freely willing her action. If an agent is not the ultimate source of her actions, then her actions do not originate in her, and if her actions are the outcomes of conditions guaranteeing them, how can she be said to control them? The conditions sufficient for their occurrence were already in place long before she even existed!

Here is an incompatibilist argument that codifies the considerations set out above:

A.Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a.
B.x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a.
C.If x is the ultimate source of a, then some condition, b, necessary for a, originates with x.
D.If any condition, b, originates with x, then there are no conditions sufficient for b independent of x.
E.If determinism is true, then the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.
F.If the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future, then for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x (in x's remote past, before x's birth) that are sufficient for b.
G.If, for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x that are sufficient for b, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from C and D.)

H.If determinism is true, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from E, F, and G.)

I.Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent, x, performs any action, a, of her own free will. (This follows from A, B, and H.)[13]

For ease of reference and discussion throughout this entry, let us simplify the above argument as follows:

1.A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source (A-B).
2.If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions (C-H).
3.Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (I).

Call this simplified argument the Source Incompatibilist Argument. It is important to see that the demand for alternative possibilities as illustrated on the Garden of Forking Paths Model is not (at least not obviously) relevant to this incompatibilist argument. Suppose, as the Garden of Forking Paths Model suggests, that a putatively freely willing agent had access to the relevant sort of alternative possibilities. According to the Source Incompatibilist Argument, a further condition is that she must have been the ultimate source of her freely willed actions. Furthermore, even if, for some reason, agency of the sort indicated by the Garden of Forking Paths model were not necessary for free will, the Source Incompatibilist Argument would carry independent force. Hence, grant for the sake of argument that it is possible for an agent to act of her own free will without the relevant sort of alternative possibilities. According to the Source Incompatibilist Argument, for an agent to take the particular path that she takes and in doing so act of her own free will, she has to be the ultimate source of that path. If determinism is true, then, while it might appear to an agent that she plays a role in the production of her action, her contribution to the subsequent action is not significant in the way required for her to act of her own free will. Why is it not significant? What explains why she acts need make no reference to her.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)