Military Necessity and the Atomic Bombs

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by The Man

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved only that the U.S. was willing to slaughter untold numbers of civilians when it was militarily unnecessary to do so, as even Eisenhower agreed it was.

Define militarily unecessary. but do it here

Fatman FistFucking Littleboy - Freethought Forum

Cuz I think it was moral or right or the best decision given the situation.

[The Man]

Don't feel like bumping a year-old thread. It was militarily unnecessary because the Japanese had already offered to negotiate their surrender. One could argue that because they didn't offer an unconditional surrender there was still an advantage to be gained, but it seems unlikely the terms offered would have been particularly horrible since there's plenty of evidence the Japanese knew they couldn't win. Killing civilians to get a more advantageous surrender than the one already on offer doesn't sit right with me.

[Jug Pilot]

To say the Japaneese were beat is really not true. The Japanese Navy was beat and in the process of building back up. But, the Japanese Army still had a very potent force to deal with. Even after the surrender, some Japanese Army groups refused to surrender and unfortunately had to be obliterated.

The atomic bombs were one of those crap decisions, kill 160,000 people and who knows how many over time and make them think we had many more bombs which they were helpless to stop. Or wait for favorable weather/season which could allow Japan to recover and field weapon systems that could draw out the invasion (remember at that time you needed a 3 to one advantage to invade).

[The Man]

Or they could have just negotiated for surrender as had been offered. Judging from the sources I've read I've gotten the impression that the only condition that probably wouldn't have flown was knocking down the Emperor as a god figure, but internal communications intercepted by the United States indicated that the Japanese were apparently convinced they couldn't win. Granted I wasn't aware that some of the army groups refused to surrender even after the surrender was official.

[California Tanker]

Last guy surrendered in 1974. Not a group, granted.

Teruo Nakamura - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Hiroo Onoda's small group kept fighting until two surrendered in the 1950s, one was killed in 1972, and Onoda finally turned himself in in 1974. (I know the caption says 1975, but everything I've found says 1974...)



NTM

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by The Man

Or they could have just negotiated for surrender as had been offered. Judging from the sources I've read I've gotten the impression that the only condition that probably wouldn't have flown was knocking down the Emperor as a god figure, but internal communications intercepted by the United States indicated that the Japanese were apparently convinced they couldn't win. Granted I wasn't aware that some of the army groups refused to surrender even after the surrender was official.

That simply isn't true, there was never a serious offer of surrender on the part of the japanese that didn't involve them keeping their war gains.

[The Man]

Eisenhower and several other people in similar positions seem to have believed otherwise.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by The Man

Eisenhower and several other people in similar positions seem to have believed otherwise.

You goin to post some proof or just vague appeals to authority?

I don't recall Ike having command in the pacific theater but hey, I am weak on history.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by vork

To Russia, with Hope
On May 21, 1945, the new foreign minister, Togo, sent two fateful messages. First, cabled all his diplomatic posts in a circular, flatly denying that "Japan has ever made peace proposals to America and England." In his second message to Sato in Moscow, he directed the latter to sound out the glacial Molotov on Russia's intentions toward Japan. Sato met with Molotov, and then responded to Tokyo, Cassandra to Troy. "We are facing future trouble with Russia," he bluntly said, saying that it was imperative that the government clearly determine how far it would go with the Russians. It would never do that.

Japanese policy during the war was set by the Supreme War Council, consisting of six members. The Big Six from April 5 on were PM Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, Navy Minister Yonai, Army Minister Anami, Chief of the Naval General Staff Oikawa (quickly replaced by Toyoda in May) and Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu. At the time the only known advocate of peace was the redoubtable Togo, though after the war claims were made on behalf of Toyoda and Suzuki. Nothing in the record at the time supports this contention.

There are several things that must be noted at this juncture, for they formed the background to all "peace" discussions held by the Big Six and other officials. First, the law stipulated that the Army Minister must be a serving officer. Since the government could not function without all the ministerial posts filled, this meant that if the military did not like a governmental decision, it could bring down the government simply by having the Army Minister resign (which is exactly what happened when Japan surrendered). Thus, no peace agreement could take place without the military's say-so. Since Anami did not support peace -- even after two A-Bombs and Soviet entry, he still argued that the war was not necessarily lost -- there was no question of any peace agreement being made. It could not have been made without his approval, and there was no hint that any such thing would ever occur.

The second vital problem faced by peace advocates (and war advocates as well) was "government by assassination." Japanese politics was restrained by fear of assassination by rightist junior military officers. Anyone who openly advocated peace was in danger. In fact, there was little discussion of it until May, when Togo prevailed upon the Big Six to meet without their staff, so that no military underlings would be present to make implicit threats. Assassination attempts were common throughout the war; Tojo was the object of several plots, including one by more than 50 officers.

The third problem was that Japan was a totalitarian state in which thought and information were strictly controlled. This meant that discussions that sought ways to end the war could only take place in secret, and much communication consisted of circumlocutions, euphemisms, and unspoken agreements, to avoid discovery by the secret police. Most high officials did not have a clear idea of the progress of the war, nor did they understand how completely the Japanese military had been overwhelmed by superior US numbers, equipment, tactics, firepower, and technology. Many Japanese leaders argued that the Japanese possessed sufficient resources in territory and troops (about 4 million men under arms) that the US could be brought to the negotiating table. They did not conceive of Japan as a nation totally outclassed by its opponents. Thus, the thinking among Japanese leaders was founded on fantasies of Japanese strength. Those men who had realistic appraisals of the situation, such as staff officers in Imperial General HQ in Tokyo, or Kase and Sato in their embassies abroad, either had no clout or were ignored.

The ultimate fantasy of Imperial Japan was the Russian "peace" initiative of the summer of 1945. This was an attempt to get the Russians to mediate an end to the war that would leave Japan and most of its holdings intact, forestall a forced disarmament, and enable Japan to continue its adventure in China, while using Russia to compel the US to the negotiating table. Sato, Japan's man in Moscow, put this entire initiative into perspective with a series of telegrams fired off in July and read by the US. Responding to Togo's suggestion that as a bargaining counter, Japan would give up territories it had taken since the beginning of the war, Sato scathingly replied:

* How much of an effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on Soviet authorities?

As you are well aware, the Soviet authorities are extremely realistic and it is extremely difficult to persuade them with abstract arguments. We certainly will not convince them with pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality.

If the Japanese Empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our own minds to terminate the war. Unless we make up our own minds, there is absolutely no point in sounding out the views of the Soviet Government.



Sato urged the government to end the war, saying that Japan would have to accept "virtually the equivalent of unconditional surrender."

The Russian "peace" initiative began in May. Togo gradually realized that the Army would never negotiate directly with the US. The Army had long envisioned war against Russia, however, a sound whipping at Nomohan prior to WWII in what was probably history's first true combined arms battle resulted in hasty revisions to this plan, as it was obvious Japan's army would never be able to face a real opponent (as WWII revealed). The focus on Russia remained (few top Army leaders knew anything about the US), and Togo, who was the only one among the Big Six who advocated an end to the war, finally realized that the Army would only negotiate through Russia.

On May 14, 1945, Togo drafted a memorandum outlining the proposed plan in the vaguest terms imaginable, after Suzuki gave his blessing in meetings held from May 11 to the 14th. He wrote, fantastically:

* It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained nuetral, and that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United States as an enemy in the future.


The memorandum warned that Russia might demand a high price for this, and said that Japan might have to give up Port Arthur, Dairen, railways in Manchuria, and the northern portions of the Kuriles. Stalin had been promised much of this at Yalta anyway.

The draft was approved by all six of the Big Six, and Togo sent an experienced Russian specialist, Koki Hirota, to sound out Yakov Malik, the Russian ambassador. The devastating May 25 firebombing of Tokyo delayed his mission, and it was not until June 3 that he finally reached Malik in his home two hours from Tokyo. Preliminary talks yielded nothing but vague friendly comments.

Meanwhile, the military had not been idle. On June 6 there was another meeting of the Big Six. Far from seeking peace, in a new document from Supreme Command entitled The Fundamental Policy to be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War, the military demanded an official confirmation of:

* With a faith born of eternal loyalty as our inspiration, we shall -- thanks to the advantages of our terrain and the unity of our nation, prosecute the war to the bitter end in order to uphold our national essence, protect the Imperial land and achieve our goals of conquest.


A list of steps followed, including preparations for homeland defense and the formation of a national volunteer army. It called for the "honorable death of the hundred million" -- national suicide. The resolution passed over Togo's horrified objections. The resolution was then forwarded to the emperor for approval. In meeting with a number of top leaders, the motion was approved without objections.

Kido, as shocked by this as Togo was, memorialized His Majesty on the Ninth, arguing that Japan must begin negotiations with an intermediary power to get the US to end the war before Japan was destroyed. Kido, like all Japanese statesman, knew that "the enemy's main object is the overthrow of the so-called military clique" and that if Japan threw down its weapons and withdrew from occupied areas in the Pacific (no one was willing to contemplate withdrawal from China) then perhaps it could end the war. Disarmament would also have to be accepted. On the 13th Suzuki made a speech to the Diet calling for peace, and was shouted down.

Finally, on June 22 the Emperor abruptly summoned the Big Six to his side. "This is not an imperial command," he said, "but merely a discussion." There he broached the idea of sending a special envoy to Russia to negotiate for peace. Togo had been keeping the Emperor informed of progress with Malik, and the Emperor asked when an envoy could be sent. "Probably mid-July," Togo estimated. Togo warned that Japan would have to give up much.

Hirota went back to Malik and bluntly asked Russia to renew the Nuetrality Pact (it was set to expire in April of 1946; the Russians had given one year notice as the Treaty stipulated; when they invaded in August they did so by breaking this Treaty). Malik was evasive. Hirota offered Japan's resources from the South Pacific, rubber, tin, lead, tungsten. "if the Soviet Army and the Japanese Navy joined forces," he argued, "Japan and the USSR would become the strong force in the world!" Inasmuch as the Japanese Navy rested on the ocean bottom, Malik was not impressed by this offer. He replied that a concrete plan would be necessary, echoing language Sato would later use.

In less than a week, Hirota came back. In return for a new non-aggression treaty and oil, Japan would give Manchuria her independence (which it already nominally had!) and fishing concessions in Japanese waters. This was wired to Molotov through Sato in Moscow.

A week passed with no reply from Moscow to this generous offers (during this time the Okamoto affair in Switzerland began). On July 7 the Emperor lost patience and sent for Suzuki. Why not dispatch a special envoy with a personal message from the Throne?

The obvious choice for this was Konoye, and he was summoned on July 12. Recall that, as background, US planes are bombing Japan everyday, the Imperial Japanese Navy is almost gone, civilians are suffering from starvation, Japan is cut off from its garrisons and possessions, and interested readers may wonder at the absurd lack of urgency in these affairs. Yet there is was. Weeks went by with no progress. The Soviets also informed the US of these manuevers, keeping us abreast of developments, and of course, the diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Tokyo is being read by the US. Finally, ULTRA was revealing the extent of the Japanese build-up in Kyushu.

Sato was informed by telegram to expect an envoy and to ask the Russians to smooth his place. With his usual bluntness, he replied with wonder how the USSR would profit from an early end to the war. Familiar with the real situation (unlike Tokyo) Sato watched troop trains transferring troops to the Far East and knew that Russia would move against Manchuria and the Japanese Far East. He also noted that Russia had shown no interest in the Hirota-Malik talks, so why would they now accept an envoy? Common sense, however, was out of fashion in Tokyo.

On July 11 Togo notified Sato that he was to find out the intent of the Russia government toward Japan and whether it could be used to end the war. On the 12th he cabled Sato again, notifying him of Konoye's expected arrival and asking for the conference to place after Potsdam (the Japanese were aware that the Big Three were meeting there). Togo again cabled Sato on the 17th, a famous cable often deliberately misquoted by revisionist propagandists. After describing the Russia initiative, Togo noted:

* The Emperor himself has deigned to express his determination and we have therefore made this request of the Russians. Please bear particularly in mind, however that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like unconditional surrender.


Although it looks to the ignorant western reader that the Emperor has given an order and all are leaping to obey, in fact it was the opposite. Sato had already sent a telegram to Togo the previous day, asking for clarification on a vital issue:

* I would like to point out that even on the basis of your various messages I have obtained no clear idea of the recent situation. Nor am I clear about the views of the Government and Military with regard to the termination of the war.


Sato had, in polite diplomatic language, asked the 64 thousand dollar question: did the military and other government leaders support ending the war? Togo had cabled him back an evasive no, saying with elaborate circumlocution, that only the Emperor suported this initiative. Togo could not say that there was broad support because no such support existed. As both Toyoda and Suzuki said after the war (Anami killed himself), there was no agreement on terms or even on the initiative itself from the Big Six. Indeed on the 14th they had a heated confrontation in which Anami, speaking for the military, said bluntly that he would never accept any document which concluded peace on terms of Japan's defeat. Togo's message, far from establishing that the government wanted peace, in fact establishes that there was no agreement among top leaders.

The use of this cable by revisionists highlights the extent to which the revisionist argument hinges on the ignorance of westerners of the realities of Japanese politics, and why revisionist writers spend so little time on what was going on in Tokyo. The only reason that anyone could think Japan was willing to surrender is if they didn't know anything about Japanese politics or the situation in 1945. In order to support their claim, revisionists must keep the audience in ignorance.

On July 19 Sato again cabled Tokyo. He said that the Soviets had challenged the purpose of the envoy, and warned that it was hard for him to "deny that Japanese authorities are out of touch with the prevailing atmosphere here."

On July 21 Togo summarized the situation in a cable back, saying that Sato believed that unconditional surrender with the sole proviso of the preservation of the Emperor would be acceptable to the Allies (as it later proved to be). Togo explained:

* * With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, which is not so-called unconditional surrender, through the good offices of Russia.


Togo ended by saying that this was the Cabinet's will. In other words, in black and white, Togo completely rejected the position that Sato was arguing for -- we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever -- an offer of unconditional surrender with retention of the Emperor -- and said that this would never be acceptable. US leaders, reading this, had Togo's assurance that Japan would never surrender on terms acceptable to the US. The US had monitored many messages from Japanese abroad asking the government to accept unconditional surrender, but none from Tokyo going out. as US intelligence analyzed it, "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion cannot be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies."

On July 25 Sato met again with USSR rep Alexander Lozovsky, but having no concrete plans to show the Russians, danced diplomatically and promised that Konoye would have such plans when he replied. Interested readers may note that the month of July passed without any results, yet Japan showed no urgency on the peace score. The Soviets, who had informed the US that they had no interest in such negotiations, were simply spinning things out while they got their forces ready to invade Manchuria.

In sum, the Japanese move for "peace" through Russia was simply a fantasy born of desperation. It was never a real peace initiative, never contained concrete offers, and never went anywhere. It certainly was not a move to end the war on terms acceptable to the US and its allies.

60th anniversary of a-bomb attack - Page 6 - Freethought Forum

From our very own forum, now I don't claim to be a historian, but I have read this argument many times with vork on the probomb side and I found his position quite persuasive.

[beyelzu]

And keep in mind that it was a "peace offer" that would have had the net effect of 100k civillians dying a week. thats a hiroshima and nagasaki every 10 days or so.

[beyelzu]

"In 1945 ... , Secretary of War Stimson visited my headquarters in Germany, [and] informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act.... During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that

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dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and second because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions."

I found the ike quote, and I must say a couple of things, one it smacks a little of post hoc rationalization and two that he wasn't in the pacific theater even if it was exactly true as described 18 years later.

[The Man]

You found the Eisenhower quote so I won't bother repeating it. There was another quote from a Time magazine interview where he went into the matter in further depth but I can't seem to find it now.

I mentioned other military sources who regarded the bomb as unnecessary but wasn't certain who they were; however, I've found them again. MacArthur, Adm. Leahy, Brigadier-Gen. Clarke, and Fleet Adm. Nimitz also regarded the bombings as unnecessary. MacArthur, at least, was in the Pacific theatre, as was Clarke. Nimitz wrote:

The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.

Leahy wrote in his memoirs, I Was There:

The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

I'm unable to find a direct quote from MacArthur himself, but Norman Cousins wrote:

When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.

It is also worth noting that, according to overviews I've read, a large number of Japanese literature about the war seems to regard the Soviet invasion of Manchuria as at the very least equal to the bombing in its impact on the Japanese surrender, and the weakened condition of the economy by the end of the war is also often regarded as a decisive influence on the surrender. As I do not speak Japanese myself I cannot review these sources personally. Other sources seem to believe the surrender was ultimately a personal decision by the emperor, whom they claim had become significantly influenced by the peace-seeking wing of the Japanese elite. If quotes are necessary I may bother to find some tomorrow but I'm probably going to head off to bed shortly because I'm tired.

edit; oh, here are more sources. the Eisenhower interview was with Newsweek not Time; that's probably why I failed to find it earlier

[beyelzu]

So are you suggesting we could have starved the japanese into surrender? That would be the alternative right? They certainly weren't prepared to surrender and lets remember the 100k deaths each week as a result of the japanese occupation. They were brutal. And it ended with the two bombings, how long would it have gone on otherwise?

[ZEZOZE]

the atom bomb was used to terrorize the world, not just to defeat the japs.

[fragment]

Just out of curiosity, where does the 100k deaths per week figure come from? Wiki gives two estimates for civilians killed by the Japanese at 5 million and 20 million. The higher figure is in the ballpark for 100k a week for 4 years, but the lower is out by a fair bit. These don't include famine deaths. And these are over the course of the whole war, what's the rate in mid-1945?

[ZEZOZE]

history is written by the victor.

the atom bomb was more a psychological weapon...even the tests in the desert were an attack on the minds of people all over, including america.

oh...and trying to starve the japanese is what got them fighting mad in the first place.

[The Man]

Originally Posted by beyelzu

So are you suggesting we could have starved the japanese into surrender? That would be the alternative right? They certainly weren't prepared to surrender and lets remember the 100k deaths each week as a result of the japanese occupation. They were brutal. And it ended with the two bombings, how long would it have gone on otherwise?

MacArthur seems to have believed it could have ended weeks earlier than it did if the United States had agreed to the retention of the emperor, as it eventually did anyway. I'd like to think he probably knew what he was talking about, because if not it would've meant the person in charge of directing the war efforts in the Pacific was quite a bit less competent than he was given credit for.

Basically I agree with ITSOZ for once.

[livius drusus]

I split this thread from the death penalty discussion here.

[Adam]

Thread splitting is the second lamest form of censorship.

[Brimshack]

Originally Posted by Ululutremulus Cockstrangla

Thread splitting is the second lamest form of censorship.

Militarily unnecessary!

[ZEZOZE]

nevermind.

[ZEZOZE]

how catholic.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by fragment

Just out of curiosity, where does the 100k deaths per week figure come from? Wiki gives two estimates for civilians killed by the Japanese at 5 million and 20 million. The higher figure is in the ballpark for 100k a week for 4 years, but the lower is out by a fair bit. These don't include famine deaths. And these are over the course of the whole war, what's the rate in mid-1945?

I got the number from Vorkosigan years ago, it stuck in my head, I am not sure where he got it from. Note that there are military deaths and secondary deaths and chinese total deaths alone are 10 to 20 million. thats between 2 and 4 million a year, assuming 5 years, and 40k a week by itself.

I doubt that there are hard numbers for weekly totals at the time, but what is known is that the deaths were ongoing and were the result of Japanese occupation, an occupation that ended with the bombs.

Also, many more Japanese would have died if mainland Japan had been invaded using Okinawa as an example.

[beyelzu]

Originally Posted by The Man

MacArthur seems to have believed it could have ended weeks earlier than it did if the United States had agreed to the retention of the emperor, as it eventually did anyway. I'd like to think he probably knew what he was talking about, because if not it would've meant the person in charge of directing the war efforts in the Pacific was quite a bit less competent than he was given credit for.

Basically I agree with ITSOZ for once.

I don't know why. I suppose Mac wasn't privy to the magic intercepts as we are today, or maybe he didn't care, but the japanese were pursuing ketsu-go, the defense of Kyushu, they were hoping that massive casualties for the allies would ultimately allow the japanese to keep some of their gains.

[The Man]

So Vork seems to believe. However, referring to the initiative for peace, Vork explicitly says that “only the Emperor suported this initiative”. Maybe I just misunderstand the structure of the Japanese government at the time, but wasn’t the Emperor, um, the supreme god of the Japanese people? If that’s the case, then what anyone else supported was kind of irrelevant.