A revolution in thought

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by koan

I'm in a similar uncomfortable state.
I went to the doctor today for a strained tendon in my finger and ended up getting acupuncture on my butt for a sciatic problem. Now I'm here, trying to sit on my sore butt and read over 800 pages of posts in this thread.

First thought, why didn't the acupuncturist numb your butt before sticking pins in it?

Second thought, you could probably benefit from a good Butt Massage, I would offer but I can't even imagine how much trouble I would get into for that. No, but I can make a ligitimate suggestion, my daughter is a licensed professional massage therapist and I'm sure there would be something that could ease the discomfort. I'll ask.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If I can walk but I am programmed to move right instead of left, how can I be judged negatively for moving right, the very thing I have been programmed to do?

So you are arguing for hard determinism. If you then say we have agency and the ability to make choices you are contradicting yourself.

Hard determinism=no agency at all because we are programmed robots just moving through our predetermined paces.

You are trying to have your cake and eat it too, just as you accuse compatibilists of doing. Lessans idea is a compatibilist idea...especially in light of our being able to control whether we do something we don't want to do.

A robot can't refuse to do what it was programmed to do even if it doesn't desire to do so, only an agent with some level of freedom can do that.

[ceptimus]

If you're a hard determinist, then you're wasting your time trying to popularise the book - whether or not it is eventually successful is already predetermined. Of course, you'll also have no choice in how to spend your time - that is predetermined too!

[thedoc]

Koan, the page count and posts are going up, you'd better get crackin' on your reading assignment.

[LadyShea]

Thanks for the link, peacegirl. I like the discussion. See highlighted items below for some points I found pertinent.

According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom of the sort pertinent to moral evaluation is nothing more than an agent's ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” (Leviathan, p.108). Hobbes' brief remarks represent an exemplary expression of the classical compatibilist account of freedom. It involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists' benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some foreign or external source to act contrary to one's will.

Classical compatibilism is often associated with the thesis that the word freedom in the expression freedom of will modifies a condition of action and not will. For this reason, some writers advised burying the expression altogether and instead speaking only in terms of freedom of action (e.g., Schlick, 1939). For ease of expression, and to avoid cumbersome worries about different authors' formulations, lets us characterize the moral freedom pertinent to classical compatibilism as freedom of will, keeping in mind that this notion is meant to be a deflationary one attributing nothing special to the will itself

The classical compatibilist account of free will, even if incomplete, can be contrasted with the Source Incompatibilist Argument discussed in section 2.2. The dispute is over the truth of the first premise of that argument: A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source. No doubt, for one to be an ultimate source of her action, no explanation for her action can trace back to factors prior to her. This the compatibilist cannot have since it requires the falsity of determinism. But according to the classical compatibilist account of free will, so long as one's action arises from one's unencumbered desires, she is a genuine source of her action. Surely she is not an ultimate source, only a mediated one. But she is a source all the same, and this sort of source of action, the classical compatibilist will argue, is sufficient to satisfy the kind of freedom required for free will and moral responsibility.

[LadyShea]

Additionally, I am curious as to the sudden change from your recent previous stance that the past cannot cause the present, to your current stance of causal necessity and hard determinism.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are not excused by conscience. In the new world you can do anything you want. If you want to steal, people's doors are going to be unlocked so all you have to do is take what you want. You will not be blamed even if you steal all of someone's belongings while he is watching. See if you can do it.

Being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction cannot be used as an excuse when you are already excused. As Lessans stated: “This proves conclusively that the only time man can say, “I couldn’t help myself because my will is not free,” or offer any other kind of excuse, is if someone said he could help himself or blamed him in any way so he could make this effort to shift his responsibility." Why would you attempt to offer an excuse when no one is holding you reponsible? We are not going to judge you at all, wrong or right.

But that's just the point; you can't do something morally wrong because you cannot excuse what you are about to do without advance justification, and you are denied the advance justification when all blame is removed.

Don't you think I know that Spacemonkey? I've only been trying to clarify this for two days now.

But you are assuming that you will still be able to cause this harm under the changed conditions, which is the very thing that is prevented. And other people are also prevented from causing this harm once all blame is removed from the environment. That is the two-sided equation, and you haven't understood it yet.

Again, you are assuming that people are going to do those things that justify this blame. But if by removing the blame, they are prevented from doing those things that hurt others, there is no need for blame. You are putting the cart before the horse.

No, it is you who is missing the most important aspect of this equation. If you cannot justify your actions, your conscience will not allow you to hurt others. When you know you are going to be forgiven for whatever you do, because no one is going to judge what you do, right or wrong, you cannot find the justification you need in order to follow through with your contemplated actions that could harm another. You cannot move in this direction for greater satisfaction. It's a psychological law of man's nature that conscience will not allow. And please stop calling this a non-equation.

At no point in this entire post have you managed to address the objection I have been raising. At no point do you demonstrate any actual understanding of what that objection even is. It's like you're just reading from a prepared script without paying any attention to what I wrote.

You have a potential excuse and a potential justification. And you have two contexts in which they are each to be considered. The potential excuse is that people are only moving in the direction of their greater satisfaction as they are allegedly compelled to do. The potential justification is that people cannot be compelled to do something they do not want to do. The first context is that of considering one's own future act of harming another when one will not be blamed by anyone else. The second context is that of considering another person's future actions when they act in a way that harms another person.

You say that the potential excuse works against blame (towards others) in the second context but does not work in the first context against conscience. You say that the potential justification works to maintain a guilty conscience in the first context, but does not work to justify blaming others in the second context. But you can't support or justify either of these claims.

It is this completely arbitrary refusal to consider the potential excuse and the potential justification in BOTH contexts that I am objecting to. If other people are not to be blamed because they were only moving as they are compelled to in their direction of greater satisfaction, then I must judge that what they did was not bad and they should not feel bad about it (for if I don't think this, then I will seek to blame them for doing something bad that they should feel bad about). But then when I consider myself doing the same harmful action that I cannot blame others for, I will have to recognize that the same applies to me - what I did was also not something bad that I should feel bad about, because I was likewise only moving as I am compelled to do, in my direction of greater satisfaction. Hence, if this potential excuse works against blaming others, then it will be equally effective in relieving any possibility of a guilty conscience. And if it fails to serve as an excuse for my conscience, then it will equally fail to convince me that I should not blame others - for if I still see myself as worthy of a guilty conscience for performing a harmful action, then if I am consistent I must also see others as worthy of blame for performing the same action.

Likewise - and on the other side of the non-equation - if I am to feel guilty in imagining myself performing a harmful action because I know that nothing could have compelled me to do it if I didn't want to, then I must be judging that I have done something bad that I should feel bad about - despite knowing I was only moving in the direction of greater satisfaction as I am compelled to do. If I think this, then to be consistent I must also view any other people performing the same action as doing something bad that they should feel bad about. And this is all I need to be justified in blaming them.

Look at it this way: Imagine yourself behind Rawls' famous veil of ignorance. Someone has just performed a harmful action, but you don't know whether or not that person is you. The person was compelled to move in their direction of greater satisfaction, but it was also impossible for them to be compelled to do anything they did not want to do. Has that person done anything bad that they should feel bad about? Yes, or No?

Lessans has it that if the person is not you, then they cannot be blamed, and so must be judged as not having done anything bad that they should feel bad about. He also has it that if the person is you, then you will have a guilty conscience, and must be judged (by you) as having done something bad that they should feel bad about. But this is massively inconsistent with the most fundamental aspect of moral judgment - that such judgments should not depend on who the actor is, i.e. merely upon whether it is you or someone else performing the action.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

So then it's okay that I use the term "causal necessity" as being inconsistent with free will.

You can certainly use the term 'causal necessity', but you don't get to assert that it is inconsistent with 'free will' without specifying which kind of free will you mean. It is inconsistent with contra-causal/libertarian free will, but it is not at all inconsistent with compatibilist free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If one is not free from causal determination, he is not free. He can only be held responsible if he is free, and your kind of freedom (the unrestrained ability to choose between alternatives) is incompatible.

One can be free in the compatibilist sense without being free from causal determination, and this kind of freedom is therefore perfectly compatible with determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If we are programmed to do something a certain way (I'm not saying we are automatons that don't have agency, but this example will hopefully give you a little more insight into my argument), and we hurt someone due to the antecedent conditions that came before said action, how can we be blamed for performing that action that was already set in motion?

I already answered this repeatedly. We can be blamed because in relevantly similar situations with slightly different antecedent causal conditions we could have chosen otherwise, meaning blame in this situation is justified by the fact that it will be able to influence future behaviour. And you are changing the topic. You just asserted in your last post (and in this one) that compatibilist freedom is not compatible with determinism. That is obviously false, and I just gave you the definitions of both so you could show me this alleged incompatibility. But instead of doing so you have avoided the point, and repeated your false claim.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't see how you can have causal determinism and not have causal determination, so this difference in phrasing must only be in reference to a particular example.

I never said you could have causal determinism without causal determination. Obviously that is not the case. What you can have is causal determination (in a given individual case) without having causal determinism (the thesis of universal causal determination).

Originally Posted by peacegirl

My position is very well reasoned. Your analysis of what you consider free is a watered down conception of the meaning of free will that incompatibilists say does not exist.

Your position is the opposite of reasoned. Of course the compatibilists' notion of freedom is watered down in the sense of being less strong than the libertarian contra-causal notion. But this is no grounds for objection. You have to show not only that this sense of freedom is weaker, but that it is too weak to justify blame and punishment. Simply pointing out that it is 'watered down' is to object against compatibilists for not contradicting themselves, as they would be if they retained the same strength of freedom when arguing for its compatibility with determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Of course the ability to choose otherwise needs proving. What a cop-out Spacemonkey. That will give you a free pass to tell me I'm wrong without having to prove it. That's foul play because a discovery involves proof, so you can't just make an assertion that you can judge someone blameworthy based on your brand of free will.

Just once it would be nice if you could manage to properly read and comprehend what you were replying to. There are TWO senses in which one 'could have chosen otherwise'. The first is the ability to choose differently given the exact same causal scenario. This kind does not need proving because it is not the kind of ability that compatibilists say we have. The second is the ability to choose differently in relevantly similar situations with slightly different antecedent causal conditions. This kind also does not need proving, because it is trivially obvious that different initial causes can lead to different resulting effects. So I am not trying to weasel out of proving my point (as you consistently do yourself), but simply pointing out that when you distinguish between these two different senses, you are either asking me to prove something I am not claiming, or asking me to prove something that is obviously and trivially correct.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I've continued to defend determinism by showing you that there is a contradiction, and you keep telling me I haven't shown you.

You are delusional and I can prove it. Quote for me this alleged contradiction you think you have have shown me. I guarantee you will not be able to, for you have never shown any such thing. Go ahead and try.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is where you are wrong. He would have chosen otherwise if he had desired to, which would have compelled him to make a different choice than the one he chose, but he had no such option available at that precise moment that would have compelled him to prefer a different choice than the one he acted upon. This is very relevant to the discussion of blameworthiness. In fact it's central.

That he could not have chosen differently in the exact same causal situation is not at all relevant to blameworthiness, and I've already explained why. If all antecedent causal conditions - including all of my beliefs, desires, memories, values, and goals - could be held the same, without thereby determining whether I will do X or not do X, then my choice of action is not up to me - and blame will therefore be pointless, for in a future similar situation my memory of being blamed will just be another of these antecedent causal factors, which again will jointly fail to determine the course of my action. So the ability to choose differently in a contra-causal sense is not relevant to blameworthiness at all. What matters for the effectiveness and therefore justifiability of blame, is instead whether one could have chosen differently in slightly different but relevantly similar causal scenarios.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Unfortunately, threats of punishment do not always deter future behavior because people still perform all kinds of heinous acts taking into consideration that they would be blamed if caught. My father made no fat assumptions that when all blame is removed from the environment, moral responsibility goes up, not down. Conscience get stronger, and man is finally able to prevent from coming back that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary.

Punishment or the threat of it does not always have to be an effective deterrent. I am not claiming that. My point is rather that if blame was never effective in affecting future behaviour, then it would not be justified at all, and that blame is therefore justified to the extent that it can affect future behaviour. This is why what matters is not what would be causally possible in the exact same situation, but rather what is causally possible in slightly different but relevantly similar situations. And I'm afraid your father did too make a big fat assumption about conscience. You've just repeated it here for me, so I don't even need to tell you what it was.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's delusional to think that some people are free in a deterministic framework. If I can walk but I am programmed to move right instead of left, how can I be judged negatively for moving right, the very thing I have been programmed to do? Determinism does involve the agent, but he is still acting upon all of the factors that force his hand when deciding which choice is preferable, so you can't call it free in any sense of the word.

I can call it free in the compatibilist sense of the word, because being caused does not prevent one from being free in this sense. Your use of the word 'programmed' supports my point. If someone has been programmed to do X given input Y, then they will always do X in any causal scenario that meets the specification of input Y regardless of any other causal influences or variations in antecedent circumstances. This is not the case with merely being causally determined in one's choice. And please don't quote entire articles at me. If you have a point to make, then either quote the relevant paragraph, or put it in your own words.

[naturalist.atheist]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Additionally, I am curious as to the sudden change from your recent previous stance that the past cannot cause the present, to your current stance of causal necessity and hard determinism.

It would be curious if this was the first time she has shifted positions. However peacegirl has come around and gone around more times than a race car at the indy 500.

What is fascinating is the reaction of long time posters in her threads as if this is something entirely new.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by thedoc

First thought, why didn't the acupuncturist numb your butt before sticking pins in it?

Second thought, you could probably benefit from a good Butt Massage, I would offer but I can't even imagine how much trouble I would get into for that. No, but I can make a ligitimate suggestion, my daughter is a licensed professional massage therapist and I'm sure there would be something that could ease the discomfort. I'll ask.

I recommend acupuncture to relieve the pain.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by koan

I'm going to throw this out there because peacegirl obviously doesn't have an answer and I'm very interested in seeing legitimate discussions about how to solve the problem of "evil" in the world. Perhaps through showing how Lessans is wrong we might get some useful discussion about what may be right.

I offer the following:
Evil is anything that challenges your world view.

That's not how evil is defined koan. Evil is anything that someone does to you that you don't want done to yourself. Evil in most people's minds is when someone does something to hurt someone. Pure evil in most people's minds is when someone does something to hurt a lot of people or hurts them in a heartless way.

Originally Posted by koan

That world view includes feelings of safety and security and feeling that your culture, through prosperity, has value. If your culture shows flaws you will feel compelled to fix it because you want to restore value to this thing from which you get esteem, or abandon it to find a culture that gives you that sense of value, or double up blind support of it in cognitive dissonance so you don't have to deal with the threat to your sense of value. Religion often gives people that sense of security and value but those without religion still get that from their social group/country/therapist.

I have no argument that people are trying to find value and security in their lives.

Originally Posted by koan

peacegirl's world view includes that she and her father will be the bringers of a New Golden Age. We are evil to her because we don't support her world view. The problem is this, she needs us because she needs validation. Her world view still has no value unless it gets validation. Sucks doesn't it? That's why we call it evil.

I don't think anyone is evil because they don't support my worldview. I don't need you for my validation either. So you're wrong on both counts.

Originally Posted by koan

If she denies we are playing the role of evil then she is stuck with having to explain why she has told so many people to not read the book when her sole purpose for being here is to get as many people to read the book as possible.

I told people not to read the book if they don't want to. I would hope some will want to read it, but I'm not going to beg anyone to read it if they feel there is no value in it. I am not counting on them.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

That is a demonstrably false statement.

What something that exists in reality is represented by the word truth?

The word does not create a dog. A dog gives meaning to the word that is used to decribe it. The word defines what exists if it is to have real meaning or if it is to be useful to science.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am making it very simple because there's one determinism which includes the agent. I could easily come up with this type of determinism and that type of determinism, but when all is said and done, there is only one type.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

This is an assertion. You are simply stating what you believe.

This is a fact based by definition. This has nothing to do with an assertion. You can break the word determinism down into sub-categories, but the bottom line is that determinism means we are determined beings. There is no free will involved.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Can a person refrain from acting in accordance with his choices?

Only if he sees a reason to refrain as the more preferable choice. He is still under the control of determinism.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Can a person be prevented from acting in accordance with his choices (eg; by disabilities)?
Can a person control how they act in accordance with his choices?

You are trying to distinguish between a person who is physically incapable of doing something with someone who is physically capable, but both are just as much controlled by the laws of their nature which is driving their choices. Just because someone's choices in the direction of greater satisfaction are not obvious to the observer, does not mean he is not caused to make those choices. In other words, just because we see that a person cannot physically do something does not mean that the person who appears to be able to choose differently because he does not have an experienced compulsion or is not physically disabled, actually can. It's an illusion that he actually has a choice in the matter because he cannot choose what is less preferable among options. If he could, then he would be free, but he can't.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

I recommend acupuncture to relieve the pain.

Sorry, butt I must disagree, she kneads a massage.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is not one fallacy in his book, so try again. What do you mean that dead people have no free will? I have no idea where this relates to what he was trying to get across. You didn't even understand his reasoning in the slightest.

Originally Posted by koan

I agree it doesn't relate. That's exactly my point and lets review why it became an issue: You said it. You presented it as evidence:

Logical fallacies in The Decline And Fall Of All Evil, by Seymour Lessans
Lessans starts out his "foundation" chapter 1 with two major flaws:

Fallacy #1: False Dilemma (false dichotomy, black-or-white fallacy)
Either Free Will is true or Determinism is true. Because they are opposites, if one is true the other is false. pg would understand Spacemonkey's information better if she can realize that Lessans presented a false dilemma.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But it's not a false dilemma. We cannot be dead and alive at the same time, and we cannot have free will and be determined at the same time. The compatibilists who claim they can reconcile these two positions are incorrect because it is a true dilemma.

Originally Posted by koan

It is a false dilemma because being dead vs being alive is completely irrelevant to whether a person, while alive, has free will or not.
...

You can only say that a dead person has no free will because they are dead and therefore have no option of taking an action. That does not prove that an alive person has no choice. The state of being alive or dead only helps narrow down which type of person you are talking about. You've only shown that an alive person isn't dead, not that the alive person has no free will. Nobody has said that a dead person has free will. Your example is irrelevant.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That wasn't the point he was making. He was only saying that if one should kill himself, he is doing this because living the way he is, is worse than dying [in his eyes]. Therefore, when a person takes his life, he is still moving in the direction of greater satisfaction than what the present position offers.
You better go back and reread what he wrote and when you're done, come back with a question instead of telling me that his example is irrelevant.

Originally Posted by koan

You had better go back and read what you wrote.
I'll remind you: "But it's not a false dilemma. We cannot be dead and alive at the same time, and we cannot have free will and be determined at the same time. " It's your example/analogy that was being discussed. The argument about whether or not time travel is possible is not connected to the false dichotomy. You said it's not a false dilemma because you can't be alive and dead at the same time as if that somehow proves that free will and determinism can't be combined. What Lessans wrote about impossibility of time travel is dealt with in Fallacy #2
Fallacy #1 is a different beast.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And where is my apology koan? Please don't address me anymore unless you retract your statement that I'm schizophrenic.

Originally Posted by koan

I haven't asked you to retract any of the nasty things you've said about me nor your lies about me making the accusation on my first day in the thread when I demonstrably didn't arrive at that conclusion for twelve days and after much reading. I enjoy honesty. I prefer to know the perspective a person has when they speak to me. At least my concerns for your mental health have good intentions whereas your insults to me do not.

You can try to understand someone's perspective without making sweeping generalizations about someone's character and mental health.

li·bel/ˈlībəl/
Noun

A published false statement that is damaging to a person's reputation; a written defamation.

Originally Posted by koan

I won't apologize because your avoidance of the following questions gives me every reason to believe my assessment was/is correct. If you'd answered the questions I wouldn't have been so convinced.

Because I choose not to answer you after these insane remarks, you feel is supportive of your conclusion? You are no diagnostician, that's for sure.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Originally Posted by koan

So, go ahead, answer.

I don't care how many times you bump your posts. I don't care if I said the first day or the twelfth day that you labeled me schizophrenic, it was completely out of line for you to make such a judgment. If I am going to talk to you, you had better not play this game with me, or you're going to be on ignore. As far as answering your other questions, I'm still waiting to know whether you are going to play fair, or not.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Stephen Maturin

I'd say calling the ability to choose an "illusion," which peacegirl has done repeatedly, very much qualifies as disputing the ability to choose.

In all this time, you are probably the person who understands the least of anything Lessans has written.

The definition of free will states that good or evil can be chosen
without compulsion or necessity despite the obvious fact that there is
a tremendous amount of compulsion. The word choice itself indicates
there are preferable differences, otherwise, there would be no choice in
the matter at all as with A and A. The reason you are confused is
because the word ‘choice’ is very misleading for it assumes that man
has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because
the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction,
compels a person to prefer of differences what he considers better for
himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented, he is
compelled, by his very nature, to prefer not that one which he
considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better for the
particular set of circumstances involved.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by But

This is somewhat equivalent to a baby sleeping with its eyes wide open..

No, I can't do it.

Actually, people often sleep with their eyes open, or half open.

Some people may incompletely close their eyes during sleep, allowing the white part of the eye (called the sclera) to remain uncovered. This may occur occasionally in healthy people.

Sleep Eyes Open – Can You Sleep With Your Eyes Open?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

My suggestion to you: Go back to page 1.

Originally Posted by Angakuk

My suggestion to you: Go teach your grandmother to suck eggs.

I was not being sarcastic, so why are you?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If I say that flying an airplane with four engines is much better than flying with two on an international commercial flight, I guess I am telling what you ought to do if you want to have a better chance of making it across the ocean, but it's still your choice. Just as in the previous example, you can use a product that's much more expensive and less efficient if you want to, but if it's not in your best interest you won't want to, because it will be the least preferable choice in comparison to what is now available.

Originally Posted by Angakuk

Your examples miss the point entirely. Your claim has consistently been that one can't (i.e., that it is impossible to) blame someone for doing something when they could not possibly have done otherwise. It may well be the case that flying on an airplane with four engines is better (i.e., faster and safer) than flying on one with only two engines. However, that does not mean that it is not possible to fly on an airplane with only two engines.

I never implied that it was not possible to fly on an airplane with only two engines. Your response missed the point entirely.

Originally Posted by Angakuk

With both the airplane and the product examples you ignore the possiblity that there may be other, unstated, factors that determine what one decides is in one's best interest. I might choose to fly on the two engine airplane because the fare is cheaper. I might choose to purchase the more expensive but less efficient product because that one comes in my favorite color. Or, my grounds for either of those choices may be completely irrational.

I am not arguing with that. I'm not even arguing that even under risky conditions you might still want to go with the cheaper fare in the direction of greater satisfaction. I can't judge what your preference will be, and the reasons for those preferences. The point I'm making is that whatever your preference is, it is in the direction of greater satisfaction. That being said, most people would prefer to fly on a plane that has the best chances of reaching shore. If they thought for one second that flying on a two seater propeller plane was extremely risky in comparison to flying on a commercial jet across the ocean, most would prefer the commercial jet with four engines.

Originally Posted by Angakuk

In both cases I am doing what I want to do, for whatever reasons I want to do it. Likewise with assigning blame. I am free to assign blame wherever and however I want just so long as it is the case that I want to do it. The blameworthiness of the object of blame need not be taken into consideration unless I decide that I want to take that into consideration.

The only reason you will find it more preferable to agree not to blame (and become a citizen of the new world) is because you believe it is in your best interest. If you don't, then you don't have to sign the agreement, but how can you not want to sign the agreement when science establishes that in doing so we can create a better world for all. But regardless, we are leaving it to your choice. There is no force at all in this process.

Originally Posted by Angagkuk

In any event, it is clearly not the case I that can't blame someone for doing something when they could not have done otherwise. I can if I want to. So, my question remains unanswered. Why do you think that it is not possible to blame someone for doing something when they could not have done otherwise?

The choice is always there, but once you understand that no blame is better than blame, you will find greater satisfaction in not blaming. But if you want to blame, go ahead, and if you want to lie by signing the agreement not to blame so you can get the guarantee, go ahead. We won't blame you if hurt us in our effort to transition to the new world. The more power to you if you can.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The word does not create a dog. A dog gives meaning to the word that is used to decribe it. The word defines what exists if it is to have real meaning or if it is to be useful to science.

Answer my question. Replace the word dog with the word truth.

The word truth does not create what? What gives meaning to the word truth that is used to describe it?

What exists that the word truth defines?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is a fact based by definition. This has nothing to do with an assertion. You can break the word determinism down into sub-categories, but the bottom line is that determinism means we are determined beings. There is no free will involved.

This is an assertion. You are simply stating what you believe

1. Definitions are not the basis for facts. They simply describe what people mean when they use words

2. An assertion is a confident and forceful statement of fact or belief

3. Determinism has multiple meanings because people mean different things when they use it. What if the will is a cause?

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Actually, people often sleep with their eyes open, or half open.

Some people may incompletely close their eyes during sleep, allowing the white part of the eye (called the sclera) to remain uncovered. This may occur occasionally in healthy people.

Sleep Eyes Open – Can You Sleep With Your Eyes Open?

The white part of the eye cannot see

Incompletely closed is not wide open

Occasionally is not often

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In all this time, you are probably the person who understands the least of anything Lessans has written.

The definition of free will states that good or evil can be chosen
without compulsion or necessity despite the obvious fact that there is
a tremendous amount of compulsion. The word choice itself indicates
there are preferable differences, otherwise, there would be no choice in
the matter at all as with A and A. The reason you are confused is
because the word ‘choice’ is very misleading for it assumes that man
has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because
the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction,
compels a person to prefer of differences what he considers better for
himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented, he is
compelled, by his very nature, to prefer not that one which he
considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better for the
particular set of circumstances involved.

You said you have never disputed that we have the ability to choose. Maturin was pointing out that you seem to dispute this on a regular basis. Which you just did again.

So, do we have the ability to choose or don't we?

If we have the ability to choose, then we have some form of freedom.

If we do not have the ability to choose, then how can we choose to not act in a way that harms another?

[LadyShea]

Bump

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Bump

[But]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Actually, people often sleep with their eyes open, or half open.

Some people may incompletely close their eyes during sleep, allowing the white part of the eye (called the sclera) to remain uncovered. This may occur occasionally in healthy people.

Sleep Eyes Open – Can You Sleep With Your Eyes Open?

You're happily shifting goalposts in the middle of a sentence again. wide open -> open, or half open. Then your own link says it's just not quite closed, and it doesn't happen often, it's a rare medical condition. Do you notice what you're doing there? You have been doing that again and again, all over this and other threads.

I highlighted some parts for you:

Question: Can You Sleep With Your Eyes Open?
It may be a useful skill to have when you want to get some rest when you are supposed to appear attentive, but is it really possible to sleep with your eyes open?

Answer: First, it is important to agree about what sleep is. For these purposes, let’s include a lack of conscious awareness of one’s surroundings. In general, sleep involves lying in a recumbent position with the body at rest. We typically are unable to see or respond to external stimuli and we keep our eyes closed. However, as in the case of parasomnias, this may not always be the case. In these abnormal sleep behaviors, the person remains asleep, or unconscious, but is able to sleepwalk or perform other actions. They may even have their eyes open.

Some people may incompletely close their eyes during sleep, allowing the white part of the eye (called the sclera) to remain uncovered. This may occur occasionally in healthy people.

Others may be unable to close their eyes due to other medical problems. This is called lagophthalmos. It may occur most commonly as part of a condition called Bell’s palsy, which results in facial weakness and may be due to an infection of the seventh cranial nerve.

It may also be possible to disengage your mind from the processing of visual input while keeping your eyes open, such as may occur in hypnosis.

In general, sleeping with your eyes open (even if only a small degree) may be possible. It is typically harmless, but it may lead to dry or red eyes in the morning. In this case, it may be necessary to apply a lubricant to the eye and patch it overnight.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Only if he sees a reason to refrain as the more preferable choice.

So the answer is yes, a person has some level of freedom in choosing how and whether to act. They are free to contemplate whether to act or not act in accordance with their choices

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are trying to distinguish between a person who is physically incapable of doing something with someone who is physically capable, but both are just as much controlled by the laws of their nature which is driving their choices.

I am saying that some people have the ability to act in accordance with their choices and others do not.

So if someone wants to walk, it is their preferred choice to walk, but they have no ability to walk, their actions are not in the direction of greater satisfaction because they cannot act in accordance with their preferences as determined by their nature.

Just because someone's choices in the direction of greater satisfaction are not obvious to the observer, does not mean he is not caused to make those choices.

I've never said otherwise.

In other words, just because we see that a person cannot physically do something does not mean that the person who appears to be able to choose differently because he does not have an experienced compulsion or is not physically disabled, actually can.

We were talking about whether people have any ability to act, or refrain from acting, in accordance with their choices.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

So you are arguing for hard determinism. If you then say we have agency and the ability to make choices you are contradicting yourself.

That is not true LadyShea. Many determinists believe that the agent is part of the deterministic process. Look up naturalism.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Hard determinism=no agency at all because we are programmed robots just moving through our predetermined paces.

There is agency in the sense that there is an entity called "I" that is making the choice, but the choice itself is not free, therefore the agent is just another aspect of this process, not something apart from it.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

You are trying to have your cake and eat it too, just as you accuse compatibilists of doing. Lessans idea is a compatibilist idea...especially in light of our being able to control whether we do something we don't want to do.

I never said we have control over what we do. I said we are responsible in the sense that we performed an action. I was the one that went through the red light, no one else did, but this is not in contraidction because whatever I do it is a compulsion beyond my control once the choice is made, not before. Before I can weigh options, which is why as new antecedent conditions present themselves, we are able to change the direction of our lives but still in the direction of greater satisfaction.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

A robot can't refuse to do what it was programmed to do even if it doesn't desire to do so, only an agent with some level of freedom can do that.

That is not true. An agent cannot refuse to do what it is programmed to do either. Even if the agent changes his mind and chooses something different (which some robots may be able to do), this is also in the direction of greater satisfaction. There is no way of getting around it.