A revolution in thought

[thedoc]

Well the teachers at my grandaughters preschool now know me as 'Grumpa'.

Peacegirl, how are your grandchildren, do you get to see them very often, and are they going to carry the torch, after you have failed?

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And I'm telling you that it has everything to do with the issue of moral responsibility. And I say again that you are hanging on for dear life to your position, which I believe is preventing you from getting this simple concept for a person like you who has the absolute capacity for understanding this discovery.

If you think that Lessans' kind of compulsion is relevant to moral responsibility, then you have to meet my arguments as to why it is not. So far you are not doing that. You are yet again merely attacking my motivations. I am not hanging on for dear life to anything. I have simply presented my position and are still waiting for you to rationally address it.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I have read your explanation, and I understand the difference between someone who can't make a choice because the "experienced compulsion" is so great that the person cannot change in spite of new antecedent conditions and the compulsion Lessans is talking about which does not require someone to have this type of compulsion to be compelled in a deterministic sense. Did I get that right?

Yes. But you haven't raised any objection to it, or given me any reason to think that it is wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And you're telling me that because a person does not have this type of compulsion means he is free to choose and therefore blameworthy if his choice is wrong in the eyes of society. Yes, he is free of that type of restraint but that does not mean he is free to choose otherwise. You are in denial Spacemonkey and I don't know if it's possible to reach you.

There you go attacking my motivations again. That is a fallacious mode of argumentation, Peacegirl. You should stop doing that, and just address my points. You are again equivocating between the two different senses of being able to choose otherwise. I have pointed this out several times already. Being free of my kind of compulsion does not mean that he was free to choose otherwise in the sense that he could have chosen differently in the exact same causal scenario. But it does mean that he was free to choose otherwise in the sense that he could have chosen differently given slightly different antecedent causal conditions. According to compatibilism, that is enough for moral responsibility and blameworthiness - and you've not given us any reason to think otherwise.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Yes, and it was a rational point. You are missing a huge chunk of why man's will is not free. You are refusing the concept of "greater satisfaction" because you can't test "greater satisfaction" empirically. The fact that you say this is not relevant to moral responsiblity shows me how stubborn you are in insisting that compatibilism is correct and you won't budge. Maybe your worldview is too entrenched to allow a new perspective based on true facts, not words strung together.

Which part was your 'rational point'? The bit were you complained about my compatibilist cronies? Where you went on about me putting cotton wool in my ears and singing? Where you accused me of being blind to the alleged wrongness of my thinking? Or where you again reverted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which I have defined, even after saying you weren't doing that? Where in all of this was your 'rational point'?

I was not rejecting his concept of greater satisfaction, or rejecting it because it cannot be tested. I haven't been saying anything of the sort (though these are good objections which you have failed to counter). My point has simply been that this kind of 'compulsion' is irrelevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness because it is not something that prevents one from having been able to do otherwise given slightly different antecedent circumstances, and therefore is not something that in any way negates the influence and effectiveness of blame and punishment. But instead of addressing this you have again launched into a fallacious attack on my motivations.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm ignoring it because it's the only form of compulsion that is relevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. It is a contradiction because the free will you are talking about is no different from the standard definition. They are making it appear different (e.g., the wolf in sheep's clothing), but the standard definition of free will is exactly the same. The only difference is that compatibilists are trying to make it appear as if there is no contradiction and that they can somehow reconcile the idea of blameworthiness with a world that is caused. This has gotten almost humorous. Am I on candid camera?

Thank you for admitting that you have been ignoring the explanations I've given in support of my position. But you are yet again asserting a contradiction which you have yet to identify or present to us. And you are flat out lying to claim that there is no difference between the compatibilist and contra-causal notions of freedom. I carefully defined and explained these to you, demonstrating that they are not the same. You know they are different, and you know you cannot show me any contradiction in compatibilism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No, it does not. You are going back to the idea of right and wrong. There is no legitimacy of self blame. We are already forgiven because our will is not free. Conscience actually is protective so that we don't feel regret for doing something that would bother our conscience. This is not about moral responsibility (the idea that someone is morally wrong); it is rather about forcing someone's hand like in a game of chess, where he is compelled to own up to what is his responsibility in a particular action (because he can't shift his responsibility to try to ease his conscience by stating that something other than him was responsible for that action). But this is not about blameworthiness.

Lessans thought that the legitimacy of self-blame via conscience was not threatened by determinism or his form of 'compulsion', but thought otherwise for external blame. This is about moral responsibility, because one cannot have a guilty conscience without feeling that one has done something morally wrong. So he agreed with me that the compulsion he speaks of does allow a form of moral responsibility - but just not one that legitimizes external blame.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Are you telling me that any important book can only be read once or twice? Twice will give you at least a basic understanding. I've had this book with me all my life and compiling it gave me an even greater understanding. People have ripped books apart dissecting every sentence and trying to interpret what the author meant if that book is considered valuable. Skimming it, or even giving it a onceover, is not enough to understand all of the ramifications of this revolutionary knowledge. You can't do it. That is arrogant Spacemonkey. Admit it.

I wasn't saying anything of the sort. I was pointing out that no matter how many times one has read the book, so long as they still don't agree with it, you'll object that they need to read it again. That is irrational and dogmatic. More importantly, I was pointing out that you can't see where compatibilism is wrong - for if you could you'd be explaining how and why it is wrong instead of just repeatedly asserting that it's wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Like I said, if you don't think I have an argument, the door's open and please shut it on your way out.

If you think you have an argument, then present it already instead of ignoring my explanations and repeatedly making fallacious attacks on my motivations and character.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Define causal necessity which compatibilism claims is unnecessary in holding people blameworthy? Show me where there is no contradiction.

causal necessity: The 'necessity' bit comes from Spinoza and means that something must be how it is - it cannot be otherwise - it is inevitable. The 'causal' bit refers to the chain of cause-and-effect manifest in the physical world. Causal necessity is thus the expression of the chain of cause-and-effect working to produce outcomes that are unavoidable.

Explain "Causal necessity" in Determinism, Philosophy*? - Yahoo! UK & Ireland Answers

Why do you need me to define causal necessity? Casual necessity differs from logical necessity (which is much stronger). Something is logically necessary if it is true in all possible worlds (i.e. every consistent way that the world could be). An event is causally necessary if, given the same antecedent conditions, it occurs in every possible world which operates under the same causal laws.

The point of my definitions was to show you that the compatibilist and contra-causal/libertarian definitions of freedom are different - they are not the same, despite your repeated assertions to the contrary.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Blameworthiness is a value judgment based on the compatibilist set of rules which determines who qualifies for this blame. The distinction they have used is artificial but gives them the justification to be the judge of who they feel should be held responsible. But the problem is that this value judgment has not produced the kind of society we want. When something doesn't work, or doesn't work very well, you have to open your mind to the possibility that there's a better way. Like Einstein said: No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.

You haven't explained the difference between an artificial and non-artificial distinction, or why this matters. And the only objection you are raising here against compatibilism, is that you think Lessans' new world and changed conditions can do better. But that means your objection has nothing to do with any alleged contradiction in compatibilism, and also that your objection depends entirely upon your and Lessans' big fat assumption regarding the alleged innate potential perfection of conscience - something you have both failed miserably to support in any way, shape, or form. So until you can support his claims about conscience, you have not raised any legitimate challenge against compatibilism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're wrong to make that distinction, as if someone could have done otherwise just because he doesn't have that stronger sense of experienced compulsion that compatibilists speak of. You don't know that he could have chosen otherwise, which is the problem. And if he couldn't have chosen otherwise, how can you blame him? I gave the example of someone in a wheelchair. How can you blame a person in a wheelchair for not being able to stand up? You wouldn't because you can see he cannot help himself. If man's will is not free, it's the same thing. How can you blame someone for doing something he couldn't help? I know this leads to a dilemma, but if you don't allow Lessans to show you how a no blame society is much better than a blame filled society, we're at a dead end. I know why you are defending blame and punishment because you believe holding people to account is the only way to keep order in a civilized society, but I will ask you once again, if there is a better way, why would you be so against opening your mind just a crack to see if there could be validity to this discovery?

Did you even read what you were replying to? I just explained the importance of the distinction. And you have replied by yet again conflating them. It is true by definition that a person free of the compatibilist's kind of compulsion could have chosen otherwise given relevantly similar causal circumstances. We know they could have chosen otherwise because we know that different causes lead to different effects. And this makes them blameworthy because they are free of the kind of compulsion that would prevent blame from having any actual effect upon their subsequent behavior. Also, I would not blame the person in the wheelchair for he is not free in the sense I have been defining. And again, if your only objection to compatibilism is that you think Lessans offers a better way, then you have not presented any challenge to compatibilism until you can provide rational support for his big fat assumption regarding the innate potential perfection of conscience.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I just gave you the justification. It was the very next sentence in my post: "We have the perfect excuse to present to our conscience - we couldn't have done otherwise as we were just moving in the direction of greater satisfaction." And in your scenario I am not already excused by my conscience. Hence I can still be motivated to rationalize an excuse.

I need a rationalization because my conscience is holding me responsible. But then I can come up with the excuse that I couldn't have done otherwise because I was compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction. Hence my conscience is appeased and I am free to harm anybody I like. Obviously this will not be the case, so something must be making me still feel morally responsible and blameworthy - but then whatever this is will also be applicable to others, making me feel justified in blaming them for their actions too.

You've completely missed my point. I won't feel guilty when considering a potentially harmful action because I will know that if I were to do that action I would not be blameworthy as I was simply moving in the direction of greater satisfaction. If I will still anticipate feeling guilty because nothing can compel me to do something I do not want to do, then I will also be able to blame others for harmful actions that they were not compelled to do against their desires (despite being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction).

What was my first premise, and why was it faulty? You still haven't done anything to address my point. You won't because you can't. It remains true that Lessans uses one side of his non-equation when considering conscience, and the other when considering the blameworthiness of others, but fails to see that the opposite sides of his non-equation are equally well applicable in each case. He doesn't even consider this obvious point or see it as a potential problem. It really is appallingly bad reasoning.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I have met your arguments as to why Lessans' kind of compulsion is relevant to moral responsibility, which is one side of the equation. But you have to understand both sides. You will still disagree because you will tell me that it's an assumption that conscience works the way Lessans' describes, and at the end of this thread you will believe you won the debate. The only problem is you didn't really win.

Yes. But you haven't raised any objection to it, or given me any reason to think that it is wrong.

That's because you don't understand the compulsion of "greater satisfaction" and I refuse to go over it again. It's like you have ignored everything I've tried to explain.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And you're telling me that because a person does not have this type of compulsion means he is free to choose and therefore blameworthy if his choice is wrong in the eyes of society. Yes, he is free of that type of restraint but that does not mean he is free to choose otherwise. You are in denial Spacemonkey and I don't know if it's possible to reach you.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

There you go attacking my motivations again. That is a fallacious mode of argumentation, Peacegirl. You should stop doing that, and just address my points.

Well you're leaving me with few options.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are again equivocating between the two different senses of being able to choose otherwise. I have pointed this out several times already. Being free of my kind of compulsion does not mean that he was free to choose otherwise in the sense that he could have chosen differently in the exact same causal scenario. But it does mean that he was free to choose otherwise in the sense that he could have chosen differently given slightly different antecedent causal conditions. According to compatibilism, that is enough for moral responsibility and blameworthiness - and you've not given us any reason to think otherwise.

Spacemonkey, why are you missing what I'm saying? I don't get it. If we are compelled to move in a particular direction, regardless of slightly different antecedent conditions, can we blame the person for going in that direction? You are making a judgment according to the definition compatibilists feel justifies blameworthiness, and it's that very judgment that is preventing the behavior you are trying to prevent. You can defend your position all you want, but it's not working.

p. 85 As we
follow the corollary, Thou Shall Not Blame, which will act as an
infallible slide rule and standard as to what is right and wrong while
solving the many problems that lie ahead, we will be obeying the
mathematical wisdom of this universe which gives us no choice when
we see what is truly better for ourselves. By removing all forms of
blame which include this judging in advance of what is right and
wrong for others, we actually prevent the first blow of injustice from
being struck. This corollary is not only effective by your realization
that we (all mankind) will never blame you for any hurt done to us,
but also by our realization that any advance blame, this judging of
what is right for someone else strikes the first blow since it is
impossible to prevent your desire to hurt us by telling you we will
never blame this hurt when we blame the possibility by telling you in
advance that it is wrong. In other words, by judging that it is wrong
to do something, whatever it may be, we are blaming the possibility of
it being done which only incites a desire to challenge the authority of
this advance accusation that has already given justification.
Therefore, in order to prevent the very things we do not want which
hurt us, it is absolutely imperative that we never judge what is right for
someone else.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Yes, and it was a rational point. You are missing a huge chunk of why man's will is not free. You are refusing the concept of "greater satisfaction" because you can't test "greater satisfaction" empirically. The fact that you say this is not relevant to moral responsiblity shows me how stubborn you are in insisting that compatibilism is correct and you won't budge. Maybe your worldview is too entrenched to allow a new perspective based on true facts, not words strung together.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Which part was your 'rational point'? The bit were you complained about my compatibilist cronies? Where you went on about me putting cotton wool in my ears and singing? Where you accused me of being blind to the alleged wrongness of my thinking? Or where you again reverted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which I have defined, even after saying you weren't doing that? Where in all of this was your 'rational point'?

I have not reverted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which you have defined. I am arguing that the free will type of compulsion that compatibilists believe justifies blameworthiness is in contradiction with the position of causal necessity.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I was not rejecting his concept of greater satisfaction, or rejecting it because it cannot be tested. I haven't been saying anything of the sort (though these are good objections which you have failed to counter). My point has simply been that this kind of 'compulsion' is irrelevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness because it is not something that prevents one from having been able to do otherwise given slightly different antecedent circumstances, and therefore is not something that in any way negates the influence and effectiveness of blame and punishment. But instead of addressing this you have again launched into a fallacious attack on my motivations.

That's why I said your premise is wrong. If man can only choose one alternative; the one that offers him greater satisfaction, he cannot be blamed for choosing that which he could not do otherwise. But this is not the end of the story. You still think that blaming and punishment are justified and are the only way to produce a healthy society. Did you ever think that blame and punishment may have inadvertantly contributed to the ill health of society?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm ignoring it because it's the only form of compulsion that is relevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. It is a contradiction because the free will you are talking about is no different from the standard definition. They are making it appear different (e.g., the wolf in sheep's clothing), but the standard definition of free will is exactly the same. The only difference is that compatibilists are trying to make it appear as if there is no contradiction and that they can somehow reconcile the idea of blameworthiness with a world that is caused. This has gotten almost humorous. Am I on candid camera?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Thank you for admitting that you have been ignoring the explanations I've given in support of my position. But you are yet again asserting a contradiction which you have yet to identify or present to us. And you are flat out lying to claim that there is no difference between the compatibilist and contra-causal notions of freedom. I carefully defined and explained these to you, demonstrating that they are not the same. You know they are different, and you know you cannot show me any contradiction in compatibilism.

The only difference is that you keep contending that your kind justifies punishment, but if someone could not have done otherwise, not because of the excused compulsion that would drive someone to be in a fixed state, but because he didn't find preferable what you felt he should find preferable (the judgment), then you are offering a flawed position. I also do not understand how you can reconcile what you call a "mere" cause with the freedom that you believe allows a person to choose otherwise.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No, it does not. You are going back to the idea of right and wrong. There is no legitimacy of self blame. We are already forgiven because our will is not free. Conscience actually is protective so that we don't feel regret for doing something that would bother our conscience. This is not about moral responsibility (the idea that someone is morally wrong); it is rather about forcing someone's hand like in a game of chess, where he is compelled to own up to what is his responsibility in a particular action (because he can't shift his responsibility to try to ease his conscience by stating that something other than him was responsible for that action). But this is not about blameworthiness.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Lessans thought that the legitimacy of self-blame via conscience was not threatened by determinism or his form of 'compulsion', but thought otherwise for external blame. This is about moral responsibility, because one cannot have a guilty conscience without feeling that one has done something morally wrong. So he agreed with me that the compulsion he speaks of does allow a form of moral responsibility - but just not one that legitimizes external blame.

This entire discovery is about feelings of moral responsibility, but it's how we reach people in acknowledging what would be their responsibility that prevent those actions from ever taking place, not who is to blame.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Are you telling me that any important book can only be read once or twice? Twice will give you at least a basic understanding. I've had this book with me all my life and compiling it gave me an even greater understanding. People have ripped books apart dissecting every sentence and trying to interpret what the author meant if that book is considered valuable. Skimming it, or even giving it a onceover, is not enough to understand all of the ramifications of this revolutionary knowledge. You can't do it. That is arrogant Spacemonkey. Admit it.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I wasn't saying anything of the sort. I was pointing out that no matter how many times one has read the book, so long as they still don't agree with it, you'll object that they need to read it again. That is irrational and dogmatic. More importantly, I was pointing out that you can't see where compatibilism is wrong - for if you could you'd be explaining how and why it is wrong instead of just repeatedly asserting that it's wrong.

That's exactly what you're doing. You're not proving that compatibilism is right. You're just agreeing with the definition which does not prove that we can do otherwise given similar antecedent conditions. And I am not telling you that if you disagree with the book after reading it at least twice, that I would accuse you of not just reading it thoroughly just because you are in disagreement. But I don't believe you have read it carefully and I don't believe that you would disagree after dissecting it the way other important books are dissected and studied. But if that was so, I would accept it.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Like I said, if you don't think I have an argument, the door's open and please shut it on your way out.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If you think you have an argument, then present it already instead of ignoring my explanations and repeatedly making fallacious attacks on my motivations and character.

Telling you I think you're in denial is no worse than you accusing me of being a liar. So stop putting yourself on a pedestal Spacemonkey. I have not ignored your explanations and I have presented an argument equal to yours if not better.

[koan]

Logical fallacies in The Decline And Fall Of All Evil, by Seymour Lessans
Lessans starts out his "foundation" chapter 1 with two major flaws:

Originally Posted by Lessans

Isn’t it obvious that if determinism (in this context the opposite of free will) was proven false, this would automatically prove free will true[#1], and didn’t we just demonstrate that this is impossible unless we can turn back the clock?[#2](p34-5)

Fallacy #1: False Dilemma (false dichotomy, black-or-white fallacy)
Either Free Will is true or Determinism is true. Because they are opposites, if one is true the other is false. pg would understand Spacemonkey's information better if she can realize that Lessans presented a false dilemma.

Fallacy #2:
Argument from ignorance
Inability to turn back time was Lessans' lead up to this conclusion that Free Will can't be proven true therefore they can't prove Determinism false.

The use of these fallacies does not mean Hard Determinism is false, it just means Lessans can't prove his conclusion by pursuing these premises.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And if he couldn't have chosen otherwise, how can you blame him? I gave the example of someone in a wheelchair. How can you blame a person in a wheelchair for not being able to stand up?

The answer to your question is quite simple. You can do it because you want to do it. Why do you think that this can't be done?

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I have met your arguments as to why Lessans' kind of compulsion is relevant to moral responsibility, which is one side of the equation. But you have to understand both sides. You will still disagree because you will tell me that it's an assumption that conscience works the way Lessans' describes, and at the end of this thread you will believe you won the debate. The only problem is you didn't really win.

Bullshit. You admitted to ignoring my explanations in your last post. I've carefully explained to you what compatibilism says, and why I think it is correct. You've responded only to attack my motivations and claim that you think Lessans can do better. At no point have you presented any rational objection against compatibilism whatsoever.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's because you don't understand the compulsion of "greater satisfaction" and I refuse to go over it again. It's like you have ignored everything I've tried to explain.

It may feel that way to you, but in reality I have been consistently supporting my position and directly addressing your points and answering your questions, while you have not been doing the same. I have explained to you why Lessans notion of compulsion is not relevant to blameworthiness and why the compatibilists' notion is relevant, and you have yet to address that explanation.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Well you're leaving me with few options.

You have the options of either addressing my points with rational responses and objections, or of fallaciously attacking my motivations. You have consistently opted for the latter, presumably because you are incapable of the former.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Spacemonkey, why are you missing what I'm saying? I don't get it. If we are compelled to move in a particular direction, regardless of slightly different antecedent conditions, can we blame the person for going in that direction? You are making a judgment according to the definition compatibilists feel justifies blameworthiness, and it's that very judgment that is preventing the behavior you are trying to prevent. You can defend your position all you want, but it's not working.

It's working just fine. We can blame a person for moving in a direction which happened to be that of greater satisfaction because they were not compelled in the stronger sense, meaning in relevantly similar situations they could have chosen differently and blaming them will therefore be able to influence their behavior in future relevantly similar situations. So why are you missing what I've been saying?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I have not reverted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which you have defined. I am arguing that the free will type of compulsion that compatibilists believe justifies blameworthiness is in contradiction with the position of causal necessity.

Of course you reverted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which I have defined. You do so every time you speak of being 'compelled' to move in the direction of greater satisfaction. This is not a compulsion in the compatibilist sense. And what is the "free will type of compulsion"? What on Earth are you claiming to be arguing? The compatibilist sense of free will is obviously incompatible with the compatibilist sense of compulsion - but neither is in contradiction with causal necessity. Do you have any idea at all of what you were here trying to say?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's why I said your premise is wrong. If man can only choose one alternative; the one that offers him greater satisfaction, he cannot be blamed for choosing that which he could not do otherwise. But this is not the end of the story. You still think that blaming and punishment are justified and are the only way to produce a healthy society. Did you ever think that blame and punishment may have inadvertantly contributed to the ill health of society?

You are yet again conflating the two senses of being able to choose otherwise. And you are still not addressing my point: Lessans' kind of 'compulsion' is irrelevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness because it is not something that prevents one from having been able to do otherwise given slightly different antecedent circumstances, and therefore is not something that in any way negates the influence and effectiveness of blame and punishment.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The only difference is that you keep contending that your kind justifies punishment, but if someone could not have done otherwise given not because of the excused compulsion that would drive someone to be in a fixed state, but because he didn't find preferable what you felt he should choose, then you are not being honest with yourself that this is a flawed position. I also do not understand how you can reconcile what you call a "mere" cause with the freedom that you believe allows a person to choose otherwise.

You clearly aren't paying attention to a word I say. Being merely caused is obviously compatible with compatibilist freedom, because that kind of freedom only requires one to have been able to choose differently given different antecedent causes. I'm being perfectly honest with both you and myself, and you haven't shown any flaw in my position. Yet again you are attacking my motivation instead of my points, and asserting rather than showing any flaw. And it is quite false that the only difference between the two definitions of freedom I gave you is that I think the compatibilist one justifies punishment. I carefully explained the difference between them and you are ignoring it once again.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This entire discovery is about feelings of moral responsibility, but it's how we reach people in acknowledging what would be their responsibility in an action in order to prevent those actions from ever taking place, not who is to blame.

Peacegirl in one post: "This is not about moral responsibility".

Peacegirl in her next post: "This entire discovery is about feelings of moral responsibility".

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's exactly what you're doing. You're not proving that compatibilism is right. You're just agreeing with the definition which does not prove that we can do otherwise given similar antecedent conditions. And I am not telling you that if you disagree with the book after reading it at least twice, that I would accuse you of not just reading it thoroughly just because you are in disagreement. But I don't believe you have read it carefully and I don't believe that you would disagree after dissecting it the way other important books are dissected and studied. But if that was so, I would accept it.

I wasn't saying anything of the sort. I was pointing out that no matter how many times one has read the book, so long as they still don't agree with it, you'll object that they need to read it again. That is irrational and dogmatic. More importantly, I was pointing out that you can't see where compatibilism is wrong - for if you could you'd be explaining how and why it is wrong instead of just repeatedly asserting that it's wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Telling you I think you're in denial is no worse than you accusing me of being a liar. So stop putting yourself on a pedestal Spacemonkey. I have not ignored your explanations and I have presented an argument equal to yours if not better.

I haven't put myself on any pedestal, Peacegirl. And telling you you are a liar is completely different from you telling me I'm in denial. Firstly because I support my charge by showing you your lies, while you can't support your allegations at all, and secondly because I do this in addition to addressing your points and answering your questions, while you attack my motivations instead of addressing my points or answering my questions. You HAVE ignored my explanations - you even admitted to doing so in your last post - and you have NOT presented any argument at all. All you've done is attack my character and assert that compatibilism is wrong. If you think you've presented an actual argument somewhere against compatibilism, then please quote or repeat it for me in your next post.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by koan

Logical fallacies in The Decline And Fall Of All Evil, by Seymour Lessans
Lessans starts out his "foundation" chapter 1 with two major flaws:

But that's true koan. We cannot prove free will unless we can turn back the clock to show that someone could have chosen differently. We can't prove it conclusively any other way. This is not a flaw, sorry.


Fallacy #1: False Dilemma (false dichotomy, black-or-white fallacy)
Either Free Will is true or Determinism is true. Because they are opposites, if one is true the other is false. pg would understand Spacemonkey's information better if she can realize that Lessans presented a false dilemma.

But it's not a false dilemma. We cannot be dead and alive at the same time, and we cannot have free will and be determined at the same time. The compatibilists who claim they can reconcile these two positions are incorrect because it is a true dilemma.

Originally Posted by koan

Fallacy #2:
Argument from ignorance
Inability to turn back time was Lessans' lead up to this conclusion that Free Will can't be proven true therefore they can't prove Determinism false.

That's not an argument from ignorance. Rationally, if free will can't be proven true, you cannot prove determinism false, because that would prove free will true, which was demonstrated accurately that it cannot be done. But that still leaves the possibility that determinism can be proven true and free will false. I'm sorry if you can't follow this, but his thinking was spot on.

Originally Posted by koan

The use of these fallacies does not mean Hard Determinism is false, it just means Lessans can't prove his conclusion by pursuing these premises.

It's not a fallacy koan. His premises are correct.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But it's not a false dilemma. We cannot be dead and alive at the same time, and we cannot have free will and be determined at the same time. The compatibilists who claim they can reconcile these two positions are incorrect because it is a true dilemma.

It's only a true dilemma if you specify that by 'free will' you are only speaking of contra-causal/libertarian free will. When you speak of free will in general you have to include other conceptions of free will, and that is what makes it a false dilemma, because there are other conceptions of free will for which we can be determined at the same time.

[koan]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But that's true koan. We cannot prove free will unless we can turn back the clock to show that someone could have chosen differently. We can't prove it conclusively any other way. This is not a flaw, sorry.

It is only true if there is no flaw. Those flaws are outlined below.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But it's not a false dilemma. We cannot be dead and alive at the same time, and we cannot have free will and be determined at the same time. The compatibilists who claim they can reconcile these two positions are incorrect because it is a true dilemma.

It is a false dilemma because being dead vs being alive is completely irrelevant to whether a person, while alive, has free will or not. You can only say that a dead person has no free will because they are dead and therefore have no option of taking an action. That does not prove that an alive person has no choice. The state of being alive or dead only helps narrow down which type of person you are talking about. You've only shown that an alive person isn't dead, not that the alive person has no free will. Nobody has said that a dead person has free will. Your example is irrelevant.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's not an argument from ignorance. Rationally, if free will can't be proven true, you cannot prove determinism false, because that would prove free will true, which was demonstrated accurately that it cannot be done. But that still leaves the possibility that determinism can be proven true and free will false. I'm sorry if you can't follow this, but his thinking was spot on.

You just repeated the fallacy. Thank you for giving a more clear example of what is wrong with that logic. Leaving possibilities does not prove either side conclusively therefore it can not be used as a proof. It only explains why the premise is not a proof. You might say the argument is an anti-premise or anti-proof.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's not a fallacy koan. His premises are correct.

I have shown exactly what fallacies they commit and you have done nothing to refute it. You are welcome to try again but, thus far, all you've said is that dead people have no free will and that there is no way of proving either free will or determinism... so it seems we agree.

[LadyShea]

But the problem is that this value judgment has not produced the kind of society we want. When something doesn't work, or doesn't work very well, you have to open your mind to the possibility that there's a better way.

This is fallacious reasoning, appeal to consequences

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I see it in black and white because that's what it is, not because I want to see it that way. Again, you are assuming there are multiple ways to understand this dilemma,

Yes, because there are multiple concepts of what free will is.

but if Lessans is right (which he is), there IS no other way to interpret this dilemma.

If Lessans is right, then he is right. If he is wrong, then he wasn't right. I have no reason to believe he was right. He didn't convince me and neither have you.

You will continue to maintain that there is, just like Spacemonkey, because you don't know the truth and you are not willing to listen if it contravenes your sacred belief system.

The only one with a sacred belief system here is you.

As I've stated multiple times, I do not adhere to any particular view in the free will v. determinism issue because I think the concepts are obsolete and probably useless. I am agnostic and apathetic regarding the "truth" as it relates to this particular topic.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

this is not to say that we cannot change our minds before something is chosen, but changing our minds is also part of the deterministic process because a new antecent condition has been introduced which compels us to prefer a different option than what was previously desired.

If you carefully analyze this, you will see that there is no action performed that is outside of the deterministic framework.

Wait, what?

I never said any action performed is outside of the deterministic framework. Where did that come from? As a matter of fact, the highlighted part of first sentence sounds almost word for word like an argument I made myself.

However, being causally determined does not add an element of necessity to Lessans statement man always moves in the direction of greater satisfaction

[koan]

Was just thinking how peacegirl tells anyone who doesn't agree with Lessans that they are ignorant or otherwise incapable of understanding. This is the exact same thing that Lessans himself complained about for the first twenty or so pages of his book. His biggest source of angst was that others told him he was uninformed and/or using fallacious reasoning and he employs Two Wrongs Make A Right to rebut them.

What Lessans claims to have wanted was for others to read his work seriously. Now we offer serious feedback after reading it, Lessans' spokesperson refuses to read and take seriously our feedback.

I agree that, if he didn't actually get feedback as to where his errors were made, he was wronged. That doesn't justify discounting feedback now on the same premise that we are ridiculous or ignorant.

He wanted peer review. Now you are getting it. Stop for a moment and appreciate the progress. Decide if you will use the peer review to get to the next step or reject the peer review and continue to fail. That's what peer review is for: to help you fix your logic.

[koan]

Out of the "goodness" of my heart, I'm going to offer up to peacegirl (since she likes life vs death analogies so much) a legitimate argument against Free Will.

Every person who is born is predetermined to die.

No matter whether we have free will or not, and despite some people thinking they can defy it, there is no scientific support for the idea that a person can avoid death through free will. If we could someone, most likely Walt Disney, would have done so.

Now I've given this "gift" I will temper it with Free Will. We have the freedom to choose whether we meet our predetermined death sooner by choosing to smoke, step in front of a subway train, kill ourselves when Lessans asks us a question,... or later by taking vitamins and/or medicine to improve our health and ignoring things that annoy us.

Hard Determinism should say that the date of your death is already set and your choices up until that point are irrelevant. Compatibilism says that your death is determined but how you get there is open to some free will. Free will doesn't have anything useful to say because they can't deny that death is predetermined.

[koan]

To discourage a jump to assumed "scientific" Determinism proof with no Free Will options:
Human observation affects reality

In a study reported in the February 26 issue of Nature (Vol. 391, pp. 871-874), researchers at the Weizmann Institute of Science have now conducted a highly controlled experiment demonstrating how a beam of electrons is affected by the act of being observed. The experiment revealed that the greater the amount of "watching," the greater the observer's influence on what actually takes place.

Water molecules changed by emotions

Dr. Emoto discovered that crystals formed in frozen water reveal changes when specific, concentrated thoughts are directed toward them. He found that water from clear springs and water that has been exposed to loving words shows brilliant, complex, and colorful snowflake patterns. In contrast, polluted water, or water exposed to negative thoughts, forms incomplete, asymmetrical patterns with dull colors.

Is it just me or does it crack you up that the guy who found emotions affect water (of which our bodies are mostly made up) is named "Dr. Emoto"?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Define causal necessity which compatibilism claims is unnecessary in holding people blameworthy? Show me where there is no contradiction.

causal necessity: The 'necessity' bit comes from Spinoza and means that something must be how it is - it cannot be otherwise - it is inevitable. The 'causal' bit refers to the chain of cause-and-effect manifest in the physical world. Causal necessity is thus the expression of the chain of cause-and-effect working to produce outcomes that are unavoidable.

Explain "Causal necessity" in Determinism, Philosophy*? - Yahoo! UK & Ireland Answers

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Why do you need me to define causal necessity? Casual necessity differs from logical necessity (which is much stronger). Something is logically necessary if it is true in all possible worlds (i.e. every consistent way that the world could be). An event is causally necessary if, given the same antecedent conditions, it occurs in every possible world which operates under the same causal laws.

Where in either definition of "cause" are we free? You are splitting hairs to make a definition fit logically so it doesn't look like a contradiction. I don't understand how logical necessity is not true if determinism is true because every consistent way that the world could be has already been established. If we are determined, the world can be no other way than what it is already. And causally necessary is also consistent with a world where the antecedent conditions occur in every possible world which ooperates under the same causal laws. Both are consistent with determinism, and there is no room for the kind of freedom that you believe justifies blameworthness.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

The point of my definitions was to show you that the compatibilist and contra-causal/libertarian definitions of freedom are different - they are not the same, despite your repeated assertions to the contrary.

I am only pointing out that the two definitions don't make a bit of difference in the real world. Whether logical or causal, they are purely deterministic and leave no room for the kind of free will that you believe justifies blame and punishment.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Blameworthiness is a value judgment based on the compatibilist set of rules which determines who qualifies for this blame. The distinction they have used is artificial but gives them the justification to be the judge of who they feel should be held responsible. But the problem is that this value judgment has not produced the kind of society we want. When something doesn't work, or doesn't work very well, you have to open your mind to the possibility that there's a better way. Like Einstein said: No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You haven't explained the difference between an artificial and non-artificial distinction, or why this matters.

The distinction they are making is artificial because it is not pure. It is a contrived definition intended to separate those who should not be held responsible due to a strong compulsion, and those who should be held responsible because they don't have the kind of compulsion that compatibilists believe are the only ones to be excused from moral responsibility. But as I stated earlier, there is no way you can prove that someone could have chosen otherwise, so the freedom you are talking about is a theoretical construct. It would be a different story if it was proven that someone could have chosen differently, which would then justify attributing blameworthisness to an individual. But this is a presupposition which has not been supported whatsoever.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

And the only objection you are raising here against compatibilism, is that you think Lessans' new world and changed conditions can do better. But that means your objection has nothing to do with any alleged contradiction in compatibilism, and also that your objection depends entirely upon your and Lessans' big fat assumption regarding the alleged innate potential perfection of conscience - something you have both failed miserably to support in any way, shape, or form. So until you can support his claims about conscience, you have not raised any legitimate challenge against compatibilism.

I don't appreciate your telling me that Lessans had a big fat assumption, when compatibilism is based on all kinds of big fat assumptions. Compatibilism is flawed and I've shown where.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're wrong to make that distinction, as if someone could have done otherwise just because he doesn't have that stronger sense of experienced compulsion that compatibilists speak of. You don't know that he could have chosen otherwise, which is the problem. And if he couldn't have chosen otherwise, how can you blame him? I gave the example of someone in a wheelchair. How can you blame a person in a wheelchair for not being able to stand up? You wouldn't because you can see he cannot help himself. If man's will is not free, it's the same thing. How can you blame someone for doing something he couldn't help? I know this leads to a dilemma, but if you don't allow Lessans to show you how a no blame society is much better than a blame filled society, we're at a dead end. I know why you are defending blame and punishment because you believe holding people to account is the only way to keep order in a civilized society, but I will ask you once again, if there is a better way, why would you be so against opening your mind just a crack to see if there could be validity to this discovery?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Did you even read what you were replying to? I just explained the importance of the distinction. And you have replied by yet again conflating them. It is true by definition that a person free of the compatibilist's kind of compulsion could have chosen otherwise given relevantly similar causal circumstances.

There you go again. How could someone choose otherwise when they couldn't choose otherwise since any other choice would have been in the direction of dissatisfaction, rendering that choice impossible because one cannot move from point a toward point b unless it is more satisfying, not less (unless there is no other option but to choose the lesser of two evils).

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

We know they could have chosen otherwise because we know that different causes lead to different effects. And this makes them blameworthy because they are free of the kind of compulsion that would prevent blame from having any actual effect upon their subsequent behavior.

This is what I'm talking about. You are distinguishing who should be blamed and who should not based on a false definition of who is free and who is not.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Also, I would not blame the person in the wheelchair for he is not free in the sense I have been defining.

Spacemonkey, you are failing to see that a person in a wheelchair is no different than a person who could make no better choice under his particular circumstances.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

And again, if your only objection to compatibilism is that you think Lessans offers a better way, then you have not presented any challenge to compatibilism until you can provide rational support for his big fat assumption regarding the innate potential perfection of conscience.

I don't want to go that far with you until you accept that compatibilism is fatally flawed.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by koan

Out of the "goodness" of my heart, I'm going to offer up to peacegirl (since she likes life vs death analogies so much) a legitimate argument against Free Will.

Every person who is born is predetermined to die.

No matter whether we have free will or not, and despite some people thinking they can defy it, there is no scientific support for the idea that a person can avoid death through free will. If we could someone, most likely Walt Disney, would have done so.

Now I've given this "gift" I will temper it with Free Will. We have the freedom to choose whether we meet our predetermined death sooner by choosing to smoke, step in front of a subway train, kill ourselves when Lessans asks us a question,... or later by taking vitamins and/or medicine to improve our health and ignoring things that annoy us.

Of course we have the freedom to choose. The question is: Is the choice we make FREE.

Originally Posted by koan

Hard Determinism should say that the date of your death is already set and your choices up until that point are irrelevant. Compatibilism says that your death is determined but how you get there is open to some free will. Free will doesn't have anything useful to say because they can't deny that death is predetermined.

Koan, you are very confused. This discovery specifically says that the agent is involved in the choice. It is not something outside of the "I" that makes the choice. How we get to death is obviously open to choices we make all our lives, but you are making a ton of assumptions, and I refuse to dissect them until you change your attitude and apologize to me for calling me schizophrenic. I'm not putting up with your insults. I have a bad taste in my mouth, and I will not engage with someone who thinks she is better than me, and has the right to talk shit about me.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Of course we have the freedom to choose.

Freedom to choose is a type of freedom

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The question is: Is the choice we make FREE

Free from what?

Really think about that answer, because it is the key difference amongst various conceptions of free will

If you start arguing for hard determinism (which you seem to keep entering that path), you remove any and all ability for the agent to affect change....you have us as automatons doing exactly as we are forced to do by circumstances we are completely unable to manipulate.

If you give us any agency, any ability to affect change through any means, we have some type of freedom. Any type of freedom could be interpreted as free will, depending on the person doing the interpretation.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Where in either definition of "cause" are we free? You are splitting hairs to make a definition fit logically so it doesn't look like a contradiction. I don't understand how logical necessity is not true if determinism is true because every consistent way that the world could be has already been established. If we are determined, the world can be no other way than what it is already. And causally necessary is also consistent with a world where the antecedent conditions occur in every possible world which ooperates under the same causal laws. Both are consistent with determinism, and there is no room for the kind of freedom that you believe justifies blameworthness.

I haven't given you two definitions of 'cause'. I was simply distinguishing for you the difference between logical and causal necessity. That a dropped apple will fall is causally but not logically necessary, because we live in a world where the law of gravity holds, yet the law of gravity itself is not a logical truth as it could have failed to hold without contradiction. This distinction between logical and causal necessity is not controversial, and is agreed to by compatibilists and incompatibilists alike. And of course there is room for the compatibilist kind of freedom I defined for you, as this kind of freedom is consistent with determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am only pointing out that the two definitions don't make a bit of difference in the real world. Whether logical or causal, they are purely deterministic and leave no room for the kind of free will that you believe justifies blame and punishment.

You aren't making any kind of sense, and no longer have any idea what you are even talking about. The two definitions were not logical vs. causal, but freedom from compulsion vs. freedom from causal determination. And there is plenty of room for the kind of freedom I believe justifies blame and punishment, for this kind of freedom is consistent with determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The distinction they are making is artificial because it is not pure. It is a contrived definition intended to separate those who should not be held responsible due to a strong compulsion, and those who should be held responsible because they don't have the kind of compulsion that compatibilists believe are the only ones to be excused from moral responsibility. But as I stated earlier, there is no way you can prove that someone could have chosen otherwise, so the freedom you are talking about is a theoretical construct. It would be a different story if it was proven that someone could have chosen differently, which would then justify attributing blameworthisness to an individual. But this is a presupposition which has not been supported whatsoever.

What is a 'pure' vs. an 'impure' definition? You are now appealing to the alleged motivations of all compatibilists, and this remains a fallacious mode of argumentation. Motivations and intentions are irrelevant to the soundness of the argument and distinctions made. And as I have repeatedly explained to you, that someone with compatibilist freedom could have done otherwise given slightly different antecedent conditions is true by definition, and proven by the obvious fact that different causes lead to different effects. So it is obviously not a presupposition or a mere theoretical construct.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't appreciate your telling me that Lessans had a big fat assumption, when compatibilism is based on all kinds of big fat assumptions. Compatibilism is flawed and I've shown where.

If you think that you've shown where compatibilism is flawed, then I am afraid you are completely delusional. You've done no such thing. All you ever do is repeatedly assert that it is flawed, without ever identifying any flaw, just as you have done here. Lessans' belief in the innate potential perfection of conscience is a big fat assumption because neither you nor he can or did provide anything at all in support of it. I'm sure you don't like being told this, but it is true nonetheless. If you think compatibilism is based on flawed assumptions then you are welcome to identify one and point it out.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There you go again. How could someone choose otherwise when they couldn't choose otherwise since any other choice would have been in the direction of dissatisfaction, rendering that choice impossible because one cannot move from point a toward point b unless it is more satisfying, not less (unless there is no other option but to choose the lesser of two evils).

Yep, there I go again directly addressing your objections and explaining your errors. Pity you can't do the same. The person could have chosen otherwise because differing antecedent circumstances would have allowed him to choose a different option as being in his direction of greater satisfaction.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is what I'm talking about. You are distinguishing who should be blamed and who should not based on a false definition of who is free and who is not.

Definitions still cannot be true or false. All you are saying is that you disagree with the compatibilists' view of what kind of freedom is needed for blameworthiness. But you have never once addressed my argument in support of this position. Not once.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Spacemonkey, you are failing to see that a person in a wheelchair is no different than a person who could make no better choice under his particular circumstances.

The person in the wheelchair differs by lacking the compatibilist notion of freedom with respect to choosing to walk. The person not in a wheelchair can walk or not walk as he chooses, while the wheelchair-bound person will not be able to walk no matter how he chooses. This is a pretty obvious difference, and is morally relevant for the reasons I've already explained, and which you have yet to address.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't want to go that far with you until you accept that compatibilism is fatally flawed.

Given your complete absence of any actual objection or argument against compatibilism, I don't see that happening any time soon.

[LadyShea]

In this statement you give us agency

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This discovery specifically says that the agent is involved in the choice. It is not something outside of the "I" that makes the choice. How we get to death is obviously open to choices we make all our lives

In this one you seem to be arguing hard determinism

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I don't understand how logical necessity is not true if determinism is true because every consistent way that the world could be has already been established. If we are determined, the world can be no other way than what it is already. And causally necessary is also consistent with a world where the antecedent conditions occur in every possible world which operates under the same causal laws.

And here you contradict yourself

Originally Posted by peacegirl

this is not to say that we cannot change our minds before something is chosen, but changing our minds is also part of the deterministic process because a new antecent condition has been introduced

If "every consistent way that the world could be has already been established" how can a new antecedent condition be introduced by an agent making choices?

[LadyShea]

Do you think it can be said, Spacemonkey, that anything that falls between contra-causal free will and hard determinism on a scale is a form of compatibilism?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

The answer to your question is quite simple. You can do it because you want to do it. Why do you think that this can't be done?

My suggestion to you: Go back to page 1.