A revolution in thought

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

What they are saying is that he didn't have to do what he did because he could have chosen otherwise; nothing was stopping him from making the correct choice.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Do and did are actions. A whole hell of a lot can go on in the mind before any action is performed.

Can one choose not to immediately act on a conscious decision, in order to contemplate or gather information, thereby changing the antecedent conditions, and then choose to perform a different action?

Only if he has had enough experience in his life to know that collecting more information (if it's available) is a smart thing to do.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

The why and how and extent of it is irrelevant to the question. Can someone refrain from acting on their first impulse or immediate impression or not?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The capability is there, if that's what you mean.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Yes, that's what I meant, as I every clearly asked

But that doesn't change anything because a person can't use what he doesn't know he needs to use, or is too inexperienced to use.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Even so, you cannot blame someone if he only has a limited amount of information at his disposal and acts on that limited knowledge.

This is very relevant because being able to refrain from acting on impulse does not mean someone will refrain if it's not on his radar to do so, therefore he might be quick in making a decision instead of slowing down. Obviously, if he knew the importance of not acting on impulse, he would have taken his time to garner more facts, in the direction of greater satisfaction.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

The quantity and quality of information available can be a mitigating or aggravating factor in deciding to what level they are responsible for an action.

You're not following me. There is no level of responsiblity in determinism which means you are coming from a free will position. It doesn't matter what those mitigating factors were, it is not up to anyone to decide who is or is not morally responsible in order to dish out a certain type of punishment that would be considered commensurate.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No LadyShea, the level of knowledge does not determine blameworthiness.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Where I have used the word blame or blameworthiness? Is the person responsible for the action they performed? Yes or no?

In the sense that they performed the action, yes, but they are not responsible in the sense that they could have done otherwise and should now be blamed or punished. This is where Lessans said you must follow this train of thought to find out what happens on the other side. Durant and many others could not get past the implications, the impasse of blame. Therefore they rejected determinism and went right back to the belief in free will, for this position justifies blame and punishment. This has been the conundrum, for how can we turn the other cheek in a world of such evil. But we must continue to follow the reasoning where Durant and others left off, to see where it leads.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If you understood anything at all in regard to "greater satisfaction", you would know that just because someone is or is not knowledgeable about his decision to do something does not make him culpable, as defined by determinism.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

It speaks to his level of responsibility for any action

Not if his will is not free. You are making him culpable because you think that he could have acted differently. But what if he couldn't LadyShea? What then? You are back to free will. Would you still blame him for something he couldn't help but do? Think about this, and be honest. Don't defend your position just because you don't like my position or where you think it's leading.

That's your free will position. Until you give up this position, you won't follow me. You're in the same spot as Durant was, and he didn't go into the vestibule. He turned around, like you and Spacemonkey are doing.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Again, the question is can someone refrain from acting on their first impulse or immediate impression or not? If so, they are responsible for the action, as they had the ability to have chosen a different action.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

They are responsible for the action in the sense that they performed the action, but to say they are blameworthy is not correct if you understand what determinism states.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I did not use the word blameworthy at all.

You didn't have to. It's implied.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Many times we learn from our experiences, and our mistakes teach us not to make rash decisions and to be more patient. But this doesn't change the fact that regardless of our options, or what we believe our options are, we base our decision on those options in the direction of greater satisfaction. Some people are extremely limited in options and have to base their choices on what is available at the moment.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

So what? Do they or do they not have the capability of contemplating actions before performing them?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Of course they have the capability, but they won't use it unless they feel it's important.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I didn't ask if they will or won't use the ability. And, how does one come to feel things are or are not important?

His value system or the things that matters to him.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Often we don't know that we need to garner more facts until the consequences of making a rash decision boomerang. We learn from our mistakes, or from not getting the desired result.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Yes. How do you suppose one can learn what guilt feels like, in order to desire to avoid it at all costs, if they've never made a mistake or performed an action that caused harm? How would they learn to hold themselves responsible if nobody else considers them responsible for any action they perform?

We don't have to hurt someone in order to learn that this is not something we want to do. We learn through conscience whether something is a hurt. As long as we grow up in a loving and nurturing environment, our empathy for others becomes strong and we wouldn't think of hurting others unless we have to in order not to be hurt ourselves. That happens when someone steals because he is starving. He doesn't mean to hurt that person, but he does it as the lesser of two evils. When this justification is removed, he wouldn't desire to strike a first blow when not to does not make him a loser.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Can one consider an array of possible actions, weighing the possible consequences, comparing the actions and consequences to their personal values, morals, and beliefs and then only performing the action that seems "right"?

Of course one can, and as one gets older and wiser, he often gets better at doing this. Children are more impulsive because they have less experience. But in the new world the conditions that caused them to contemplate hurting another as a preferable choice would not even enter their minds becauase the environmental conditions that caused them to think in these terms would have been removed.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

In my opinion all that is required for one to be considered a moral agent responsible for his/her actions is this ability to weigh, measure, and contemplate before acting...to choose different actions in one's imagination first...even if Lessans was right and the final decision rests on which of those imagined action>consequences sequences seems the most satisfactory. Someone without this ability to to weigh, measure, and contemplate before acting cannot be held responsible for their actions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Someone without this ability to weigh, measure, and contemplate cannot be held responsible for his actions, but neither can someone who can do these things.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Then why would they hold themselves responsible?

Because the changed conditions will give them no choice, which prevents them from moving in that direction. I'm trying to explain this but I can't move forward when everyone is telling me Lessans is wrong and they refuse to listen.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

he would not attempt to do anything that could hurt another so there would be no need to blame him for what he wanted to do.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

What makes you think a teenager would refrain from acting in a way that could hurt another if he/she has never learned what it is to be responsible for an action taken purposefully after contemplation? How would they know it's important to think things through? How would they develop working conscience if they never face consequences (both positive and negative) or are considered responsible (in both a positive and negative way) for their actions?

You will see why as I progress, but first I must get through the second chapter, which at this rate is not going to happen.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In fact, threats of punishment do not stop hardened criminals if they want something badly enough, even with the possibility of lifetime incarceration or the death penalty.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

And the threat of pain of a guilty conscience may not prevent some people from performing actions that harm others.

As long as a person has a working conscience (one that isn't disabled or severed), and is not psychotic where he knows the difference between right and wrong (what is a hurt) this law will have a powerful effect. The very crime that a person could commit in this world, he will unable to repeat under the changed conditions, once the transition is underway and he becomes a citizen.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I said nothing about judging an action right or wrong, I only discussed one being responsible for their actions because they could have not acted, or performed a different action after contemplating the factors.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Right, and if they could have not acted, or performed a different action after contemplating factors, how can they be held responsible?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

They could have not acted- meaning they could have refrained from acting. They could have performed a different action after contemplation. They could have done differently than they did, so are responsible for what they actually did.

That's not true if their will is not free. How could they have done differently, if what they did was the only choice they could have made at that moment, even after careful consideration? You are assuming that they could have acted differently, which gives you and everyone else the right to be judge and jury. But don't you see, you're right back to the free will position? We have to assume for the moment that he could not have done differently in order to find out what occurs when we stop judging. We're never going to move forward with this discovery until you give up that control.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Judging what is right or wrong for others is very subjective, based on the values system of the person making the judgment.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is true, but that is what we do everyday.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Sure, we judge others based on what we each think is right and wrong.

All you are doing is defending the free will position, which states that a person is responsible and therefore should be punished so that justice is served.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

However, I was not speaking to judging others as doing right or doing wrong, only if they are or are not responsible for their actions.

But why are you judging whether they are responsible for their actions other than determining whether those actions were "wrong" so they can be held responsible? You are judging whether someone is morally responsible in order to justify the blame and punishment that follows.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How could he have made a better choice when this choice was good in comparison to not stealing, which was bad, according to his circumstances?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I said nothing about good or bad, I said only responsible for his action. It's not about whether he could make a "better" choice (better is subjective), it's about if he could have performed a different action.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And who judges that?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Judges what? It's not a judgment call.

It is very much a judgment call, otherwise we wouldn't be making them.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

He/she is responsible for actions taken, because he/she could have acted differently or not acted at all.

You're a freewiller then. If determinism is true (which it is), he could not have acted differently or not acted at all. Do you see the difference for purposes of discussion? If you can't get this straight, we can't move forward.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How can we know he could have made a different action when we were not in his shoes. We can't go back in time to prove this.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

We know because we've already agreed that people have the ability to contemplate, and therefore change the antecedent conditions, indefinitely, and choose from multiple actions or choose not acting at all.

No LadyShea. He could have changed the antecedent conditions if he knew about them. Everyone is doing and choosing that which is best for themselves given the options available, but if he didn't know that there were better options, he couldn't have used them to make a better choice.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

If the person knew what the law stated, and the possible consequences of breaking the law, and chose to break the law instead of choosing a different action, he/she is responsible for breaking the law.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

According to the legal system of today, yes, he would be held responsible,

Originally Posted by LadyShea

He is responsible for his actions. Period. Breaking the law is just a consequence of the action he performed after contemplation.

Yes, in a free will society he is held morally responsible. Yes, he is responsible in the sense that he performed the action, but to judge his actions is what we're discussing right now. You have half the equation, which will help you understand the two-sided equation if we ever get to it. I have my doubts. I am not going to be here forever, and my patience is running thin.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Again, judging what is good or bad for others is very subjective, based on the values system of the person making the judgment.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Then how can you judge what is good and bad for others?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I judge them based on my own subjective values system the same as everyone else. But, that's irrelevant to this discussion

But if will is not free, we cannot judge what is good and bad for others because we are not in their position. We can try to give advice and change the antecent conditions that [we hope] will lead them to a better choice, but that's all we can do.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's what you're doing. You're saying that if they did something judged bad by others, they can be held accountable and punished accordingly.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Where did I use the words accountable, "bad" or say anything about being punished? You are arguing against a strawman again.

Being held morally responsible is being held accountable, which leads to punishment. You are not being honest Ladyshea because any kind of judgment is done for the purpose of making someone accountable if their actions are considered "bad" or "wrong".

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Being responsible for an action is a neutral position. Responsibility may be for an action others judge as "good" just as easily as it could be judged as "bad"

But it's still a judgment. It is not neutral. It is meant to judge and punish if that action is considered wrong in the eyes of society.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by koan

"Oh dear," says God, "I hadn't thought of that," and promptly vanishes in a puff of logic.

Be very careful at the next Zebra crossing !

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're not following me. There is no level of responsiblity in determinism which means you are coming from a free will position.

You are still conflating determinism and hard determinism. Do you really still not understand the difference between the two? This is a pretty elementary distinction in the free will debate.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In the sense that they performed the action, yes, but they are not responsible in the sense that they could have done otherwise and should now be blamed or punished.

You are still failing to distinguish between the two senses of 'could have chosen otherwise' that I have explained to you. Here's a hint: Don't ever use this phrase without following it with either "...given the exact same antecedent causal circumstances" or "...given relevantly similar causal circumstances".

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Think about this, and be honest. Don't defend your position just because you don't like my position or where you think it's leading.

You are projecting again. You are asking LadyShea to refrain from doing exactly what you have been doing.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's your free will position. Until you give up this position, you won't follow me. You're in the same spot as Durant was, and he didn't go into the vestibule. He turned around, like you and Spacemonkey are doing.

Rational people like us will not abandon our beliefs and agree with you just because you want us to. You need to first give us rational grounds for thinking our current beliefs are wrong. You haven't done that here.

[LadyShea]

2nd bump

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Post about conscience you ignored

[LadyShea]

I do not believe in or adhere to the concept of free will. I think it is useless outside of theology.

I believe in a deterministic universe; effects have causes, effects contribute to causes. I have stated this many, many times.

This is the definition of determinism I have in mind at all times: The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.

Therefore, nothing I have said or will say is based on or advocating a free will position.

[LadyShea]

Back in September, you were arguing that the past does not cause the present-meaning you were arguing against determinism. Do you still think that?

Additionally you previously argued:

Originally Posted by peacegirl in October

Free will the way it's defined by the standard definition is fine as long as it's qualified. We can say "I did it of my own free will." There's nothing wrong with saying this, if this means (p. 53) "I did it because I wanted to, nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to."

So, according to Lessans someone can perform an action, and nothing compelled or caused him/her to do it and s/he could have acted otherwise had s/he desired.. is that not exactly what I have been saying? That someone is responsible for an action if they could have performed a different action? Why are you suddenly against this when you previously advocated it?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

They could have not acted- meaning they could have refrained from acting. They could have performed a different action after contemplation. They could have done differently than they did, so are responsible for what they actually did.

Originally Posted by peacegirl today

That's not true if their will is not free. How could they have done differently, if what they did was the only choice they could have made at that moment, even after careful consideration? You are assuming that they could have acted differently

You are making him culpable because you think that he could have acted differently. But what if he couldn't LadyShea?

[koan]

Perhaps we need to educate peacegirl on what all the logical fallacies are... since she's so quick to call everyone else's thinking fallacious but doesn't name which fallacy was committed then uses fallacies to support her dad, who was also fond of calling others fallacious without naming the fallacy.

Lessans seems to have taken on the dialectic approach to proving his arguments, presumably out of fondness for Socrates. The problem is that he "wins" his invented debates by debating the weakest arguments offered by his opponents. This technique is only effective if you choose the strongest arguments from your best critics.

Fallacies evident in Lessans' imaginary discourses:
Straw Man. He over simplifies the arguments against him.
Cherry Picking. He only considers evidence that supports his conclusions.

And he gets jiggy with it by combining a whole bunch of fallacies all in one paragraph:
Proof By Example. He considers one, cherry picked, example of an observable event (eg baby sleeping with eyes open) then uses that example to claim it proves a general statement by Affirming The Consequent.

It's difficult to find a passage in the book that doesn't contain at least one fallacy.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are still conflating determinism and hard determinism. Do you really still not understand the difference between the two? This is a pretty elementary distinction in the free will debate.

But these are only words Spacemonkey, as if the word "hard" or "soft" in front of the word determinism makes a difference in reality.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In the sense that they performed the action, yes, but they are not responsible in the sense that they could have done otherwise and should now be blamed or punished.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are still failing to distinguish between the two senses of 'could have chosen otherwise' that I have explained to you. Here's a hint: Don't ever use this phrase without following it with either "...given the exact same antecedent causal circumstances" or "...given relevantly similar causal circumstances".

But your explanation isn't right. Compatibilists are saying that only people who cannot respond to changes in antecedent conditions are exempt from responsibility, but all people are exempt from responsibility if they couldn't have acted otherwise. I don't know you don't get this.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Think about this, and be honest. Don't defend your position just because you don't like my position or where you think it's leading.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are projecting again. You are asking LadyShea to refrain from doing exactly what you have been doing.

No I'm not. I'm not refraining from seeing it her way. I know what her position is because it's the very foundation of our civilization. We live in a free will environment. She's just defending it to maintain the status quo.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's your free will position. Until you give up this position, you won't follow me. You're in the same spot as Durant was, and he didn't go into the vestibule. He turned around, like you and Spacemonkey are doing.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Rational people like us will not abandon our beliefs and agree with you just because you want us to. You need to first give us rational grounds for thinking our current beliefs are wrong. You haven't done that here.

I'm not asking you to abandon your beliefs and agree. I am trying to give you rational grounds for considering another way of seeing something. And you keep coming back with arguments that are flawed. I can't help that you can't or won't allow yourself to see the flaw. I'm not even talking about the eyes right now, because I know that this is going to be that much more difficult to prove since it has already been established that the eyes are a sense organ.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But that doesn't change anything because a person can't use what he doesn't know he needs to use, or is too inexperienced to use.

Knowledge and experience are mitigating or aggravating factors in the level of responsibility for an action. For example being a child or having diminished capacity would reduce responsibility for your actions.

So, how did Lessans figure that responsibility would go up (which speaks to a level) under his brand of determinism if there is no level of responsibility in determinism?

You are contradicting yourself and changing your views every time we have this discussion.

I am not coming from a free will position at all. I accept determinism as defined a few posts back. We are debating how responsibility manifests within that framework.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It doesn't matter what those mitigating factors were, it is not up to anyone to decide who is or is not morally responsible in order to dish out a certain type of punishment that would be considered commensurate.

Where did I say anything at all about moral responsibility or punishment? I didn't. That's not part of my argument.

I am talking about what does or does not constitute responsibility and how and if it is manifest, only.

Consequences and ethical questions are not on topic here.

I never mentioned blame or punishment.

They are responsible because they performed the action. Now, the question is could they have done otherwise? Lessans seemed to think so when he said

Originally Posted by Lessans

nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If you understood anything at all in regard to "greater satisfaction", you would know that just because someone is or is not knowledgeable about his decision to do something does not make him culpable, as defined by determinism.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

It speaks to his level of responsibility for any action

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are making him culpable because you think that he could have acted differently.

I am making him responsible because he could have acted differently by changing, via contemplation, the conditions under which he decided how to act.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But what if he couldn't LadyShea? What then?

What might prevent one from contemplating the situation before acting? What might create a condition where only one action is an available option to explore during the contemplative process, and where not acting at all is not an option?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Would you still blame him for something he couldn't help but do?

According to Lessans, the person must agree with the conditions in order to do the action, if the person "couldn't help but do it" that is not something he himself agreed to do, is it? That sounds like he is being made or forced to perform an action. Is that what you meant to imply?

Originally Posted by Lessans

It is a fact that nothing can cause you to do anything, not your past, not your heredity, not even God, can cause you to do something you yourself don't agree to.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's your free will position. Until you give up this position, you won't follow me.

I do not hold a free will position

It is not implied. You are inferring it, incorrectly, because you believe I hold a position I do not hold. That is called fighting a strawman.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

We learn through conscience whether something is a hurt.

How could one learn that if they've never hurt someone or been hurt because the new world conditions prevent such things? How would the conscience develop the ability to recognize this?

Conscience could not develop at all in such a world. The values system would be stunted.

You aren't giving us any valid reason to believe your assertions. YOu just keep stating that things are the way you believe they are.

From an epistemological standpoint, you have not justified your beliefs.

Weasel

Originally Posted by peacegirl

As long as a person has a working conscience (one that isn't disabled or severed), and is not psychotic where he knows the difference between right and wrong (what is a hurt) this law will have a powerful effect.

How would this working conscience and knowledge of right and wrong develop in a world with no consequences for actions, and where, apparently, nobody has any control or input over their actions at all (which is what "can't help but do" means)?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

They could have not acted- meaning they could have refrained from acting. They could have performed a different action after contemplation. They could have done differently than they did, so are responsible for what they actually did.

That's not true if their will is not free. How could they have done differently, if what they did was the only choice they could have made at that moment, even after careful consideration? You are assuming that they could have acted differently

How did Lessans think people could choose to desire to do differently?

Originally Posted by Lessans

nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired

Originally Posted by LadyShea

However, I was not speaking to judging others as doing right or doing wrong, only if they are or are not responsible for their actions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But why are you judging whether they are responsible for their actions

I am interested in whether you think people have any control or input into the actions they perform. If they do, then they are responsible for their actions.

If they have no control, nor can they offer any input into the actions they perform, you are now advocating hard determinism, and Lessans statements about responsibility going up become baffling.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I said nothing about good or bad, I said only responsible for his action. It's not about whether he could make a "better" choice (better is subjective), it's about if he could have performed a different action.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And who judges that?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Judges what? It's not a judgment call.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is very much a judgment call, otherwise we wouldn't be making them.

We are discussing whether a person, through contemplation and consideration, can decide from amongst multiple options how and whether to act. So, can a person have performed a different action than he/she did? If so, then he/she is responsible for taking the action.

We are NOT talking about judging the action good, bad, better or worse. We are only saying is the person responsible, yes or no?

Then so is Lessans a freewiller. I am not advocating a thing he didn't support

Originally Posted by Lessans

It is a fact that nothing can cause you to do anything, not your past, not your heredity, not even God, can cause you to do something you yourself don't agree to.

Nothing can compel man (not the past or anything else; this bars what other people can do to us) to do anything against his will, for over this he has absolute control (you can lead a horse to water but you cannot make him drink).

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No LadyShea. He could have changed the antecedent conditions if he knew about them.

Every single thought in your head, every single question you ask yourself, and every single second that passes changes the antecedent conditions. What's to know about?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Being responsible for an action is a neutral position.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But it's still a judgment. It is not neutral.

So what on Earth was Lessans talking about when he said responsibility will go up? Was he using it as a judgment too?

How was he defining responsibility that was so very different from the way I am using it?

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by koan

Perhaps we need to educate peacegirl on what all the logical fallacies are... since she's so quick to call everyone else's thinking fallacious but doesn't name which fallacy was committed then uses fallacies to support her dad, who was also fond of calling others fallacious without naming the fallacy.

Lessans seems to have taken on the dialectic approach to proving his arguments, presumably out of fondness for Socrates. The problem is that he "wins" his invented debates by debating the weakest arguments offered by his opponents. This technique is only effective if you choose the strongest arguments from your best critics.

Fallacies evident in Lessans' imaginary discourses:
Straw Man. He over simplifies the arguments against him.
Cherry Picking. He only considers evidence that supports his conclusions.

And he gets jiggy with it by combining a whole bunch of fallacies all in one paragraph:
Proof By Example. He considers one, cherry picked, example of an observable event (eg baby sleeping with eyes open) then uses that example to claim it proves a general statement by Affirming The Consequent.

It's difficult to find a passage in the book that doesn't contain at least one fallacy.

Perhaps where he says that the book must be read in correct order, (front to back) with a complete 'suspension of disbelief' so that everything he writes will be accepted without question, and only then will people understand (completely agree with) the book.

Maybe Lessans didn't use those exact words, but the implication was there, and Peacegirl has stated as much in her posts.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by koan

Perhaps we need to educate peacegirl on what all the logical fallacies are... since she's so quick to call everyone else's thinking fallacious but doesn't name which fallacy was committed then uses fallacies to support her dad, who was also fond of calling others fallacious without naming the fallacy.

Lessans seems to have taken on the dialectic approach to proving his arguments, presumably out of fondness for Socrates. The problem is that he "wins" his invented debates by debating the weakest arguments offered by his opponents. This technique is only effective if you choose the strongest arguments from your best critics.

Fallacies evident in Lessans' imaginary discourses:
Straw Man. He over simplifies the arguments against him.
Cherry Picking. He only considers evidence that supports his conclusions.

And he gets jiggy with it by combining a whole bunch of fallacies all in one paragraph:
Proof By Example. He considers one, cherry picked, example of an observable event (eg baby sleeping with eyes open) then uses that example to claim it proves a general statement by Affirming The Consequent.

It's difficult to find a passage in the book that doesn't contain at least one fallacy.

He didn't cherry pick, or do any of those other things you are accusing him of. Sorry, that wasn't what he did. In the example with the baby, he was just saying that no baby would react to anything in the room even if his eyes were wide open (other than the pupils dilating and contracting), unlike the other senses where there would be an immediate reaction, because the eyes do not function like the other four senses.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But these are only words Spacemonkey, as if the word "hard" or "soft" in front of the word determinism makes a difference in reality.

Hard determinism=automoton
No responsibility whatsoever
If you are now advocating for hard determinism, as I stated, this would make Lessans statements about responsibility going up, and holding oneself responsible, and feeling guilt proactively, completely baffling and nonsensical.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

He didn't cherry pick, or do any of those other things you are accusing him of. Sorry, that wasn't what he did.

pupils dilating and contracting He did use those fallaices, as Koan demonstrated. Your simple denial isn't a rational refutation

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In the example with the baby, he was just saying that no baby would react to anything in the room even if his eyes were wide open (other than the pupils dilating and contracting), unlike the other senses where there would be an immediate reaction, because the eyes do not function like the other four senses.

1. Define reaction in such a way that pupil response is not included
2. Do you have any evidence to provide in support of this claim?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

You're still missing the entire point of his demonsration in that if will is not free we cannot judge any action. When you talk about mitigating factors, you are judging whether someone should be blamed due to your reasons. But don't you see that even if someone knew what he was doing, he cannot be held responsible because at that moment this was the preferred choice, over which he has no control.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

So, how did Lessans figure that responsibility would go up (which speaks to a level) under his brand of determinism if there is no level of responsibility in determinism?

That is the two sides of the equation which I posted, but it obviously had no impact because your mind is attuned to thinking a certain way and it will take longer to fully grasp why responsibility goes up in a world of no blame. Forget brands of determinism. It's all one. We either have no free will, or we do. That's why when you gave the quick summary of the two sided equation, you thought that was enough, but it was far from enough because you're still thinking in terms of free will, responsibility, blame and punishment.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

You are contradicting yourself and changing your views every time we have this discussion.

No I'm not. There's a distinction between being responsible for doing something (I hit that car's fender; no one else did), and being held morally responsible for what I did.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I am not coming from a free will position at all. I accept determinism as defined a few posts back. We are debating how responsibility manifests within that framework.

I'm trying to show you but that is in chapter two where the two principles (ie., we are always moving in the direction of greater satisfaction and nothing can make someone do anything against his will) leads to the two-sided equation. As you carefully study this you will see that under the changed conditions, no one can do those things that they could very well have done in a free will environment.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It doesn't matter what those mitigating factors were, it is not up to anyone to decide who is or is not morally responsible in order to dish out a certain type of punishment that would be considered commensurate.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Where did I say anything at all about moral responsibility or punishment? I didn't. That's not part of my argument.

I am talking about what does or does not constitute responsibility and how and if it is manifest, only.

Consequences and ethical questions are not on topic here.

We are not removing someone's responsibility in what he did, like in some thought systems where the "I" doesn't exist so a person is free of responsiblity because he didn't really do it. That's not what I'm saying.

Then yes, but there is no one in the new world who is going to say to him that he was responsible, which places a tremendous amount weight on him if he was responsible because he can't shift it to something else, which will make him feel terrible remorse if he was partly or fully responsible.

True, and the conditions of the new environment compel a person to desire to act otherwise, which prevents the act. These are the new antecedent conditions.

Maybe if he had contemplated more, maybe if the conditions under which he decided to act were different, but they weren't, and you can't go back in time. You can only change the next moment which takes into consideration your newfound knowledge which is used to make a better choice.

It's not a matter of whether there are options available. As I said earlier, it's whether someone cares to use them. Many times people do not consider the possible consequences of their actions, or they just don't care how their actions could affect others. This law of our nature compels them to desire being more careful, where the existing laws do not always get the desired response.

I'm talking in terms of determinism. If a person could not have done otherwise, can you blame him? As far as taking the exam and the agreement, it's only to allow the transition to get underway. There is no force whatsoever.

That's true. Nothing but you makes a choice to do or not to do something, so you can't say that something other than you made that choice. That's all he meant by that.

Then I hope you follow me because any talk about holding someone responsible because they could have done otherwise (through contemplation or anything else you care to throw in), is a free will position.

It is not implied. You are inferring it, incorrectly, because you believe I hold a position I do not hold. That is called fighting a strawman.

It's certainly much easier to explain this knowledge to someone who is leaning toward no free will than it is to explain this to someone who believes we have a free choice.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

We learn through conscience whether something is a hurt.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

How could one learn that if they've never hurt someone or been hurt because the new world conditions prevent such things? How would the conscience develop the ability to recognize this?

Children learn very quickly what is and what is not a hurt through their ability to empathize. When the conditions are such that they are never hurt (and there are many ways children are hurt in our society: Chapter Nine), they will never desire to hurt others. To hurt someone for any reason would never be a preferable choice under the changed conditions. It would be alien to them. Imagine never hearing people fighting, hearing about murders on t.v., seeing the devastating consequences of war and poverty. You can't even begin to imagine the difference between these two world.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Can one consider an array of possible actions, weighing the possible consequences, comparing the actions and consequences to their personal values, morals, and beliefs and then only performing the action that seems "right"?

The interesting thing here is that people will become much more contemplative about their actions when they realize that should they hurt someone, even accidentally, they will not be blamed, which compels them to be extremely careful before doing anything that poses a risk to someone else.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Of course one can, and as one gets older and wiser, he often gets better at doing this. Children are more impulsive because they have less experience. But in the new world the conditions that caused them to contemplate hurting another as a preferable choice would not even enter their minds becauase the environmental conditions that caused them to think in these terms would have been removed.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Conscience could not develop at all in such a world. The values system would be stunted.

It's the exact opposite.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

In my opinion all that is required for one to be considered a moral agent responsible for his/her actions is this ability to weigh, measure, and contemplate before acting...to choose different actions in one's imagination first...even if Lessans was right and the final decision rests on which of those imagined action>consequences sequences seems the most satisfactory. Someone without this ability to to weigh, measure, and contemplate before acting cannot be held responsible for their actions.

You keep thinking that people won't measure their actions, but they will do it to a much greater degree. They would never want to give advice that they aren't sure about either because they would never want to be responsible for hurting someone, and not be blamed for that hurt.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Someone without this ability to weigh, measure, and contemplate cannot be held responsible for his actions, but neither can someone who can do these things.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Then why would they hold themselves responsible?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Because the changed conditions will give them no choice, which prevents them from moving in that direction. I'm trying to explain this but I can't move forward when everyone is telling me Lessans is wrong and they refuse to listen.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

You aren't giving us any valid reason to believe your assertions. YOu just keep stating that things are the way you believe they are.

From an epistemological standpoint, you have not justified your beliefs.

I disagree. You are concluding that people will make choices without thinking or contemplating because anything they do will be excused, but that's not the way it works LadyShea.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

he would not attempt to do anything that could hurt another so there would be no need to blame him for what he wanted to do.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

What makes you think a teenager would refrain from acting in a way that could hurt another if he/she has never learned what it is to be responsible for an action taken purposefully after contemplation? How would they know it's important to think things through? How would they develop working conscience if they never face consequences (both positive and negative) or are considered responsible (in both a positive and negative way) for their actions?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You will see why as I progress, but first I must get through the second chapter, which at this rate is not going to happen.

Actually it's not weaseling. I'm telling you what is necessary to understand this book. I can only do so much when no one wants to meet me half way.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

In fact, threats of punishment do not stop hardened criminals if they want something badly enough, even with the possibility of lifetime incarceration or the death penalty.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

And the threat of pain of a guilty conscience may not prevent some people from performing actions that harm others.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

As long as a person has a working conscience (one that isn't disabled or severed), and is not psychotic where he knows the difference between right and wrong (what is a hurt) this law will have a powerful effect.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

How would this working conscience and knowledge of right and wrong develop in a world with no consequences for actions, and where, apparently, nobody has any control or input over their actions at all (which is what "can't help but do" means)?

I already answered this. It's not that people have to experience hurting someone to learn from it just by thinking about how they would feel if they hurt someone intentionally or unintentionally, and not be blamed. It's not a good feeling at all, and prevents someone from even wanting to get close to a situation that could possibly hurt someone. That means the only avenue open is to be very contemplative and thoughtful in their choices, since that's the only means by which they can prevent what they DO NOT want, and would never want to experience.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

They could have not acted- meaning they could have refrained from acting. They could have performed a different action after contemplation. They could have done differently than they did, so are responsible for what they actually did.

That's not true if their will is not free. How could they have done differently, if what they did was the only choice they could have made at that moment, even after careful consideration? You are assuming that they could have acted differently

Originally Posted by LadyShea

How did Lessans think people could choose to desire to do differently?

Originally Posted by Lessans

nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired

The conditions of the new world change the antecedent events to such a degree that the desire not to hurt others would be inevitable, as that choice which gives greater satisfaction.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

However, I was not speaking to judging others as doing right or doing wrong, only if they are or are not responsible for their actions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But why are you judging whether they are responsible for their actions

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I am interested in whether you think people have any control or input into the actions they perform. If they do, then they are responsible for their actions.

They are responsible for performing that action because nothing other than them is performing that action. But they cannot be held morally responsible if that is the only choice they could have make at that moment. You will understand this better if you let me proceed. I am not weaseling out of anything.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

If they have no control, nor can they offer any input into the actions they perform, you are now advocating hard determinism, and Lessans statements about responsibility going up become baffling.

I did not say they don't have any input into their actions. There is still an agent that is performing the action, and it is their input. This is in keeping with naturalism, but they don't have all the pieces of the puzzle.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I said nothing about good or bad, I said only responsible for his action. It's not about whether he could make a "better" choice (better is subjective), it's about if he could have performed a different action.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And who judges that?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Judges what? It's not a judgment call.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is very much a judgment call, otherwise we wouldn't be making them.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

We are discussing whether a person, through contemplation and consideration, can decide from amongst multiple options how and whether to act. So, can a person have performed a different action than he/she did? If so, then he/she is responsible for taking the action.

Yes, he is responsible in that sense because nothing but him is performing the action.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

We are NOT talking about judging the action good, bad, better or worse. We are only saying is the person responsible, yes or no?

Yes.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

He/she is responsible for actions taken, because he/she could have acted differently or not acted at all.

No, you are conflating the two principles which is confusing you. That's why I want to show you where the responsiblity for doing something cannot be shifted when no one is holding that person responsible. This places an enormous weight on the individual to make sure his choices do not hurt anyone, or he would have no way of shifting that which is his responsibility.
There are two sides to this, which you're not seeing yet. You will in time.

You're a freewiller then. If determinism is true (which it is), he could not have acted differently or not acted at all.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Then so is Lessans a freewiller. I am not advocating a thing he didn't support

Originally Posted by LadyShea

That's true LadyShea. That's one half of the equation. Nothing other than you can make you do what you do not desire BUT THAT DOES NOT MAKE WILL FREE. That's the whole first chapter. That's why this book takes studying not just once or twice Each time you read it you get more out of it. I've got to give you an A for persistence. At least you have questions, instead of just giving up.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How can we know he could have made a different action when we were not in his shoes. We can't go back in time to prove this.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

We know because we've already agreed that people have the ability to contemplate, and therefore change the antecedent conditions, indefinitely, and choose from multiple actions or choose not acting at all.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No LadyShea. He could have changed the antecedent conditions if he knew about them.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Every single thought in your head, every single question you ask yourself, and every single second that passes changes the antecedent conditions. What's to know about?

That's true, but the antecedent conditions (including the knowledge that he would be punished for his wrongdoing) might not be enough to change his actions.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Being responsible for an action is a neutral position.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But it's still a judgment. It is not neutral.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

So what on Earth was Lessans talking about when he said responsibility will go up? Was he using it as a judgment too?

I think you were using the term responsibility in the way that was clarified. That is a neutral position. I caused this thing to happen by something I did. Therefore, the responsibility for doing that thing is mine.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

How was he defining responsibility that was so very different from the way I am using it?

Responsibility #1: I am responsible for doing this meaning no one else did this thing but me.

Responsibility #2: You are not morally responsible because you were compelled to do that thing given your particular circumstances.

You have to remember that under the changed conditions, the antecedent conditions change drastically, compelling someone who may previously gotten satisfaction out of hurting others to prefer not to, as that choice which is better for himself.

[But]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

I do not believe in or adhere to the concept of free will. I think it is useless outside of theology.

I believe in a deterministic universe; effects have causes, effects contribute to causes. I have stated this many, many times.

This is the definition of determinism I have in mind at all times: The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.

Well, but that isn't true. You can start from identical states and get completely different outcomes. The universe, as far as we know, isn't deterministic, not on that level.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by But

Well, but that isn't true. You can start from identical states and get completely different outcomes. The universe, as far as we know, isn't deterministic, not on that level.

Can you explain further, please?

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But these are only words Spacemonkey, as if the word "hard" or "soft" in front of the word determinism makes a difference in reality.

They are words which stand for concepts - different concepts - and yet you keep conflating them. Would it be reasonable for me to keep ignoring the difference between afferent and efferent vision by claiming they are just words which make no difference in reality? Ignoring the meanings of words is not what one does when one is interested in the truth.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But your explanation isn't right. Compatibilists are saying that only people who cannot respond to changes in antecedent conditions are exempt from responsibility, but all people are exempt from responsibility if they couldn't have acted otherwise. I don't know you don't get this.

What isn't right about my explanation? Why have you just responded to my point that you are fallaciously conflating the two senses of 'could have done otherwise' by repeating the very same mistake? Was that a rational thing to do?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No I'm not. I'm not refraining from seeing it her way. I know what her position is because it's the very foundation of our civilization. We live in a free will environment. She's just defending it to maintain the status quo.

Neither I nor LadyShea believe in free will as you define it (i.e. in the contra-causal sense). And you are again attacking our alleged motivations instead of meeting our arguments. That also is a fallacious mode of argumentation.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm not asking you to abandon your beliefs and agree. I am trying to give you rational grounds for considering another way of seeing something. And you keep coming back with arguments that are flawed. I can't help that you can't or won't allow yourself to see the flaw. I'm not even talking about the eyes right now, because I know that this is going to be that much more difficult to prove since it has already been established that the eyes are a sense organ.

I can't see any flaws in the arguments I have presented because you simply aren't pointing any out. You have not been addressing my arguments at all. You keep asserting there to be flaws in my position but you never actually identify them. If you are trying to provide rational grounds for your own position, then I'm afraid you are failing epically. You have provided no such grounds at all. I've explained compatibilism to you in detail, yet you have failed to respond to most of my points, and when you do respond you simply gainsay whatever you are replying to, while ignoring the careful distinctions and definitions I provide for you. It might be about time for you to recognize that rational debate is not something you are cut out for, and that your time may be better spent working out how to best market the book, rather than digging Lessans' hole ever deeper with your irrational and faith-driven attempts at defending his claims.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

There is nothing wrong with the definitions I gave you. Why is the compatibilist definition not useful? You say later that this means it cannot be applied to reality. But it can. We can distinguish between psychological compulsion and mere causal determination. We can choose to hold people blameworthy just so long as they are not coerced or compelled in this sense. Nothing at all prevents us from applying these definitions to reality.

I don't know why you say the definition I gave reverts right back to freedom of the will. It is a definition of freedom of the will. It is the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will - yet we already proved that it is different from the contra-causal notion of free will, so surely you don't mean it reverts back to that?

You ask who determines the standard for what kind of ability to choose otherwise will be relevant for being 'free' (in the sense of being blameworthy). And the answer is that WE do. That is the core point you seem to be missing. Whether or not people are blameworthy when they meet the compatibilist definition of freedom is NOT a factual issue. There is no fact of the matter to be uncovered. Blameworthiness is itself a value judgement, and not an empirical fact - it is something for us to decide rather than to uncover. And I have given you my reasoned explanation for why the compatibilist distinction is the one morally relevant for determining blameworthiness (i.e. a good place to choose to set the boundary), yet you have not replied to or addressed my point.

As things stand, you have failed to show any contradiction in compatibilism, and you have failed to provide any rational reason for thinking it to be wrong.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Oh, but you are, Peacegirl. Your behaviour fits this definition perfectly. You are constantly dogmatically asserting and repeating unproven claims and principles - often the very claims and principles you have been asked to support - such as that compatibilism is wrong and contradictory, that one cannot harm another without justification under Lessans' changed conditions, that conscience has a natural state of perfection it is only prevented from reaching by our environment of blame, and that your claims are falsifiable. You are dogmatic on all of these points. They are unproven, and you just keep on arrogantly asserting them over and over again.

There's that dogmatism again. And no, you haven't given me ANY reason to believe that a justification will always be required. The closest you came was in asserting that it was just obvious.

No, that is not what compatibilists are saying. The compatibilist definition of freedom is NOT the same as the contra-causal/libertarian definition (which seems to be what you keep wrongly referring to as the 'standard definition'). And you are again conflating the two different senses of 'could have chosen otherwise' - which I have specifically corrected you on, and which you have specifically ignored yet again.

You are clearly either lying, or have not been paying any attention at all to the discussion we've been having for the last several days. Only contra-causal freedom is incompatible with determinism. The compatibilist type of freedom which I have defined for you is PERFECTLY CONSISTENT with determinism - causal determination and compatibilist freedom are not at all mutually exclusive positions. You are again just dogmatically asserting the things you would like to be true, instead of actually engaging with the points I have made. I have specifically explained to you the compatibilist definition of freedom, how it differs from the contra-causal variety, and how it is not incompatible with causal determination. But you just ignore all of my explanations, and revert back to claiming things you know are not true.

That's exactly what you and your father have done. You both make wild assertions that you cannot back up with detailed demonstrations. What happened yesterday? I bumped my last reply on compatibilism for you, noting that it was very long and highlighting the important bit for you. What did you do? You tried to answer the whole thing, only got halfway through, and never even got to the important bit. This is ridiculous.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

It was too that you didn't care: "I don't care about your choice of words... I could care less what definition of compulsion you are using". And by which definition of free will is mere causal determination a lack of this? Certainly not by the compatibilist definition of freedom, and that is the only one relevant to evaluating compatibilism.

It's a different conception of free will, but you haven't said anything to show that it is faulty.

It doesn't render the compatibilist notion of free will an illusion, and that is the only one we are discussing. Also, why did you ask me to explain a definition you said you already understood?

You are again reverting to a definition of compulsion other than the one I defined for you. You said you weren't doing that: "I understand the definitions you have given. I'm not using them in any other way than what you presented". Moving in the direction of greater satisfaction is not an example of the kind of compulsion i have defined for you. And you still haven't identified any contradiction in my words which you said involved a contradiction.

Of course I can. I can and have. As an example, in your last post you argued against me by saying that no compulsion is uncaused, failing to pay enough attention to see that I had not said otherwise.

That's not a contradiction at all. Do you know what a contradiction is? It is something which says or implies something of the form 'A & ~A'. Saying that we are both merely caused and also morally responsible is not of this form - it is simply something you irrationally disagree with. And I have already explained why my definitions are useful.

I can and do say exactly what you keep telling me I can't say. And no, a person is not always compelled to choose as he does when we use the definition I have given you. That is obviously incorrect.

Being caused to choose as one does, and having his actions be the result of his experiences and heredity, does not prevent a person from having the compatibilist kind of freedom I have defined for you. And there is no reason not to consider such a person blameworthy for his actions.

I know you don't like it, but it is a perfectly legitimate distinction which applies to reality perfectly well, as I have already explained to you.

Your 'therefore' does not follow from the rest. You have again resorted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which I have defined for you, and you have again reverted to speaking of the difference as a matter of degree when it clearly is not. A person who is merely caused to choose as he does most certainly can be held blameworthy, so long as he is free of the kind of compulsion I have been talking about, and you've said nothing to show otherwise.

All you've done in this post is repeatedly reassert your incompatibilist stance. At no point are you actually engaging with my points, or giving me any actual reason to question compatibilism. You are not making a rational case.

Bump.

[But]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Can you explain further, please?

That's what quantum physics says. There is inherent randomness that is not just the consequence of incomplete information. If we tossed a coin in a deterministic universe, we would get something that looks completely random, but it would only be that way because the whole thing would be too complicated for a human to predict. If we were able to throw the coin in exactly the same way several times (in that hypothetical universe), the outcome would always be exactly the same.

On the other hand, if we have something like a radioactive atomic nucleus (in our own non-hypothetical universe), there is no way we can predict when it's going to split, not even in principle (although we can predict the probability very precisely). It doesn't just apply to tiny things; we can link the outcome of an intrinsically random event to the behavior of a big object. That's what a measurement apparatus does. It's also the origin of the Schrödinger's cat thought experiment, where the behaviour of a decaying atom is linked to the fate of a cat.

One could prepare a photomultiplier and wire it up to a megaton nuclear warhead. The photomultiplier could be behind an optical filter that lets a single photon through, on average, per hour. Then there would be no way, even in principle, of predicting at noon if the city will still be there at 1 PM.

All of that is further complicated by the fact that the probabilities of these events can be predicted accurately and they evolve completely deterministically. That's why I said "not on that level".

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're still missing the entire point of his demonsration in that if will is not free we cannot judge any action. When you talk about mitigating factors, you are judging whether someone should be blamed due to your reasons.

No, I am not. You are arguing as if I am saying that, but it is not at all what I am actually saying.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But don't you see that even if someone knew what he was doing, he cannot be held responsible because at that moment this was the preferred choice, over which he has no control.

So, you are saying a person cannot control or affect whether s/he acts or how s/he acts.

You just contradicted yourself

Statement 1: There is no level of responsibility in determinism
Statement 2: responsibility goes up (in Lessans brand of determinism)

Is there or is there not levels of responsibility in determinism as Lessans defined it?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

We either have no free will, or we do.

False dichotomy as stated, because there has been no agreement between interlocutors on the definition of the term "free will"

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There's a distinction between being responsible for doing something (I hit that car's fender; no one else did), and being held morally responsible for what I did.

I have only been talking about being responsible for doing something

Irrelevant to the point under discussion

Why have you been arguing with me then? I am talking about what does or does not constitute responsibility and how and if it is manifest, only. Why do you keep bringing up blame and punishment?

How can someone be responsible if they are not responsible (as you've been arguing)? How can there be levels of responsibility, as implied by the words partly or fully, if there are no levels of responsibility (as you've argued)?

And finally, how can someone be responsible if they "cannot help" the action they take as you've also argued?

This is why I accused you of being all over the place and changing your view.

How can a person act otherwise if they are unable to choose how and whether they act, if they "cannot help" what action they perform?

Correct, which contemplation can be done indefinitely prior to acting, choices can be changed an infinite number of times prior to acting.

Only an action cannot be undone.

Are you saying, as you seem to be, that people cannot help how and whether they perform an action? Yes or no?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

you think that he could have acted differently. But what if he couldn't LadyShea?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

What might prevent one from contemplating the situation before acting? What might create a condition where only one action is an available option to explore during the contemplative process, and where not acting at all is not an option?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am not saying one action is an available option, or where not acting at all is not an option, but a person might not consider those options, or he might not find a better answer even after carefully thinking things through that would make another choice more preferable.

So why did you say "what if he couldn't?" As if there was a possible situation where one was unable to choose whether and how to act?

Can the person have performed a different action after contemplation, or refrained from acting altogether? If so they are responsible for their actions.

Once again, I am not talking about blame, I am talking about being responsible for one's own actions.

You are backpedaling quickly away from your hard determinism stance of only a few posts ago.

And that is exactly what I have been saying this whole time, yet you argued against the individual having the capability of choosing their actions, and therefore being responsible for their actions, and argued for hard determinism until reminded of Lessans words. Weasel.

I have been arguing for the same position you have just agreed to: "nothing but you makes a choice to do or not to do something"

Is this a free will position?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's certainly much easier to explain this knowledge to someone who is leaning toward no free will than it is to explain this to someone who believes we have a free choice.

[/quote]
LOL, who have you explained it to that agreed with you ever? Your position is completely incoherent.

Here's a hint: I have said nothing about free anything. I am arguing from a deterministic point of view.

I never said that even once. You are fighting a strawman again

That's not at all what I've said.

I am asking you to explain your viewpoint without contradicting yourself. You said people cannot be held responsible for their actions, I asked why and how they would hold themselves responsible then. Can you answer the question without making an assertion as you did last time when you answered "Because the changed conditions will give them no choice, which prevents them from moving in that direction. "?

Originally Posted by LadyShea

How would this working conscience and knowledge of right and wrong develop in a world with no consequences for actions, and where, apparently, nobody has any control or input over their actions at all (which is what "can't help but do" means)?

I already answered this. It's not that people have to experience hurting someone to learn from it just by thinking about how they would feel if they hurt someone intentionally or unintentionally, and not be blamed.

Experts disagree with you on that. We cannot learn what pain is without experiencing pain. If we don't have a shared experience to use to relate to another, we cannot empathize.

Let's say we are well into the new world, transition is over. How do children learn what responsibility for consequences is and what it feels like to cause something (good or bad) in order to avoid or seek that feeling in the future?

You are backpedaling...weasel

Thank you, so why were you arguing that they couldn't have done differently unless they had free will?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's not true if their will is not free. How could they have done differently, if what they did was the only choice they could have made at that moment, even after careful consideration? You are assuming that they could have acted differently

Backpedal much?

Yes.

Again, thank you. Why did you spend all day arguing for hard determinism by saying things like this?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If determinism is true (which it is), he could not have acted differently or not acted at all.

?

I am not. I am only talking about responsibility.

Give the girl a patch. Yes, that's what I meant by responsibility.

Had I meant culpability I would have used the word culpability.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Post about conscience you ignored

Please do not accuse me of ignoring your posts. I've been answering them all day. Just because I missed this one doesn't mean I'm ignoring you.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Lessans disagrees with this because it's a psychological tactic. Being overtly disappointed can make a child feel guilty over something that his parents wanted him to do, but he had every right not to do. That's what Durant did with his daughter. He showed his disappointment when she didn't practice the scales on the piano and he made her feel guilty because of his disappointment. That's selfishness on his part. You should read Chapter Nine.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

So, if a child is born into Lessans new world, and never feels guilt or shame, it's possible that the child will not develop a conscience due to having no understanding of the emotions involved in it.

One hundred percent wrong. Emotions don't develop from our making a child feel guilty or ashamed over our disappointment. Shame is not the same thing as guilt. Shame is related to embarrassment. A child doesn't need to be shamed to feel guilty over something. He may need correction in the sense that he needs to be shown that what he did hurt someone, especially if a child is not old enough to understand the principles (which is around age 5). He may need to be told that if he does it again he will be punished, which is explained in Chapter Nine. If he is old enough to understand the principles, his conscience would bother him if he should hurt someone which is exactly what prevents him from doing it. We're not talking about normal play where children may get minor scrapes or cuts. We're talking about a child maliciously causing harm. These behaviors seem to be getting worse due to the internet, especially bullying.

The very thought of shooting a little girl inspires in most people a profound feeling of horror. But feelings can fail us when we face more ambiguous moral choices, such as whether it is right to help a struggling friend cheat on a test. Much as children pass through stages of cognitive reasoning, so they pass through six stages of moral reasoning. In the model developed by the late Lawrence Kohlberg and still accepted today, children's first glimmer of conscience comes in the form of thinking, "I won't do this; Mommy will punish me if I do." That gives way to a positive spin: "I won't do this bad thing, because I want a reward for being good." Both forms of reasoning at this early stage, which roughly coincides with toddlerhood, turn on self-interest. But most preschoolers also grasp and believe in abstract ideas like fairness and reciprocity. When asked, as part of an experiment, how to distribute a pile of toys or a box of cookies to a group of children, many respond with explanations such as "We should all get the same," reports Stanford's Damon.

Children have an innate sense of fairness. It's also true that children will try to avoid punishment or receive rewards. These are extrinsic motivations. They do not come from an intrinsic desire to do something because it's the right thing to do.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

As a parent, I have seen some of these stages in this development, as have most parents. Children are not born with fully developed conscience, as I pointed out. They do have some sense of fairness and empathy very young, but those are aspects only.

Unlike empathy, full-fledged conscience does not seem innate.

The seeds of conscience are there, but it does take development. Even in the new world children will sometimes have to be told that if they continue doing what they're doing (in the book he gave an example of a child jumping on someone's new sofa) they will be punished, but this is only necessary until they are old enough to understand the principles.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by But

That's what quantum physics says. There is inherent randomness that is not just the consequence of incomplete information. If we tossed a coin in a deterministic universe, we would get something that looks completely random, but it would only be that way because the whole thing would be too complicated for a human to predict. If we were able to throw the coin in exactly the same way several times (in that hypothetical universe), the outcome would always be exactly the same.

On the other hand, if we have something like a radioactive atomic nucleus (in our own non-hypothetical universe), there is no way we can predict when it's going to split, not even in principle (although we can predict the probability very precisely). It doesn't just apply to tiny things; we can link the outcome of an intrinsically random event to the behavior of a big object. That's what a measurement apparatus does. It's also the origin of the Schrödinger's cat thought experiment, where the behaviour of a decaying atom is linked to the fate of a cat.

One could prepare a photomultiplier and wire it up to a megaton nuclear warhead. The photomultiplier could be behind an optical filter that lets a single photon through, on average, per hour. Then there would be no way, even in principle, of predicting at noon if the city will still be there at 1 PM.

All of that is further complicated by the fact that the probabilities of these events can be predicted accurately and they evolve completely deterministically. That's why I said "not on that level".

I am still confused. On which level does cause and effect cease to hold? And how, given that states of affairs include everything on every level, can it even be theoretically possible to have exactly identical states of affairs for the starting point of two different outcomes? You would have to have the same time, same place, same forces at same levels.

And let me further ask, given all we do not know about the Universe (multiverse, 11 dimensions, dark matter and energy) is it at all possible that cause and effect hold at all levels, but we simply can't observe or detect some causes?