A revolution in thought

[LadyShea]

Changing from contingent to necessary does not create a modal fallacy.

Uh, that's pretty much the definition of modal fallacy.

Originally Posted by Bradley Dowden

This is the error of treating modal conditionals as if the modality applies only to the then-part of the conditional when it more properly applies to the entire conditional.

Example:

James has two children. If James has two children, then he necessarily has more than one child. So, it is necessarily true that James has more than one child.

This apparently valid argument is invalid. It is not necessarily true that James has more than one child; it’s merely true that he has more than one child. He could have had no children. It is logically possible that James has no children even though he actually has two. The solution to the fallacy is to see that the premise “If James has two children, then he necessarily has more than one child,” requires the modality “necessarily” to apply logically to the entire conditional “If James has two children,then he has more than one child” even though grammatically it applies only to “he has more than one child.” The modal fallacy is the most well known of the infinitely many errors involving modal concepts. Modal concepts include necessity, possibility, and so forth. http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/

Alethic Modalities: These include possibility and necessity, which were already mentioned, as well as impossibility and contingency. Some propositions are impossible, that is, necessarily false, whereas others are contingent, meaning that they are both possibly true and possibly false.

Temporal Modalities: Historical and future truth or falsity. Some propositions were true/false in the past and others will be true/false in the future.

Deontic Modalities: Obligation and permissibility. Some propositions ought to be true/false, while others are permissible.

Epistemic Modalities: Knowledge and belief. Some propositions are known to be true/false, and others are believed to be true/false.

Most modalities are propositional functions―that is, they are functions which when applied to a proposition produce a proposition―like negation, but unlike negation in that they are not truth-functional. That is, you cannot determine the truth-value of a modal proposition based solely upon the truth-value of the proposition it contains. For instance, from the fact that a certain proposition is true it does not follow that it is necessarily true, nor that it isn't. Some true propositions are necessary, but others are not.

Modal fallacies are formal fallacies in which modality plays a role in the fallaciousness of a type of argument.

Fallacy of Modal Logic

Norman Schwartz was wrong.

Oh? Explain how he was wrong and what actually constitutes the modal fallacy in your eyes

[LadyShea]

Having the ability to contemplate doesn't take away from the fact that only one choice is possible, and it is the choice that leads to greater satisfaction when meaningful differences are being considered. We don't have a free choice because it is impossible to choose what is less satisfying when a more satisfying choice is available. Even though it looks like we have free will, it's a mirage because we really never are given a free choice at all.

Assertions.

[Vivisectus]

We don't have a free choice because it is impossible to choose what is less satisfying when a more satisfying choice is available.

This is simply a redefinition of "free choice" beyond "The freedom to choose according to my preference" to "The power to determine what my preferences are in every respect". It is the same windmill Harris likes to tilt at. And indeed: what we could call Jovian free willl: the power to determine absolutely everything about ourselves and the world around us, which is what would be required to give us absolute control over our preferences, does not seem to exist.

But what remains unproven is that we cannot self-determine anything about our preferences: we can think here, for instance, about making a conscious decision to learn to appreciate wine, for instance, or we can think of a pedophiles decision to try to get rid of destructive sexual desires.

We can say that the desire to actively change a desire itself is something that occurs in a deterministic universe and then start an endless regression right to the Big Bang, but there are two problems with that. Firstly, we may or may not live in a deterministic universe, but we can say for sure that we do not live in a determined universe. In order words, everything that happens may be a result of pre-existing conditions, but the fact remains is that we have no way of knowing all of those conditions.

Secondly, there is no evidence that the limited ability to self-determine your desires that I described earlier does not also apply to each step in that endless regression that involves us.

I think the definition of free will that you use is overly simplistic, just like the one Harris uses.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Uh, that's pretty much the definition of modal fallacy.

Wrong again. It is necessarily true that he had more than one child. Before he had two children he could have had less than two if the circumstances were different, but the circumstances were such that he had more than two, therefore, he could not have had less than two except in imagination.

Anything is logically possible in theory, but in actuality James having two children means that he necessarily has more than one child because the choice has already been made meaning no other choice could have been made. What could logically be possible does not mean that choice could have been made unless it had been desired. But it wasn't desired when compared to the available options, therefore it could not have been chosen under those exact conditions. It is not a modal fallacy.

Fallacy of Modal Logic

There is no fallaciousness in Lessans proposition whatsoever. The confusion is due to the fact that, the way determinism is defined, means that only one choice is possible and that we can predict what choice that will be. But when it's contingent, there is no way that a a choice can be predicted with absolute certainty. This is actually true, but this does not mean that there is an actual fallacy going on. According to free will, the choice is never necessary due to the contingent nature of the outcome. According to the standard definition of determinism, there is only one choice possible. This, therefore, is called the modal fallacy. But according to the way Lessans' defines determinism, there is no conflict between a contingent choice, and a necessary choice. Before the choice is made, yes it is contingent on factors only known to the person making the choice but this doesn't change the fact that the choice was necessary once it was made. His definition is more useful because it is more accurate since it explains why, once the choice is made, even though it was contingent, could not have been otherwise. The people who call this a modal fallacy are calling it such because it appears that no one choice, before the fact, is necessary, which is true. The only time it becomes necessary is when it is chosen as a preferable alternative. The choices that were considered could not have been made at that moment in time (that is why the word "choice" is so misleading because it is illusory), therefore only one choice could have been made. This makes it a necessary choice. The contingency upon which a choice is based, before the fact, does not conflict with the fact that once a choice is made, it was a necessary choice which includes all of the antecedent events, experiences, lifestyle, genetics, etc. of that individual leading up to that choice.

Norman Schwartz was wrong.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Oh? Explain how he was wrong and what actually constitutes the modal fallacy in your eyes

The fact that a choice was contingent on unknown factors does not make it any less necessary once it has been chosen.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is necessarily true that he had more than one child. Before he had two children he could have had less than two if the circumstances were different, but the circumstances were such that he had more than two, therefore, he could not have had less than two except in imagination.

It is only actually true that he had more than one child, not also necessarily true.

You still are conflating necessarily and actually, which may or may not coexist.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is no fallaciousness in Lessans proposition whatsoever. The confusion is due to the fact that the way determinism is defined means that only one choice is possible, when it is not the only choice possible because it is contingent on many factors. This, according to free will, means that the choice being contingent was not a necessary choice. Actually, this is true but due according to the standard definition of determinism which says that only one choice is possible, there can be no other. This is actually true but according to the way Lessans' defines it, there is no conflict between a contingent choice, and a necessary choice. His definition is more useful because it is more accurate since it explains why, once the choice is made, it could not have been otherwise. Before the choice is made, it is contingent on factors only known to the person making the choice but this doesn't change the fact that the choice, once made, was necessary. The people who call this a modal fallacy are calling it such because it appears that no one choice, before the fact, is necessary, which is true, until it is made. This contingency, before the fact, does not conflict with necessity, after the fact.

Word salad. You have absolutely no idea what you're even saying. You don't know what your words mean. This is complete gibberish. Get help.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Assertions.

If you had read and understood Chapter One, you would have understood why choice is an illusion, and why this was not an assertion. But you didn't understand. I suggest that when I leave here, you buy the book and read it carefully. You may change your entire view.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Word salad. You have absolutely no idea what you're even saying. You don't know what your words mean. This is complete gibberish. Get help.

Thank God you are not the only philosopher out there, and that there are many different views on this subject. You hold one view only, and it appears that the more my view threatens yours, the nastier you get. This has been this groups collective MO. I forgive you and everyone else. It has been a great learning experience for me, and I value that. But let's not talk anymore. You can't seem to contain yourself without blurting out something derogatory about me with any real justification.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Thank God you are not the only philosopher out there, and that there are many different views on this subject. You hold one view only, and it appears that the more my view threatens yours, the more nastier you get. I forgive you. But let's not talk anymore. You can't seem to contain yourself without blurting out something derogatory about me.

You're an idiot. You won't find a single philosopher anywhere who agrees that you are using these words correctly. You keep trying to use words like 'contingent' and 'necessary' without having any idea what they mean. Get help.

[LadyShea]

Anything is logically possible in theory

Not at all. It is neither actually or logically possible for a 40 year old person to age backwards and become a child then an infant again.

but in actuality James having two children means that he necessarily has more than one child because the choice has already been made meaning no other choice could have been made

Wrong, it merely means he did have two children.

What could logically be possible does not mean that choice could have been made unless it had been desired. But it wasn't desired when compared to the available options, therefore it could not have been chosen under those exact conditions. It is not a modal fallacy.

It is

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If you had read and understood Chapter One, you would have understood why choice is an illusion, and why this was not an assertion. But you didn't understand. I suggest that when I leave here, you buy the book and read it carefully. You may change your entire view.

I understand why Lessans thought that, but his reasoning was not convincing. I have a copy of the book still, I will probably not buy one.

[LadyShea]

Does your marketing plan include non-English translation? Only about 30% of the world speaks English after all.

I can't wait to see how Lessans super special brand of word usage translates to Mandarin Chinese, then back to English. Let's play with Google Translate a bit!

From English to Arabic to Spanish back to English (original under spoiler tag)

You may ask, "Well, suppose the child is not interested in
Marriage, only in the presence of a little sexual pleasure, and assume that the girl is not
You marry, only in the presence of a little sexual pleasure, and then what?
You can meet and have a good time without getting hurt
Others? There is something called contraception, as you know, there
Ways to make love where there is no possibility of getting pregnant.
For example, if a boy meets a girl who likes him, and he
He says bluntly: "Hey, honey, I appeal to
For me, I am writing to you? 'If you said yes, then he said,' How
On this subject, and I love to go to bed with me just to get something sexual
Fun? "Without the slightest idea of ​​marriage. Whether they agree
Making love in a way that ensures against pregnancy, and how does
Possible for either of them to get hurt? "

show spoiler

You may wonder, “Well, supposing the boy is not interested in
marriage, just in having some sexual fun, and supposing the girl is not
interested in marriage, just in having some sexual fun, what then?
Can’t they get together and have some fun without hurting each
other? There is a thing called contraception, you know, and there are
ways of making love where there is no possibility of getting pregnant.
For example, what if a boy meets a girl that appeals to him and he
says to her without beating around the bush, ‘Say honey, you appeal
to me, do I appeal to you?’ If she says yes then he would say, ‘How
about it, would you like to go to bed with me just to have some sexual
fun?’ without the slightest thought of marriage. If she agrees and they
make love in a manner that ensures against pregnancy, how is it
possible for either of them to get hurt?”

[LadyShea]

From English to traditional Chines back to English

"You mean, rabbis , each person has two or more
Alternative selection is made it? "

" Last week, the bank robber did not rob
Banks , he wanted to do so. "

" But suppose you are saying is true, how it can be proved
This can not prove it ? Let me explain what I mean. "

" Did I not do what has been done yet ? "

"No, this is not possible, I do not do anything, has been done
Because I 've done it. "

"This is an undeniable relationship between mathematics or equivalent and
To ask that anyone could not understand as an answer to four
Two plus two . Now, if what has been done is the choice of B
Instead of A, try not to choose is already a B,
Choice? "

"It is impossible , of course ."

"Since it is absolutely impossible (this is reasoning
Mathematics, logic, generate opinions) do not choose B
Rather than once B has been selected, how might choose A
In this comparison the possibility to make the current selection
You can not choose B, has chosen you? "

"Again, I must admit that this is impossible to do."

"However, in order to prove the true freedom, we must do it -
Impossible. It must go back, reversing the order of time, undo what
Has been done, and then display, A - condition is
Exactly the same - may have been selected instead of B. Because it is
In chronological order, it is absolutely impossible to reverse
The necessary mathematical proof, free will must always remain
Theory.

show spoiler

“Do you mean, Rabbi, that every person has two or more
alternatives when making a choice?”

“Absolutely; that bank robber last week didn’t have to rob the
bank, he wanted to do it.”

“But assuming that what you say is true, how is it possible to prove
that which cannot be proven? Let me illustrate what I mean.”

“Is it possible for me not to do what has already been done?”

“No, it is not possible for me not to do what has already been done
because I have already done it.”

“This is a mathematical or undeniable relation and is equivalent
to asking is it possible for anyone not to understand four as an answer
to two plus two. Now if what has been done was the choosing of B
instead of A, is it possible not to choose B which has already been
chosen?”

“It is impossible, naturally.”

“Since it is absolutely impossible (this is the reasoning of
mathematics, not logic, which gives rise to opinions) not to choose B
instead of A once B has been selected, how is it possible to choose A
in this comparison of possibilities when in order to make this choice
you must not choose B, which has already been chosen?”

“Again I must admit it is something impossible to do.”

“Yet in order to prove free will true, it must do just that — the
impossible. It must go back, reverse the order of time, undo what has
already been done, and then show that A — with the conditions being
exactly the same — could have been chosen instead of B. Since it is
utterly impossible to reverse the order of time which is absolutely
necessary for mathematical proof, free will must always remain a
theory.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is no fallaciousness in Lessans proposition whatsoever.

Faith claim. Also it is arguments and not propositions that are fallacious.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The confusion is due to the fact that, the way determinism is defined, means that only one choice is possible and that we can predict what choice that will be.

There is no confusion on our end. Determinism says that only one choice is causally possible given actual antecedent conditions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But when it's contingent, there is no way that a a choice can be predicted with absolute certainty.

Our objections and the charge of modal fallacy have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with prediction. Also, you need to be clear about which kind of contingency you are speaking of. Causal determinism is perfectly compatible with both the ontological and logical contingency of our choices.

Causal determinism: Given actual antecedent conditions, only one outcome is consistent with actual causal laws.

Ontological contingency: Choices are causally dependent upon the causes that produce them, such that different causes would have had different effects.

Logical contingency: There is no contradiction or conceptual error involved in the notion of a world where a different choice was made (perhaps in a world with different antecedent conditions or different causal laws).

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is actually true, but this does not mean that there is an actual fallacy going on. According to free will, the choice is never necessary due to the contingent nature of the outcome.

Wrong. This is not what free will says. You also need to be more specific about what kind of free will you are talking about. There are many kinds! Not just one! It is only libertarian free will that says our choices are not (causally!) necessary, but it does not say that this is due to the outcome being ontologically contingent upon preceding causes. It says rather that this is due to the failure of actual causal laws to determine a single outcome given actual antecedent conditions. It is compatibilist free will that appeals to how different causes could have produced different effects, but then this kind of free will does not deny our choices to be causally necessary. So either way your statement here is wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

According to the standard definition of determinism, there is only one choice possible.

Only one outcome is causally possible given actual laws and antecedent conditions, according to determinism. But many outcomes remain logically possible under determinism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This, therefore, is called the modal fallacy.

Um, no. You haven't identified the modal fallacy at all. You still have no idea what it even is, do you? The modal fallacy is the confusion of necessarily (If A then B) and (If A then necessarily B).

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But according to the way Lessans' defines determinism, there is no conflict between a contingent choice, and a necessary choice.

Redefining terms doesn't solve anything. And even under the regular definition of determinism, there is no conflict between our choices being causally necessary and their being ontologically and causally dependent upon their antecedent causes.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Before the choice is made, yes it is contingent on factors only known to the person making the choice but this doesn't change the fact that the choice was necessary once it was made.

If it was causally necessary after it was made, then it was causally necessary before it was made too. And it is the standard definition of determinism (not Lessans' botched attempt at redefining it) which establishes this. What the person knows or can predict is irrelevant. Without the standard definition, there is no causal necessity for the choice either before or after it is made. You still don't know whether or not Lessans' definition is meant to entail the standard one, do you?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

His definition is more useful because it is more accurate...

You are still botching this simple point. You've remembered that definitions should be described as more or less useful, but you've forgotten that the reason for this is that they cannot be more or less accurate.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

...since it explains why, once the choice is made, even though it was contingent, could not have been otherwise.

If it could not have been otherwise (given actual laws and antecedent conditions) after the choice is made, then it could not have been otherwise before the choice either - regardless of whether or not it could have been predicted. Causal necessity does not imply epistemic necessity (prediction), and epistemic contingency (no prediction) does not imply an absence of causal necessity.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The people who call this a modal fallacy are calling it such because it appears that no one choice, before the fact, is necessary, which is true.

No, that is not why they are calling it a modal fallacy at all. They are calling it this because by rejecting the standard definition of determinism, and supplanting it with his own, Lessans is left with no element of causal necessity by which to claim that what is actually chosen was what had to have been chosen.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The only time it becomes necessary is when it is chosen as a preferable alternative.

Choices cannot become either causally or logically necessary. Choices are never logically necessary, so focusing on causal determinism, if a choice that has now been made was causally determined by previous causes such that no other choice was ever going to be possible, then this must have been the case both before and after it was made. A choice that was not causally necessary before it was made cannot become so after it is made.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The fact that a choice was contingent on unknown factors does not make it any less necessary once it has been chosen.

No-one has ever claimed otherwise. Not once. Ever. Nor does the necessity of a causally determined choice have anything to do with when it is made.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

It is only actually true that he had more than one child, not also necessarily true.

You still are conflating necessarily and actually, which may or may not coexist.

It is actually true that he had more than one child, which makes it necessarily true. I am not conflating these two terms.

[LadyShea]

Yes you are. Actual truth may or may not also be necessary truths.

A single belief which could not be false is said to express a necessary truth.

A single belief which is not inconsistent and does not express a necessary truth is said to be contingent.

Note: we are dealing with a very weak sort of possibility, or a very strong sort of impossibility. For the purpose these definitions, it is possible for a human being to run a mile in under a minute (humans might have been stronger; the laws of nature might have been different) but it is not possible for 2 and 2 to make 5; it is not possible for a person to be both a bachelor and married; it is not possible for it to be both raining and not raining in the same place at the same time. http://logic.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/tutorial1/tut1-01.htm

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Our objections and the charge of modal fallacy have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with prediction. Also, you need to be clear about which kind of contingency you are speaking of. Causal determinism is perfectly compatible with both the ontological and logical contingency of our choices.

Causal determinism: Given actual antecedent conditions, only one outcome is consistent with actual causal laws.

Ontological contingency: Choices are causally dependent upon the causes that produce them, such that different causes would have had different effects.

Logical contingency: There is no contradiction or conceptual error involved in the notion of a world where a different choice was made (perhaps in a world with different antecedent conditions or different causal laws).

What would be the proper term for the type of argument being employed here, and Is there a text or comprehensive article that would explain and define all the different terms particular to it. Free, if possible, is always good. My own courses in Philosophy and logic were many years ago and I am playing catch up with current usage, and much of what I did learn then is probably out of date or out of fashion.

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It seems to me that if you had done reading in this field you would have known what this word was.

The things I read simply use syllogisms without labeling them as such. It's not like they say "Here is a syllogism". I recognized it was logic and understood how it was being used.

Do you need to know the term Anapestic Tetrameter to recognize and understand that Dr. Suess used forms of poetry?

Anyway, why didn't Lessans know the word photon despite all his reading and wearing out dictionaries?

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Yes you are. Actual truth may or may not also be necessary truths.

Where I grew up there were a lot of gravel roads, and the township would periodically spray the roads with a liquid tar to bind the gravel and control the dust in the summer. The road would be sprayed half at a time so traffic could still pass on the dry side and a barricade would be placed at the end of the road. One day the wife who lived on the other side of the hill from us, came home from work and turned off the main road went around the barricade and then drove on the right side of the road except that was the side that had been sprayed. When the husband came home and saw the car he questioned her about it and she explained that she saw that the one side was wet, but she thought "It had rained on half of the road" and she didn't know it was tar. The husband looked at her and said, "You thought it rained on half the road? Lengthwise?"

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Faith claim. Also it is arguments and not propositions that are fallacious.

The argument is not fallacious though, not when you understand the proposition put forth.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The confusion is due to the fact that, the way determinism is defined, means that only one choice is possible and that we can predict what choice that will be.

Originally Posted by spacemonkey

There is no confusion on our end. Determinism says that only one choice is causally possible given actual antecedent conditions.

That is true, and that is why determinism holds true.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But when it's contingent, there is no way that a a choice can be predicted with absolute certainty.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Our objections and the charge of modal fallacy have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with prediction.Also, you need to be clear about which kind of contingency you are speaking of. Causal determinism is perfectly compatible with both the ontological and logical contingency of our choices.

So there's no problem then. It's now a game of semantics.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Causal determinism: Given actual antecedent conditions, only one outcome is consistent with actual causal laws.

Ontological contingency: Choices are causally dependent upon the causes that produce them, such that different causes would have had different effects.

Correct, there is no problem.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Logical contingency: There is no contradiction or conceptual error involved in the notion of a world where a different choice was made (perhaps in a world with different antecedent conditions or different causal laws).

I said that. If the conditions were different, the choice would be different. This logically possible world you're talking about doesn't exist. If it did, then the causal mechanism would produce a different outcome. We can say he could have chosen something different, which is true had he wanted to, but he didn't want to under the conditions. You're not talking about reality. You're talking about an imaginary world where there is no such parallel.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This is actually true, but this does not mean that there is an actual fallacy going on. According to free will, the choice is never necessary due to the contingent nature of the outcome.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Wrong. This is not what free will says. You also need to be more specific about what kind of free will you are talking about. There are many kinds! Not just one! It is only libertarian free will that says our choices are not (causally!) necessary, but it does not say that this is due to the outcome being ontologically contingent upon preceding causes. It says rather that this is due to the failure of actual causal laws to determine a single outcome given actual antecedent conditions. It is compatibilist free will that appeals to how different causes could have produced different effects, but then this kind of free will does not deny our choices to be causally necessary. So either way your statement here is wrong.

No, you are stuck on the belief that our choices have more than one single outcome given the exact circumstances under which a person chooses. It is one's personal subjective experience (whether true or not) that leads to one outcome based on those experiences. It is this very kind of false compatibilist free will (which doesn't exist in reality) that is very misleading for it assumes that regardless of the choices made, there is still an opening for a different outcome which justifies the blame and punishment that follows.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

According to the standard definition of determinism, there is only one choice possible.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Only one outcome is causally possible given actual laws and antecedent conditions, according to determinism. But many outcomes remain logically possible under determinism.

Of course; there are all kinds of logically possible outcomes under determinism, but there is only one outcome possible in actuality. There is no parallel world Spacemonkey where another outcome, under the same exact circumstances, could ever be proven. You are going right back to before the action, which I have not denied. Taking into consideration that a person knows that if he performs an action, he will be punished, does not always deter a person from acting on his desires. In actuality it has not deterred our society's most violent; in fact, it gives further justification.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This, therefore, is called the modal fallacy.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Um, no. You haven't identified the modal fallacy at all. You still have no idea what it even is, do you? The modal fallacy is the confusion of necessarily (If A then B) and (If A then necessarily B).

I am very clear on that. And there is no modal fallacy. If A, then necessarily B given the exact same circumstances.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

But according to the way Lessans' defines determinism, there is no conflict between a contingent choice, and a necessary choice.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Redefining terms doesn't solve anything. And even under the regular definition of determinism, there is no conflict between our choices being causally necessary and their being ontologically and causally dependent upon their antecedent causes.

At least there is agreement on that very important point. But Lessans' proposal is different in the sense that although we have no choice because we are always moving in the direction of greater satisfaction, it allows for the other side of the equation, which the conventional definition does not do, since it leaves out the fact that although we are compelled to do what we do, nothing can make us do it if we don't want to, but this does not make our will free. People are turned off to determinism because it implies that we are victims of a force that makes us to what we don't really want to do. This is a fallacy, and why so many people believe this position is dangerous in that it would release people of all responsibility, which it doesn't when you understand why it increases responsibility. You still don't get the two-sided equation at all, and don't tell me you do. You are too caught up in defending compatibilist views because you believe it's the only way to keep societal order, and that threats of punishment are used as a deterrent. It is believed that if our will is not free, we would have to excuse everyone even for the most heinous crimes and that would be detrimental to society. But that is only because no one understands this law and why it actually prevents the very thing that all of the threats of punishment would never accomplish, which has been shown many times over.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Before the choice is made, yes it is contingent on factors only known to the person making the choice but this doesn't change the fact that the choice was necessary once it was made.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If it was causally necessary after it was made, then it was causally necessary before it was made too.

That is true, but we don't know what those causal mechanisms are since no one knows all of the factors that lead to a particular choice.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

And it is the standard definition of determinism (not Lessans' botched attempt at redefining it) which establishes this.

He didn't botch anything.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

What the person knows or can predict is irrelevant.

That's what determinism claims it should be able to do; to be able to predict the future all the way from the Big Bang. Yes, determinism is a one way street but there is no way we can know all the many factors that lead to a particular choice. We can make guesstimates about how someone may react, but many predictions have been wrong. This does not mean that our choices are undetermined. It just means we don't have all the facts. The same goes for quantum mechanics. There is nothing random in this universe. It just appears that way.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Without the standard definition, there is no causal necessity for the choice either before or after it is made. You still don't know whether or not Lessans' definition is meant to entail the standard one, do you?

Determinism means caused. In that sense, we are determined beings whether it's Lessans' definition that is being used, or the standard definition.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

His definition is more useful because it is more accurate...

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You are still botching this simple point. You've remembered that definitions should be described as more or less useful, but you've forgotten that the reason for this is that they cannot be more or less accurate.

Okay, granted. His proposition is more accurate because this is how reality works, and that is what he based his knowledge and observation on.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

...since it explains why, once the choice is made, even though it was contingent, could not have been otherwise.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If it could not have been otherwise (given actual laws and antecedent conditions) after the choice is made, then it could not have been otherwise before the choice either - regardless of whether or not it could have been predicted. Causal necessity does not imply epistemic necessity (prediction), and epistemic contingency (no prediction) does not imply an absence of causal necessity.

I agree. Therefore any outcome that is possible in logical terms, remains just that; a logical construct that has nothing to do with the reality of determinism, which means only one possible choice given the antecedent conditions present.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The people who call this a modal fallacy are calling it such because it appears that no one choice, before the fact, is necessary, which is true.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

No, that is not why they are calling it a modal fallacy at all. They are calling it this because by rejecting the standard definition of determinism, and supplanting it with his own, Lessans is left with no element of causal necessity by which to claim that what is actually chosen was what had to have been chosen.

Of course he does. That's the whole point; that given the exact environmental conditions combined with one's genetics, there is only one possible choice that one can make. If any new conditions are added to the mix, then we're not talking about the same conditions anymore. The outcome will necessarily be different, but who is arguing with this?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The only time it becomes necessary is when it is chosen as a preferable alternative.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Choices cannot become either causally or logically necessary. Choices are never logically necessary, so focusing on causal determinism, if a choice that has now been made was causally determined by previous causes such that no other choice was ever going to be possible, then this must have been the case both before and after it was made. A choice that was not causally necessary before it was made cannot become so after it is made.

That is true. That is why he is right that determinism is valid. Whatever the circumstances are that lead to a particular choice can never produce a different outcome. The only time it can produce a different outcome is if the conditions change whereby a new set of conditions are created.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The fact that a choice was contingent on unknown factors does not make it any less necessary once it has been chosen.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

No-one has ever claimed otherwise. Not once. Ever. Nor does the necessity of a causally determined choice have anything to do with when it is made.

I never said it has to do with when it is made. Free will is an illusion because free choice is an illusion. If we were truly free we could choose another option than the one we did, given the same circumstances. And that's impossible to do.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I never said it has to do with when it is made. Free will is an illusion because free choice is an illusion. If we were truly free we could choose another option than the one we did, given the same circumstances. And that's impossible to do.

What is impossible is to test this or to prove it in any way, you can only assert that it is so. It can only be assumed that the same circumstances will lead to the same choices.

[davidm]

I no longer read the asinine drivel of that pathetic idiot peacegirl, but occasionally look in this thread and find interesting nuggets worth expanding upon, like this:

Originally Posted by Lady Shea

Not at all. It is neither actually or logically possible for a 40 year old person to age backwards and become a child then an infant again

A correction. It IS logically possible that a 40-year-old person age backward and become a child and infant again. The great sci-fi writer J.G. Ballard even wrote a story in which people rise from their graves, get younger and younger and eventually "die" when they re-enter their mothers' wombs.

One must distinguish between physical impossibility and logical impossibility.

Modal logic employes the useful heuristic of possible worlds. There is a possible world at which people get younger with the passage of time rather than older. There is a possible world at which pigs fly and donkeys talk. There is a possible world at which the entire universe consists of nothing but exact replicas of the Eiffel Tower stacked side by side and up and down infinitely. And so on. These are possible worlds. They're just not actualworlds. From this, we dan derive the conclusion that there exist a subset of worlds called possible non-actual worlds. The number of possible non-actual worlds greatly exceeds, of course, the number of possible actual worlds, which is the one world that we experience.

In contrast to possible non-actual worlds, there are non-possible worlds which by definition are not (and cannot be) actual, on pain of logical contradiction. There is no logically possible world at which twice two makes five. There is no logically possible world at which bachelors are married. There is no logically possible world at which triangles have four sides. And so on.

This "possible worlds" heuristic can help us easily see why, for example, as explained in another thread, the claim "God's perfect foreknowledge of all our acts precludes free will," viz.:

There is a possible world at which p chooses x and God infallibly foreknows p chooses x.

There is a possible world at which p chooses y and God infallibly foreknows p chooses y.

Readily we can see that p can choose either x or y, vindicating the power of choice. BUT!

There is no logically possible world at which p chooses x but God infallibly foreknows p chooses y.

There is no logically possible world at which p chooses y but God infallibly foreknows p chooses x.

The latter two propositions are necessarily false in virtue of God's omniscience. We see that while p can choose among available alternates, he can't choose other than what God foreknows. So the possible worlds heuristic readily demonstrates that God's perfect foreknowledge and human free will are fully compatible.

It is true that no one attains age 40 and then ages backward in the actual world. But there is a possible world at which this happens. The only worlds that are impossible are worlds that cannot exist on pain of logical contradiction. There is nothing logically contradictory about attaining age 40 and then getting younger, so the proposition remains possible; i.e. there is a possible world at which this state of affairs takes place, as well as possible worlds of flying pigs and talking donkeys. Moreover, such worlds were, are and always will be, metaphysically possible.

There is a subset of modal logic called modal realism, or extreme modal realism, its originator and chief exponent the late philosopher David K. Lewis. His book On the Plurality of Worlds is the classic text. In it, Lewis argues that actuality, like the spatial "here" and the temporal "now" is an indexical, a matter of perspective. I'm "here" but all other "heres" exist (I just call them "theres,") I'm writing this "now" but all other "nows" exist (I just call those other "nows" "thens,") and I'm "actual" but all other "actuals" exist (I just call them "possible non-actuals.") The upshot is, according to Lewis, that all counterfactual propositions, providing they are not logically impossible, are true. There is indeed an existing world in which one attains to age 40, and then gets younger. There is an existing world in which donkeys talk. There is an existing world in which pigs fly. They're just not our world. Imagine anything you like, and provided it's not logically impossible, it is actual (really existing!) at some (logically) possible world. By "world" Lewis means a self-contained universe that is spatio-temporally disconnected from all other possible worlds (universes). Lewis notes, rather understatedly, then when people first apprehend what he is arguing, they usually acquire "an incredulous stare."

Sadly, this means that there really exists an actual world (just not ours, thank Zod!) in which Lessanism has a wide following. Alas, there is no actual world at which we see the sun immediately when God turns it on at noon, but not our neighbors until the photons arrive eight minutes later, because such a state of affairs is logically impossible, not just physically impossible, and therefore no such world ever attains to the status of "indexically actual" in the Lewisian modal multiverse. But note that since it's logically possible for large numbers of people to believe in the sun bilge even though the claim is logically impossible, there does indeed exist a world of Lessanism triumphant in the modal multiverse. It would just be a world of people who believe something false (actually logically impossible), but our own actual world is full of people who believe in bunkum.

Prof. Norman Swartz provides a rigorous treatment of possible worlds heuristic in his book, "Possible Worlds: An Introduction to its Logic and Philosophy." The book, now out of print, may be downloaded for free here.

Swartz wrote two other books, both of which may also be freely downloaded:

The Concept of Physical Law

Beyond Experience: Metaphysical Theories and Philosophical Constraints.

All three books are highly recommended, especially "Beyond Experience" and its masterful treatment, in Chapter 8, concerning the philosophy of space and time.

Why you people are still talking to this little kook peacegirl passes my understanding. Read Swartz's books instead. As for Lewsis's book, you'll have to buy that. Unlike Swartz's lucid books, Lewis's book is hard going, so be forewarned if you decide to tackle it.

Lewis, regarded as one of the great analytic philosophers of the 20th century, also has a wonderful paper on time travel, the grandfather's paradox and free will. It is free online, here.

[Adam]

Originally Posted by davidm

There is a possible world at which people get younger with the passage of time rather than older.

Is there? Aren't "younger" and "older" defined relative to the passage of time, making that an actual logical impossibility? (Of course, it is logically possible for a world to exist in which people come into existence with the physical characteristics of what we think of as old age, and acquire the physical characteristics of what we think of as infancy with the passage of time.)

[LadyShea]

Originally Posted by davidm

The upshot is, according to Lewis, that all counterfactual propositions, providing they are not logically impossible, are true. There is indeed an existing world in which one attains to age 40, and then gets younger. There is an existing world in which donkeys talk. There is an existing world in which pigs fly. They're just not our world. Imagine anything you like, and provided it's not logically impossible, it is actual (really existing!) at some (logically) possible world. By "world" Lewis means a self-contained universe that is spatio-temporally disconnected from all other possible worlds (universes). Lewis notes, rather understatedly, then when people first apprehend what he is arguing, they usually acquire "an incredulous stare."

This is not that different from the idea I have been introduced to, that there are universes/worlds/dimensions (whatever) for all possible options. So for example if I choose to turn left at an intersection, there are worlds where I turned right, went straight, wasn't driving at all, was at a different intersection etc. etc.

Might be the same idea I guess.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The argument is not fallacious though, not when you understand the proposition put forth.

Faith claim. State the argument. State the proposition. You still have no idea of what you are even saying.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is true, and that is why determinism holds true.

I was simply correcting your mistaken characterization of what determinism says. Your book doesn't contain any argument for causal determinism at all, so you have no basis for asserting it to be true.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

So there's no problem then. It's now a game of semantics.

Correct, there is no problem.

Correction: What you were mistakenly characterizing as what we think the problem is, is not problematic. IOW you created a strawman to argue against which completely missed the actual problems with Lessans' argument.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I said that. If the conditions were different, the choice would be different. This logically possible world you're talking about doesn't exist.

I've never claimed that it does. I am not a modal realist.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No, you are stuck on the belief that our choices have more than one single outcome given the exact circumstances under which a person chooses.

I can't be stuck on a belief that I don't hold, idiot. I don't believe in libertarian free will, as I've told you multiple times over the last five years.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is this very kind of false compatibilist free will (which doesn't exist in reality) that is very misleading for it assumes that regardless of the choices made, there is still an opening for a different outcome which justifies the blame and punishment that follows.

Holy fuck you're an idiot. You just described libertarian free will and labelled it as compatibilist free will. You've been at this 10+ years and still don't understand even the most basic and fundamental terms involved in the debate.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Of course; there are all kinds of logically possible outcomes under determinism, but there is only one outcome possible in actuality. There is no parallel world Spacemonkey where another outcome, under the same exact circumstances, could ever be proven. You are going right back to before the action, which I have not denied. Taking into consideration that a person knows that if he performs an action, he will be punished, does not always deter a person from acting on his desires. In actuality it has not deterred our society's most violent; in fact, it gives further justification.

I wasn't making an argument, Peacegirl. I was simply clarifying terms and meanings, because the way you have been using terms is both ambiguous and completely incorrect.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am very clear on that. And there is no modal fallacy. If A, then necessarily B given the exact same circumstances.

That is the modal fallacy.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

At least there is agreement on that very important point. But Lessans' proposal is different in the sense that although we have no choice because we are always moving in the direction of greater satisfaction, it allows for the other side of the equation, which the conventional definition does not do, since it leaves out the fact that although we are compelled to do what we do, nothing can make us do it if we don't want to, but this does not make our will free. People are turned off to determinism because it implies that we are victims of a force that makes us to what we don't really want to do. This is a fallacy, and why so many people believe this position is dangerous in that it would release people of all responsibility, which it doesn't when you understand why it increases responsibility. You still don't get the two-sided equation at all, and don't tell me you do. You are too caught up in defending compatibilist views because you believe it's the only way to keep societal order, and that threats of punishment are used as a deterrent. It is believed that if our will is not free, we would have to excuse everyone even for the most heinous crimes and that would be detrimental to society. But that is only because no one understands this law and why it actually prevents the very thing that all of the threats of punishment would never accomplish, which has been shown many times over.

Stop trying to tell me my views and motivations. Nothing you have said on that front is even remotely correct. Lessans' view is a version of compatibilism, and his two-sided non-equation is flatly contradictory.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is true, but we don't know what those causal mechanisms are since no one knows all of the factors that lead to a particular choice.

And this is completely irrelevant.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's what determinism claims it should be able to do; to be able to predict the future all the way from the Big Bang.

Only in principle, not in practice.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Yes, determinism is a one way street but there is no way we can know all the many factors that lead to a particular choice. We can make guesstimates about how someone may react, but many predictions have been wrong. This does not mean that our choices are undetermined.

No-one is claiming that it does.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

The same goes for quantum mechanics. There is nothing random in this universe. It just appears that way.

That's a completely unsupported assertion. Neither you nor Lessans have made any argument for this whatsoever.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Okay, granted. His proposition is more accurate because this is how reality works, and that is what he based his knowledge and observation on.

What proposition? We were talking about his definition. You can't fix your mistake by simply calling it a 'proposition' instead.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I agree. Therefore any outcome that is possible in logical terms, remains just that; a logical construct that has nothing to do with the reality of determinism, which means only one possible choice given the antecedent conditions present.

Only one causally possible choice. At the moment I'm simply trying to get you to use words correctly.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Of course he does. That's the whole point; that given the exact environmental conditions combined with one's genetics, there is only one possible choice that one can make.

That's the standard definition. My point was that he has no element of necessity without this. His argument hangs upon the standard definition of determinism (which he fails to argue for), and his redefinition adds nothing but his own confusion.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That is true. That is why he is right that determinism is valid.

That wasn't an argument for determinism. It was simply an expression of what it means.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I never said it has to do with when it is made.

But you have. You've repeatedly claimed that choices are not necessary until after they are made, at which point they could not have been otherwise. This is what I was correcting you on.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If we were truly free we could choose another option than the one we did, given the same circumstances.

Why do you presuppose that being "truly free" amounts to having libertarian free will? No version of freedom worth wanting requires contra-causal choice, still less does it require the freedom to choose what we least prefer - which was your father's moronic straw-man freedom.