A revolution in thought

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Bump.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

None of what you just said is true. You tried to insist upon using what you thought was the standard definition, saying you didn't care how I was choosing to define my terms. And you repeatedly stated that you didn't understand the distinction I was making, the notion of freedom I had defined for you, or how it differed from contra-causal freedom.

"Mere causal determination" means causal determination without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion I have been explaining to you. And why do you ask? Didn't you just tell me you understood the definitions I have given?

I don't think I'm confused, and I can assure you I am paying attention to what you say (probably more attention than you are). So why are you again telling me there is a contradiction without telling me what it is? I do not see any contradiction in what I said. Nor do you. If you did, then you would have been able to tell me what it was. The actions I am deeming free and blameworthy are not under the kind of compulsion I have been talking about. And that renders them free in the only sense relevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. I've never denied that a person acting from compulsion is still causally determined, so I have no idea why you've been trying to tell me this.

I explained it in the post you just replied to: "Being caused merely requires the choice to be the same given the exact same antecedent causal conditions. Being compelled (in my sense) requires in addition to this that the choice will also be the same given significant changes in those antecedent causal conditions. This is not merely a difference in the degree of compulsion."

The lack of resistance to change in antecedent causal conditions makes the person free in the sense of free will that compatibilism has defined. It isn't meant to make the will free in any other sense, and especially not in the contra-causal sense. Compatibilism does not view that kind of freedom as morally relevant. And yes, according to compatibilism choices are made blameworthy by being 'compelled' only in the sense of being caused, because that is an excusable - i.e. not morally relevant - kind of 'compulsion'.

Your not liking it doesn't make it 'artificial' or problematic. What exactly is an "artificial distinction", and why are they bad? Are you trying to say that it is an ad hoc or irrelevant distinction? Could you support either charge?

Can you state this "underlying proposition" and tell me why it is wrong? Yes, I am defining the kind of compulsion I am talking about as one that must be felt. Yes, that means Lessans' notion of being compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction does not qualify as a compulsion of the sort I have been explaining to you - i.e. it is not an example of the kind of compulsion which compatibilism views as a constraint upon or a threat to free will.

I thought you said you understood the definitions I have been using? Was that not true? The compatibilist freedom I have defined differs from the contra-causal sort by requiring only that one could have done otherwise in causally similar situations, but not that one could have done otherwise in casually identical situations. Your above equation only holds if the 'free will' in question is of the contra-causal variety, and this is not the kind of free will that compatibilism is concerned with.

And compatibilism says that this kind of compulsion simply isn't relevant to whether or not we are free in the sense of being morally responsible agents who can be fairly blamed for our actions.

Yes, you are apparently on a wavelength of not reading what I wrote, for I never said that there can be compulsions which are not caused. I have put in bold the word which you appear to have missed.

I'm glad you finally understand that the distinction I've been drawing is not merely one of degree. But I disagree with your above claim. A person whose choice is open to change based on changes to antecedent causal conditions is rendered blameworthy because blame then becomes a causal factor itself in influencing future behaviour in similar circumstances. A person whose choice is not open in this way, due to being subject to coercion or the kind of compulsion I have been talking about is not blameworthy because blame will be ineffective - it will just become another factor which fails to influence the choice due to the compulsion in question. So the distinction I have been making is both legitimate and morally relevant.

Definitions cannot be right or wrong. My distinction is not a mishmash of words, and I have explained why it is relevant. The person could have acted differently because there is no coercion or compulsion present preventing a change in antecedent conditions from causally determining a different resulting choice. We can know this because it follows from the definitions. It doesn't need proving. And the freedom I have defined does not require one to be able to choose what one views as a worse choice. It requires only that one could have chosen it by not viewing it as the worse choice (given differing antecedent circumstances).

It's a pity then that you can't identify or point out any of these alleged mistakes of mine, for if there are any then I would like to know about them.

That's not a rational basis. That's merely you repeating your overall position. A basis would be the supposedly rational grounds upon which this position is based. Grounds which you have yet to provide.

I don't know what you think "true determinism" is, but determinism itself does not say that we are unfree. Perhaps you are thinking of hard determinism, which is the combination of determinism and incompatibilism. Yet even hard determinism does not deny that we can be free in the compatibilist sense (it just denies that this freedom is enough to make us morally responsible agents). Other than that I don't know what you are saying here. I don't know what you mean by an 'artificial' distinction, and I don't know what "additional word" you are talking about.

You haven't been paying attention. You are now back to conflating two senses of 'could have chosen otherwise'. The compatibilist's free agent could not have chosen otherwise in the exact same causal scenario, but he could have chosen differently given slightly different antecedent causal conditions. The compatibilist's unfree compelled agent could not have chosen otherwise given slightly different antecedent circumstances due to the compulsion which renders the choice immune to such changes. According to compatibilism, the kind of ability to have chosen otherwise is not one that requires freedom from causal determination.

Maybe, but I back up my resistance with clear arguments and explanations. I agree that causal determination means the choice is caused, but I see no reason to agree that this means we are not morally responsible in any deep sense. If you think you have a stronger argument than me then I would very much like you to present it. I'd also like to know why you have been withholding it from us for all of this time.

Bump.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

If the thought of being blamed by others isn't less satisfying enough to stop an action, why would the thought of guilt (which is simply self blame) be less satisfying enough to stop an action?

Bump.

Peacegirl cannot answer this, for it is again the fundamental assumption regarding the innate potential strength of conscience which underlies Lessans' whole argument. The best we will ever get from her is that he astutely 'observed' it to be true and will one day be proven right.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

How many times do I have repeat myself that this was an astute observation that cannot be tested directly. This is how conscience works or we wouldn't have one. Yes, there are things that can get in the way of conscience working at full throttle, but that also means we can change the environment in such a way that we can get conscience to work at full throttle.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

You can repeat yourself about his claims being astute observations all you like. It doesn't help you one bit. That isn't supporting his claims, but is rather only your excuse for not being able to do so.

It's not an excuse Spacemonkey, and if you don't like the way he came about this discovery, or you can't even accept the possibility that his observations and reasoning were spot on, then go research other claims that you feel have greater substantive potential.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Again, why do you keep assuming that conscience has some kind of natural "full throttle" state that it is prevented from reaching due to present conditions and limitations? This is the fundamental assumption I keep asking you to support. Would you believe me if I said we had a natural ability to jump to the moon if only our present conditions and practices of [insert social practice here] were to be removed, allowing our jumping ability to run at full throttle?

I wouldn't believe you because jumping to the moon is unreasonable. Developing a stronger conscience is not. He demonstrates his observations regarding conscience in detail even though he didn't write the data down, and describes exactly why conscience does not work at full throttle in a free will environment, and why a no blame environment causes conscience to work more efficiently. Again, he is not saying to suddenly stop blaming, because this could make matters worse. He is trying to show you where a "no blame" environment will lead once determinism is established as a scientific fact.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Stop telling me I'm not supporting these claims. I'm explaining what conditions in the environment have to be met (which you don't know yet because you never got that far) for a person not to have any justification to hurt another.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Why should I stop telling you that you are not supporting his claims? YOU AREN'T. You are not providing any support for them at all. I'm not asking you to tell me what conditions you think have to be met to remove all justifications. I'm asking you why you think a justification would always be necessary under those changed conditions.

And I've answered you. This was an inference that he made after years of careful observation. He didn't write the data down, but the data was in his head and it was significant. These conclusions did not come from a couple of samplings. It was a process of years and years of reading and analyzing which led him to seeing what kind of justifications people use in order to clear their conscience of any responsibility. Yes, there are mentally ill people whose consciences seems to have been severed due to childhood trauma, in which case they may kill without any apparent justification, but these extreme cases are rare and will disappear completely in time.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm sorry but you can't tell someone in hindsight that has offered a valuable discovery, how he should have done it, or how he should have anticipated certain things, or what he should have written. I know he did the best he could and it took him years to put this discovery into words that people would be able to digest and comprehend. And what do you do? Complain. You just can't do that in all fairness.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I most certainly can. It is perfectly fair and reasonable for me to ask why Lessans never anticipated that the complete absence of any support for his fundamental premises regarding conscience would lead to so many people failing to be convinced of or impressed by his argument. If he was as perceptive and insightful as you claim, then he should have anticipated such an obvious problem. Anyone who has voraciously read and studied history and human behavior should have known that rational people will have a problem with claims that lack any supporting evidence.

I am going to repeat one last time that he didn't plan on making a discovery. It happened after years of reading and studying. He was very insightful and perceptive which allowed these truths to be revealed to him even though he didn't plan on making a discovery through the scientific method. That does not mean that his discovery is unscientific. Once this discovery is confirmed valid, how he uncovered this discovery will be less important than the fact that he did, and for you to condemn him even while making a major discovery is unfair and undeserving.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And I am going to say one last time that he didn't plan on making a discovery. It happened after years of reading and studying. These truths were revealed to him; he didn't go searching for them. Once this discovery is confirmed valid, how he uncovered this discovery will be less important than the fact that he did, and for you to condemn him even while making a major discovery is unfair and undeserving.

This doesn't answer what I asked you to address:

You can repeat yourself about his claims being astute observations all you like. It doesn't help you one bit. That isn't supporting his claims, but is rather only your excuse for not being able to do so. Again, why do you keep assuming that conscience has some kind of natural "full throttle" state that it is prevented from reaching due to present conditions and limitations? This is the fundamental assumption I keep asking you to support. Would you believe me if I said we had a natural ability to jump to the moon if only our present conditions and practices of [insert social practice here] were to be removed, allowing our jumping ability to run at full throttle?

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

If the thought of being blamed by others isn't less satisfying enough to stop an action, why would the thought of guilt (which is simply self blame) be less satisfying enough to stop an action?

Because someone else blaming a person is what conscience needs in order to come up with reasonable excuses which then loosens the grip that conscience holds. Knowing well in advance that he is not going to be blamed because everyone knows he can't help himself (since his will is not free) -- but he knows before he hurts someone that he can help himself; that nothing can make him hurt this person if he doesn't want to (you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink) --- prevents the desire to move in this direction because he cannot justify his contemplated actions. How can he offer excuses for his conduct when he knows he is already excused? Therefore, the only person he has to justify what he is about to do is to himself, no one else, and if his actions are first blows, he cannot do it because the justification that could be used to appease his conscience has been removed by changes in environmental conditions.

In other words, the alternative of having to live with this pain is less satisfying than the alternative which is to prevent the act from ever taking place. The constant realization that one will not be blamed for an action that could never be justified is the driving force that prevents the very act that could not be prevented in a free will environment

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Peacegirl cannot answer this, for it is again the fundamental assumption regarding the innate potential strength of conscience which underlies Lessans' whole argument. The best we will ever get from her is that he astutely 'observed' it to be true and will one day be proven right.

I'm sorry that you are skeptical to the degree that you can't even entertain the thought that he is right. Truth #1: Justification is necessary for human beings to gain at another's expense, and if the justification isn't there, they cannot do it.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

This doesn't answer what I asked you to address:

You can repeat yourself about his claims being astute observations all you like. It doesn't help you one bit. That isn't supporting his claims, but is rather only your excuse for not being able to do so. Again, why do you keep assuming that conscience has some kind of natural "full throttle" state that it is prevented from reaching due to present conditions and limitations? This is the fundamental assumption I keep asking you to support. Would you believe me if I said we had a natural ability to jump to the moon if only our present conditions and practices of [insert social practice here] were to be removed, allowing our jumping ability to run at full throttle?

It's not an assumption Spacemonkey. It's a well established observation that our present free will environment of blame and punishment give people the justification they need to do the very thing these threats of blame and punishment are trying to prevent. I can only ask you to keep an open mind and if you aren't completely convinced that he is right, have a little trust that his observations were absolutely, positively correct so that we can continue the discussion. I can't give you a full data report that would satisfy you, but this knowledge will one day be proven true because this two-sided equation works, and success is the ultimate proof.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm sorry that you are skeptical to the degree that you can't even entertain the thought that he is right.

I'm not. I can easily entertain the thought that he could be right. Unfortunately you have offered no reason at all to consider such thoughts to be correct. I am sorry you are dogmatic to the degree that you can't even entertain the thought that he was wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Truth #1: Justification is necessary for human beings to gain at another's expense, and if the justification isn't there, they cannot do it.

Labeling it a truth does not make it one. I've asked you several times to support this alleged truth, and you've had nothing at all to offer.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's not an assumption Spacemonkey.

Of course it is.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's a well established observation that our present free will environment of blame and punishment give people the justification they need to do the very thing these threats of blame and punishment are trying to prevent.

That's not even what I was asking you about.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

...have a little trust that his observations were absolutely, positively correct so that we can continue the discussion.

Stop begging us to share your faith. That is never going to happen.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's not an excuse Spacemonkey, and if you don't like the way he came about this discovery, or you can't even accept the possibility that his observations and reasoning were spot on, then go research other claims that you feel have greater substantive potential.

Of course it's an excuse. It's exactly what you say every time you are asked to support something you are unable to support.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I wouldn't believe you because jumping to the moon is unreasonable. Developing a stronger conscience is not.

I know you believe that. My question was why? Why do you believe that conscience has this innate level of potential perfection it would reach in the absence of blame? So far this is just a big fat assumption which neither you or Lessans have done anything to support.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

He demonstrates his observations regarding conscience in detail even though he didn't write the data down, and describes exactly why conscience does not work at full throttle in a free will environment, and why a no blame environment causes conscience to work more efficiently. Again, he is not saying to suddenly stop blaming, because this could make matters worse. He is trying to show you where a "no blame" environment will lead once determinism is established as a scientific fact.

You still aren't answering the question. What makes you think there is any natural full throttle state for conscience to reach? Consider again the jumping analogy. We have no natural full-throttle state for jumping that social practices prevent us from reaching. Our natural jumping ability is no greater than our past evolutionary circumstances have required it to be. Why is it not the same with conscience?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

And I've answered you. This was an inference that he made after years of careful observation. He didn't write the data down, but the data was in his head and it was significant. These conclusions did not come from a couple of samplings. It was a process of years and years of reading and analyzing which led him to seeing what kind of justifications people use in order to clear their conscience of any responsibility. Yes, there are mentally ill people whose consciences seems to have been severed due to childhood trauma, in which case they may kill without any apparent justification, but these extreme cases are rare and will disappear completely in time.

Sorry, but this is not answering me at all. Telling me he carefully observed things after years of reading and analyzing doesn't tell me jack shit about why a justification is allegedly always necessary. Nor does it help for you to repeatedly assert that the only exceptions are extreme cases of mental illness.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am going to repeat one last time that he didn't plan on making a discovery. It happened after years of reading and studying. He was very insightful and perceptive which allowed these truths to be revealed to him even though he didn't plan on making a discovery through the scientific method. That does not mean that his discovery is unscientific. Once this discovery is confirmed valid, how he uncovered this discovery will be less important than the fact that he did, and for you to condemn him even while making a major discovery is unfair and undeserving.

Yet again, your response does not address the point. Why did he not anticipate such an obvious problem? Why did he not anticipate the need for him to provide evidential support for his own claims about conscience? And I'm afraid not using the scientific method certainly does make his non-discovery unscientific. If you don't use the scientific method then you are not doing science.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Because someone else blaming a person is what conscience needs in order to come up with reasonable excuses which then loosens the grip that conscience holds. Knowing well in advance that he is not going to be blamed because everyone knows he can't help himself (since his will is not free) -- but he knows before he hurts someone that he can help himself; that nothing can make him hurt this person if he doesn't want to (you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink) --- prevents the desire to move in this direction because he cannot justify his contemplated actions. How can he offer excuses for his conduct when he knows he is already excused? Therefore, the only person he has to justify what he is about to do is to himself, no one else, and if his actions are first blows, he cannot do it because the justification that could be used to appease his conscience has been removed by changes in environmental conditions.

People can rationalize morally questionable decisions and actions by anticipating a guilty conscience just as well as they can by imagining being blamed by others, and the absence of blame will do nothing to prevent this. This has been pointed out to you before. The person in the no-blame environment can imagine doing X (which will harm some other person) and anticipates feeling guilty about it. In response he then comes up with the exact same rationalizations that a person in a blame environment would come up with in response to anticipated blame. Only instead of being the things he would say to those who would blame him, they are things he would say to himself to appease his own conscience. People do this all the time, fooling themselves into believing that what they are about to do is not something they should feel bad about. This astute observation alone completely destroys Lessans' entire argument.

[But]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

People can love other people for many different reasons and be enamoured, but marriage is a separate issue that is related to procreation and sexual desire in order to achieve that end. You cannot tell me that marriage and sex are unrelated, or just a peripheral aspect.

Your father wrote that physical attraction, sex and genitals are the ONLY factor involved. He said there is NOTHING ELSE, which is ridiculous and obviously wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No LadyShea, sex is not a wonderful bonus. It is of major importance in all species because sex is what brings new life. You cannot tell me in all honesty that this is just icing on the cake.

For a lot of people, it is just icing on the cake. Anyway, you're trying to avoid the point, which is that See-More (LOL) said there is NOTHING BUT physical attraction involved.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's why I clarified "romantic". It is the eros kind of love that involves sexual desire. Again, this doesn't mean someone cannot love other aspects of someone,

No, this doesn't mean that, but what Seemore said does.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

but it is a major factor in marriage and one of the major reasons for dissatisfaction and divorce, second to finances.

Yes, but so what? That's not what Seemore claimed.

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Neither you nor Lessans get to define other people's feelings or how they are prioritized in their own lives and relationships.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Lessans made an accurate observation. I am not prioritizing people's relationships but if you look carefully you will see that what draws two people together for the purpose of marriage is not personality alone.

You're arguing against strawmen again, as usual.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's sexual attraction.

Yes, but not sexual attraction alone, like your Dad said.

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by thedoc

From these posts on this thread, it seems that both Peacegirl and Lessans placed a great deal of emphasis on sex as part of the relationship, and this quote by Peacegirl in post #22074,

would support that conclusion. It would also seem to indicate that for both Lessans and Peacegirl sex was either 'bad' or 'nonexistant' which would account for the relative importance to them. So the account as represented in the book and Peacegirls posts, must be seen as heavily biased from an abnormal sex life. It seems that neither of them was, or is, getting any, and so it becomes the most important factor in their lives. I wonder if this lack is dirving Peacegirl's fanaticism about the book and world peace, and just what kind of piece is she refering to?

Sex now seems to be central to this thread, or is it just a side issue?

[thedoc]

Should everyone now feel guilty about enjoying sex?

[But]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I'm sorry that you are skeptical to the degree that you can't even entertain the thought that he is right. Truth #1: Justification is necessary for human beings to gain at another's expense, and if the justification isn't there, they cannot do it.

Let me quote this excellent post in case you missed it or ignored it:

Originally Posted by koan

An important non sequitur in Lessans "logic" leading to freeing the world of all evil:
"In order to hurt another, man must be able to derive some satisfaction from this,"(p78)

Wrong. Much of the hurt that is done to others is with complete ignorance that anyone in the world has feelings of importance. I'm not sure what Lessans did in his relationships with others but he seems to think that everyone who hurt him had taken the time to think about it first. His solution relies upon that. In reality, many assholes are completely oblivious to the concept that pursuing their ambitions is a)hurting anyone b)happening in a world in which other people even have feelings. There is the occasional person who acts maliciously because they get joy from seeing someone else turn red with rage but that is the minority of injustice.

Where do you think the expression "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" comes from? People simply don't realize the harm they cause more often than not. In making that mistake Lessans has failed to even recognize the source of evil let alone provide any hints at its successful removal.

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I am creating no problem that you yourself aren't doing all by yourself. I understand the definitions you have given. I'm not using them in any other way than what you presented, therefore, I am arguing against the actual compatibilist position, and it's still wrong.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

None of what you just said is true. You tried to insist upon using what you thought was the standard definition, saying you didn't care how I was choosing to define my terms.

It's not that I didn't care; only the definition of "mere" causal determination is, by definition, lack of free will.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

And you repeatedly stated that you didn't understand the distinction I was making, the notion of freedom I had defined for you, or how it differed from contra-causal freedom.

You are insisting that man can be under the control of causal determination but can still be held responsible because they can change according to antecedent conditions, which is a faulty conception of free will.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's exactly what you're doing. What do you mean by "mere" causal determination?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

"Mere causal determination" means causal determination without the kind of experienced psychological compulsion I have been explaining to you. And why do you ask? Didn't you just tell me you understood the definitions I have given?

I did, but I wanted to understand what causal determination means in the context you are using it. It doesn't work because true causation where someone could not have chosen otherwise (regardless of what antecedent conditions were present) renders free will an illusion.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You're very confused Spacemonkey. You are not listening at all, which is why you don't get it. This theory is wrong because there are no causal conditions where someone is free. That right there is a contradiction, which you are trying to overcome by distinguishing between compulsive actions and those that are not, but the point is that the compulsive actions you are deeming free and therefore blameworthy, are also under a compulsion. Can't you see the contradiction in what you just said?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

It doesn't matter whether or not it can be overcome in the face of really terrible consequences, the point is simply that this is a different kind of 'compulsion' to merely being caused

You are defining compulsion in one sense offered in the dictionary, but compulsion is anything that you are compelled to choose. If you threaten that I be killed if I do a certain thing, I will be compelled to prefer not doing that thing as a form of self-preservation. But even if the conditions aren't harsh, I am still compelled to choose the most preferable alternative even though this compulsion is not felt in the same way that an obsessive/compulsive disorder is felt. It doesn't change the fact that I am compelled to prefer the choice that gives me greater satisfaction. I may prefer eggs and bacon, or eggs and sausage. I really don't mind choosing either one, but I end up choosing eggs and bacon because I have a slight yen for the taste of the bacon over the sausage. Once my selection is made, I couldn't have chosen otherwise at that moment because my preference for the eggs and bacon was stronger. If two choices are exactly the same in preference, my next move (in the direction of greater satisfaction) might be to flip a coin or close my eyes and pick. That doesn't change the direction we must travel from here to there. The next day I may have a desire for an egg with sausage, which then becomes the more preferable choice, rendering any other choice in that comparison an impossibility because it would offer less satisfaction at that moment in time.

Obviously, someone who is ill and does things compulsively has a different kind of problem than a "mere" causal condition, but it's still causal. That's what I've been trying to tell you.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I don't think I'm confused, and I can assure you I am paying attention to what you say (probably more attention than you are).

You can't back up the claim that I'm paying less attention than you are, so don't make claims you can't support.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

So why are you again telling me there is a contradiction without telling me what it is? I do not see any contradiction in what I said. Nor do you.

It is a contradiction to say that we have "mere" determination, which is causal, and in the next breath say we can be held morally responsible because we have the capacity to make the "right" choice than someone who has fixed responses regardless of the changes in antecedent conditions. That is not a useful definition because regardless of the antecedent conditions, man is compelled to prefer one alternative, and it cannot be the alternative that appears to him to be the least desirable among the available options.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

If you did, then you would have been able to tell me what it was. The actions I am deeming free and blameworthy are not under the kind of compulsion I have been talking about. And that renders them free in the only sense relevant to moral responsibility and blameworthiness. I've never denied that a person acting from compulsion is still causally determined, so I have no idea why you've been trying to tell me this.

There is no kind of compulsion that renders someone free in the only sense relevant to moral responsibility. You cannot agree that a person acting from compulsion, and then tell me that he has free will. Yes, he is free from the constraints that a person with a compulsive disorder has, but he is not free in terms of free will and moral responsibility. He is still compelled to do what he does regardless of what definition you use.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

So what is it then?

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

I explained it in the post you just replied to: "Being caused merely requires the choice to be the same given the exact same antecedent causal conditions. Being compelled (in my sense) requires in addition to this that the choice will also be the same given significant changes in those antecedent causal conditions. This is not merely a difference in the degree of compulsion."

Just because someone can choose according to changed antecedent conditions does not in any way, shape, or form mean he has the kind of free will that renders him blameworthy. If he is caused, all of his actions are the result of all of his experiences, and his heredity, that make him who he is. There is no freedom in the sense that a person could have done otherwise.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Just because there's no resistance to change does not mean a person is free in the sense of free will. Yes, he is free of psychological compulsion. But that doesn't mean his choices are blameworthy because they aren't the kind of "compulsion" compatibilists consider excusable.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

The lack of resistance to change in antecedent causal conditions makes the person free in the sense of free will that compatibilism has defined. It isn't meant to make the will free in any other sense, and especially not in the contra-causal sense. Compatibilism does not view that kind of freedom as morally relevant. And yes, according to compatibilism choices are made blameworthy by being 'compelled' only in the sense of being caused, because that is an excusable - i.e. not morally relevant - kind of 'compulsion'.

This distinction between different kinds of compulsion (although we all know that some choices are based on a much stronger desire than others, or of a disordered kind) is a logical construction that does not correlate with reality if you analyze it more thoroughly.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You make an artificial distinction between causal determination and compulsion, which is the source of the problem.

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

Your not liking it doesn't make it 'artificial' or problematic. What exactly is an "artificial distinction", and why are they bad? Are you trying to say that it is an ad hoc or irrelevant distinction? Could you support either charge?

That's what I've been trying to tell you. A person can have a disorder where he would be excused. For example, if he didn't show up to his class on time because he couldn't stop checking to see if the door was locked and the teacher was aware of his disability, he would be excused. But a person who has less of a compulsion is still compelled to choose that which is most preferable amongst different alternatives, He, therefore, cannot be held responsible or blameworthy for a choice he had to make based on his particular preference. I know that nothing I say is going to matter because your mind is made up that compatibilism is right.

to be cont...(this is a long post)

[peacegirl]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

People can rationalize morally questionable decisions and actions by anticipating a guilty conscience just as well as they can by imagining being blamed by others, and the absence of blame will do nothing to prevent this. This has been pointed out to you before. The person in the no-blame environment can imagine doing X (which will harm some other person) and anticipates feeling guilty about it. In response he then comes up with the exact same rationalizations that a person in a blame environment would come up with in response to anticipated blame. Only instead of being the things he would say to those who would blame him, they are things he would say to himself to appease his own conscience. People do this all the time, fooling themselves into believing that what they are about to do is not something they should feel bad about. This astute observation alone completely destroys Lessans' entire argument.

A person will be unable to rationalize his actions when he knows in advance that no matter what he does, he will not be judged, blamed, or criticized. You are missing the fact that he needs to be able to shift his responsibility to something other than him as being partly or completely responsible. If he can't do that, his conscience won't be appeased. That's just the point. No matter what he does to try to rationalize his behavior, he can't do it because he can't lie to himself under these conditions, which prevents the desire to commit those very actions that heretofore his conscience would allow.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It's not that I didn't care; only the definition of "mere" causal determination is, by definition, lack of free will.

It was too that you didn't care: "I don't care about your choice of words... I could care less what definition of compulsion you are using". And by which definition of free will is mere causal determination a lack of this? Certainly not by the compatibilist definition of freedom, and that is the only one relevant to evaluating compatibilism.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are insisting that man can be under the control of causal determination but can still be held responsible because they can change according to antecedent conditions, which is a faulty conception of free will.

It's a different conception of free will, but you haven't said anything to show that it is faulty.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

I did, but I wanted to understand what causal determination means in the context you are using it. It doesn't work because true causation where someone could not have chosen otherwise (regardless of what antecedent conditions were present) renders free will an illusion.

It doesn't render the compatibilist notion of free will an illusion, and that is the only one we are discussing. Also, why did you ask me to explain a definition you said you already understood?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are defining compulsion in one sense offered in the dictionary, but compulsion is anything that you are compelled to choose. If you threaten that I be killed if I do a certain thing, I will be compelled to prefer not doing that thing as a form of self-preservation. But even if the conditions aren't harsh, I am still compelled to choose the most preferable alternative even though this compulsion is not felt in the same way that an obsessive/compulsive disorder is felt. It doesn't change the fact that I am compelled to prefer the choice that gives me greater satisfaction. I may prefer eggs and bacon, or eggs and sausage. I really don't mind choosing either one, but I end up choosing eggs and bacon because I have a slight yen for the taste of the bacon over the sausage. Once my selection is made, I couldn't have chosen otherwise at that moment because my preference for the eggs and bacon was stronger. If two choices are exactly the same in preference, my next move (in the direction of greater satisfaction) might be to flip a coin or close my eyes and pick. That doesn't change the direction we must travel from here to there. The next day I may have a desire for an egg with sausage, which then becomes the more preferable choice, rendering any other choice in that comparison an impossibility because it would offer less satisfaction at that moment in time.

You are again reverting to a definition of compulsion other than the one I defined for you. You said you weren't doing that: "I understand the definitions you have given. I'm not using them in any other way than what you presented". Moving in the direction of greater satisfaction is not an example of the kind of compulsion i have defined for you. And you still haven't identified any contradiction in my words which you said involved a contradiction.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You can't back up the claim that I'm paying less attention than you are, so don't make claims you can't support. :giggle

Of course I can. I can and have. As an example, in your last post you argued against me by saying that no compulsion is uncaused, failing to pay enough attention to see that I had not said otherwise.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

It is a contradiction to say that we have "mere" determination, which is causal, and in the next breath say we can be held morally responsible because we have the capacity to make the "right" choice than someone who has fixed responses regardless of the changes in antecedent conditions. That is not a useful definition because regardless of the antecedent conditions, man is compelled to prefer one alternative, and it cannot be the alternative that appears to him to be the least desirable among the available options.

That's not a contradiction at all. Do you know what a contradiction is? It is something which says or implies something of the form 'A & ~A'. Saying that we are both merely caused and also morally responsible is not of this form - it is simply something you irrationally disagree with. And I have already explained why my definitions are useful.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

There is no kind of compulsion that renders someone free in the only sense relevant to moral responsibility. You cannot agree that a person acting from compulsion, and then tell me that he has free will. Yes, he is free from the constraints that a person with a compulsive disorder has, but he is not free in terms of free will and moral responsibility. He is still compelled to do what he does regardless of what definition you use.

I can and do say exactly what you keep telling me I can't say. And no, a person is not always compelled to choose as he does when we use the definition I have given you. That is obviously incorrect.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Just because someone can choose according to changed antecedent conditions does not in any way, shape, or form mean he has the kind of free will that renders him blameworthy. If he is caused, all of his actions are the result of all of his experiences, and his heredity, that make him who he is. There is no freedom in the sense that a person could have done otherwise.

Being caused to choose as one does, and having his actions be the result of his experiences and heredity, does not prevent a person from having the compatibilist kind of freedom I have defined for you. And there is no reason not to consider such a person blameworthy for his actions.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

This distinction between different kinds of compulsion (although we all know that some choices are based on a much stronger desire than others, or of a disordered kind) is a logical construction that does not correlate with reality if you analyze it more thoroughly.

I know you don't like it, but it is a perfectly legitimate distinction which applies to reality perfectly well, as I have already explained to you.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

That's what I've been trying to tell you. A person can have a disorder where he would be excused. For example, if he didn't show up to his class on time because he couldn't stop checking to see if the door was locked and the teacher was aware of his disability, he would be excused. But a person who has less of a compulsion is still compelled to choose that which is most preferable amongst different alternatives, He, therefore, cannot be held responsible or blameworthy for a choice he had to make based on his particular preference. I know that nothing I say is going to matter because your mind is made up that compatibilism is right.

Your 'therefore' does not follow from the rest. You have again resorted to speaking of compulsion in a different sense to that which I have defined for you, and you have again reverted to speaking of the difference as a matter of degree when it clearly is not. A person who is merely caused to choose as he does most certainly can be held blameworthy, so long as he is free of the kind of compulsion I have been talking about, and you've said nothing to show otherwise.

All you've done in this post is repeatedly reassert your incompatibilist stance. At no point are you actually engaging with my points, or giving me any actual reason to question compatibilism. You are not making a rational case.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

A person will be unable to rationalize his actions when he knows in advance that no matter what he does, he will not be judged, blamed, or criticized.

Yes he will. I just told you how. He can do so by anticipating a guilty conscience, and coming up with the same excuses he could come up with by anticipating external blame.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

You are missing the fact that he needs to be able to shift his responsibility to something other than him as being partly or completely responsible.

That's not a fact. It is precisely what I just showed to be wrong.

Originally Posted by peacegirl

No matter what he does to try to rationalize his behavior, he can't do it because he can't lie to himself under these conditions...

He can, and I just explained to you how. You haven't said anything to address my point. You are merely asserting that it will not be possible without a shred of evidence or supporting argument...

Just like your father.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by LadyShea

Again, talents is just one aspect of personality. People fall in love with people, not just their bodies, not just a single talent...a whole person, with sex organs, AND lots of aspects and thoughts and opinions and traits.

I fell in love with my wife because of her totally awesome garlic toast.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

If he can't choose otherwise (beyond the compulsion compatibilists excuse), he is not blameworthy.

Why isn't he blameworthy?

Originally Posted by peacegirl

...if you look carefully you will see that what draws two people together for the purpose of marriage is not personality alone. It's sexual attraction.

What about people who get married for financial reasons? What about people who get married for dynastic reasons? What about arranged marriages? What about shotgun weddings?

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by Spacemonkey

But I will bump it for you anyway, highlighting the most important section.

Get off your high horse Spacemonkey. You are not the god of deciding what is important.

[Angakuk]

Originally Posted by peacegirl

Knowing well in advance that he is not going to be blamed because everyone knows he can't help himself (since his will is not free) -- but he knows before he hurts someone that he can help himself; that nothing can make him hurt this person if he doesn't want to (you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink) --- prevents the desire to move in this direction because he cannot justify his contemplated actions.

He can't help himself and he can help himself. Talk about your contradictions. That's one right there, that is.

[Spacemonkey]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

Get off your high horse Spacemonkey. You are not the god of deciding what is important.

You can lead my horse to pudding, but you can't make me get off it, because over that I have mathematical control. Future testing will prove me right. This is not about faith. You just have to accept everything I say until the evidence is available to support me. Who are you to decide for everybody who is or is not a god of deciding what is important? How many times do I have to say this?

[thedoc]

Originally Posted by Angakuk

I fell in love with my wife because of her totally awesome garlic toast.

So now instead of sleeping, the people (if any) in the front pews, will be passed out.